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Preface
Writing a ph-thesis resembles in some ways a medieval pilgrimage, when pilgrims
were sometimes travelling years on foot to reach their destiny. Both are experiences
of endurance, self-confrontation and revelation. Although a solitary experience,
there have been paradoxically many which have contributed in various ways to the
research and the writing of this book.
First and foremost the participants of the six municipalities which participated
in the research are thanked here for their contribution. Most will undoubtedly find it
very difficult to uncover in this book their own experience. Such are the wilful ways
of academic discourse.
I thank Gerton Heyne who introduced me into the wondering world of gam-
inglsimulation and the regular visitors of SPIN for providing a floor to people who
work with or on gaming~simulation. Another academic debating ground was pro-
vided by Dorien Detombe the always energetic chair of the NOSMO group on
approaches to complex societal problems. They are thanked for providing inspira-
tion. Colin Eden and Fran Ackermann gave me the opportunity to read the draft of a
number of chapters from their 1998 book "Making Strategy", a gesture which is
much appreciated.
I was very fortunate in having a band of angels assisting me in gathering the
data and which travelled with me to the various towns that participated in the re-
search: Bregje van Bragt, Jorn Bruining, Boris Brummans, Rianne Gabrielse and
Petra Habets are thanked for their hard work and the beauty oftheir company.
Thanks be also to G.O.D., the Game Overall Director on all six runs, Jac
Geurts who also happens to be my promotor. He travelled with us to the edge of the
country: journeys which made us more aware of our cultural and geographical roots.
He provided also valuable input for the research design and the book.
Of the MTO-section I thank Emmanuel and Wicher for tutorials and time and
Theo van der Net and Jan Scheirs who each read a chapter in which the data are
presented: for I was blind and they did their best to make me see.
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Rinus Verkooyen and Marcel van der Graag assisted with preparing the manuscript
and figures. The secretaries Margreet, Anita and Jeanette and the librarians Ingrid
and Roger have been beacons of lightening in busy times.
There were many fellow `pilgrims' on a similar endeavour which contributed
in different but not less important ways to the completion of this book. Johan
Verwey was my one and only roommate in the early days. His sense ofhumor was a
good antidote for a troubled mind. We created in some ways are own rebirthing
therapy for aio's. For sharing daily lunch (walks) and so much more I thank Marloes
and Iwan, and in earlier days Jeroen, Maaike and Romke. The Warande is - Marloes
and I agree - the most valuable fringe benefit the KUB has to offer. Fortunately,
most university staff and students prefer the company oftheir computer, car or some
ceiling to that of trees. As a result, the trees per human ratio is still quite meditative,
something which we have learned to appreciate. Thanks be also to Frank, Roel and
Elly of the Policy and Organization Department for the invaluable teas and thoughts.
For all sorts of advice and support I thank Reiny and Edith who combine sense
and sensibility in their very own way. Credits go to Pascale for bringing to life
`Hope and optimism inspite of the present difficulties'', Engelien for sensitivity and
thundering laughs and Bertine for compassion and a sunlit smile.
Ton Heinen, the aio-coordinator of the Faculty is honoured for taking the
concerns of aio's seriously. Where others are lost in words or in themselves, he acts.
Pieter, Ineke, Tobias and Julie gave advise and moral support in how to overcome
the last unexpected (and other) hurdles. It is heartwarming to see how much they
rejoice over the fact that Pieters' statement "Power to the people"came true.
I am much obliged to friends and family for their patience and support. Cer-
tainly in the last 2 years I became somewhat self-absorbed by the whole undertak-
ing. A special `thank you' goes to my sister Jet and to Esther for caring in the days
when head and heart were heavy.
Finally, the last will be the first, I thank Cisca Joldersma my supervisor and
brevary during the project. The analytical thoroughness and energy with which she
guided me through different time zones and landscapes, have never stopped to
amaze me. If it had not been for her I would have taken up a different cause ages
ago. I thank her for keeping faith.
Ellie Roelofs
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1.1 Policy issues and problem structuring
The central theme of this thesis concerns complex policy issues and the role methods
of problem structuring can play in facilitating policy processes which evolve around
those issues. Policy makers increasingly face complex policy issues which cannot be
structured straightforwardly due to their intransparency. They involve many interest
organizations and groups and concern different aspects which often require special-
ized knowledge. The consequences of interventions directed at solving the issue are
difficult to foresee. The policy issues addressed here involve a network of policy
actors in which governmental or semi-governmental organizations play a dominant
role. The issues are therefore situated in the public domain and have reached the
agenda of public-policy makers.
Like all interventionists, policy makers - like policy analysts - have a strong
inclination to pay more attention to problem solving than to problem structuring
(Dunn, 1994). Insufficient attention for what characterizes the issue may result in
policies that do not deliver the answer to the issue policy makers try to deal with. As
a result, the wrong issue is solved. This is what Dunn (1988) has described as a type
III error. However, there are signs that interest in problem structuring is growing (cf.
Van de Graaf and Hoppe, 1992; Schbn and Rein, 1994; Hoppe, 1989; Rosenhead,
1998; Rooze, 1999). This thesis aims to contribute to the knowledge of problem
structuring of complex issues and, in particular, of the role problem-structuring
methods can play in this process. A methodical approach is important, given the
increasing complexity ofpolicy issues.
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1.2 Complex policy issues and societal developments
Policy issues have become more complex in the last decades of the 20`h century.
Society has become increasingly more difficult to comprehend. There are a number
of reasons underwriting the assumption that it is increasingly difficult for policy
makers to understand, interpret, and conceptualize the issues they aim to solve. One
of these causes is the modernization process due to which social networks have
become less hierarchical, transparent, and tight, and norms and value patterns within
society have become increasingly pluralistic. Citizens of this pluralistic society have
very diverse expectations and wishes regarding societal arrangements in education,
arts, politics, religion, etc. As a result, the number of policies has increased dramati-
cally since the Second World War (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983) and, conse-
quently, expectations have risen. Improved and more education for the majority,
developments in communication technologies, and democratization processes have
stimulated the emancipation of the citizen who has become a critical customer with
increasingly higher expectations regarding the benefits public policy-making can
bestow on him or her. For policy makers, it has become increasingly difficult to keep
track of the many policies that are initiated, and which are often interdependent. Not
only has the number of policies increased exponentially, the number of actors inter-
ested in a particular policy field has also grown. The institutionalization process has
led to an enormous proliferation of organizations in the 20th century. Furthermore,
all types of organizations are increasingly interconnected across countries. As a
result, in the past fifty years, organizations have had to take greater account of
external factors: the growing interdependency of organizations makes it more diffi-
cult for actors alone to determine their own organization's future policies. Techno-
logical developments have also contributed to the growing complexity of the task
policy makers have to deal with. Modern technologies make it possible to give
increasingly sophisticated answers to complex policy issues, but for policy makers it
is, therefore, more difficult to grasp the implications of different policy options.
They are more dependent on expert advice, and it is often difficult for them to
foresee the consequences of their choices (cf. Bertels, 1995).
1.3 Participatory policy-making and policy nehvorks
Since the late seventies of the previous century, there has been mounting criticism of
public policy makers and analysts on the effectivity and eftíciency of public policies.
A call has been made for more involvement of other stakeholders in policy-making
processes. Confronted with the limited ability of the state to govern complex societ-
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ies, there is a growing awareness among public policy analysts, and, increasingly,
also among policy makers, that governmental organizations must change their role
from that of a regulator to that of a facilitator or intermediary between other organi-
zations (cf. Deleon, 1990; Mayer, 1997; Pr~pper and Steenbeek, 1998; Bongers,
2000; Heyne, 2000). Consequently, due to the changing role of the state, other
organizations have to change parts as well.
In view of the growing complexity of policy issues, it seems plausible that
involving policy actors in the policy-making process is an effective and efficient
strategy. Through the early involvement of those who have a stake in a specific
issue, the quality and quantity of the available information will improve. More
importantly, participation will encourage co-responsibility and increase the policy's
legitimacy (cf. Korsgaard, 1995). If policy is perceived as legitimate, people's
behaviours will be more supportive of upholding that policy and, as a result, the
policy may become more effective. Participatory policy-making focuses on the
interactions between stakeholders in the policy-making process and aims to steer
these interactions. The interactions around a policy issue between various actors or
stakeholders can be viewed as a policy network. Networks can differ to the extent in
which relationships have been institutionalized. Policy networks can be viewed as a
new mode of governance. They can be seen as a third form of societal regulation,
next to markets or hierarchies. Policy networks are horizontal arrangements marked
by negotiated self-coordination. The policy network is regarded to be innovative in
comparison with the central rule model in which government is the key and omnipo-
tent actor (March, 1998: 8-9). The focus of this study are inter-organizational net-
works in which a governmental organization has the role of coordinator and initiator.
1.4 Problem structuring, policy-making and method
In order to assist policy makers in managing complex issues, numerous methods and
techniques have been designed since the Second World War to facilitate policy-
making processes. Scientific inquiry has become an important source of information
for policy makers. Methods have been designed to collect expert information on
particular policy choices such as a policy delphi'. In addition, alternative methods
seek the contribution of ordinary citizens in, for example, as hearings. Consensus
conferences are a method which draws upon the information provided by both
experts and ordinary citizens. Furthermore, there are methods which can be tailored
1 For an elaborate account ofdifferent forms of participatory policy methods and instruments, see Mayer,
1997, Chapier 4.
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to both target groups. For instance, Bongers (2000) used Group Support Systems - a
computer-based method - to facilitate policy-making processes involving citizens
and experts.
The methods which are discussed in this research contribute to a particular
category of activities within policy-making processes, namely problem structuring.
Different heuristics or techniques are used to structure complex issues. A common
distinetion which is made is between techniques directed at problem reduction on the
one hand, and at problem expansion on the other (Volkema, 1983; Abualsamh et al.,
1990). Problem reduction techniques focus on change, factoring of issues in sub-
issues, or on the controllable components of issues. They have the disadvantage that
they risk premature closure of options due to an inadequate structuring of the issue.
Problem expansion techniques explore the boundaries of issues. Methods can in-
volve a trajectory in which different techniques or tools are introduced. The methods
which will be addressed in this study have some characteristics of both problem
expansion and problem reduction. Problem-structuring methods firstly encourage
divergent thinking, and stimulate convergent thinking in the course of the process.
They explore the boundaries of issues but also involve different interests in that
exploratory process. Hence, the methods discussed in this book can contribute to
participatory policy-making. They belong to the soft Operational Research tradition
and aim to develop a model of the policy makers' perceptions of the issue. These
models are referred to as cognitive maps (Bougon, 1992; Eden, 1992; Hofman,
1995), mental models (Geurts and Vennix, 1989) or schemata (Rumelhart, 1980).
The methods addressed in this research are Group Model Building, Compram, Soft
Systems Methodology, Strategic Option Development and Analysis, and Strategic
Assumption Surfacing and Testing.
1.5 Three traditions in the literature on problem structuring
Summarizing, this research can be positioned at a crossroads of three streams within
the literature on policy-making and problem structuring. The first stream consists of
the more practical and prescriptive works of those actively engaged in problem
structuring and policy-making. These publications are often written by consultants or
policy analysts working in the field who apply one or more methods of problem
structuring in policy-making processes in both the public and private sector (e.g.,
Eden, et. al. 1979, 1983, 1998; Hickling, 1990; Phillips, 1990; Checkland, 1999).
By trial and error, the authors develop (new) methods of problem structuring. They
contribute to our understanding of the way these methods are applied. A second
stream that can be distinguished within the literature are the scientists who construct
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models or theories of policy- and decision-making processes, some of which have a
prescriptive nature. These models are often too abstract to appeal directly to those
active in the policy field: references that fit within this line of thinking are Dery
(1984), Hoogerwerf (1987), De Geus (1988), Van de Graaf and Hoppe (1992), and
Dunn (1994). The third stream of literature concerns empirical research in policy and
organization sciences. Examples are Hickson et. al. (1986), Joldersma (1993), and
Bovens and 't Hart (1996). These studies describe different aspects ofpolicy-making,
problem structuring, and the way problems are defined. Whereas the prescriptive,
consultancy oriented literature draws from experiences the authors had as active
participants within policy analysis, the latter group of studies reflects from a distance
and in abstract terms on their object of study.
1.6 Research questions
This research aims to contribute to the knowledge of problem structuring regarding
complex policy issues and, in particular, the contribution methods of problem struc-
turing can make to policy-making processes in interorganizational networks. Some
of the main theoretical perspectives which compose the outline of the research were
already introduced briefly above.
The main research questions are:
1. How can we develop measures to empirically assess the quality of problem
structuring in inter-organizational policy networks?
Policy science is predominantly theory-oriented and has produced relatively little
empirical research in the field of problem stnacturing. Joldersma (1993) and Tenneer
(1993) are among the very few who have addressed this topic. This study aims to
contribute to empirical knowledge on problem structuring.
2. What is the contribution of problem-structuring methods to the quality of
problem structuring by policy networks?
There has been a proliferation of the use of problem-structuring methods but there
has been little empirical research into the effects of these methods. This research
aims to contribute to empirical insight in this field.
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3. How can gar~ting~simulation be used to study problem structuring in policy
nenvorks?
Field research as a method to gather data on problem structuring would be very
difficult. lt would take a very long time to draw substantial conclusions. Further-
more, gaming~simulation has been propagated as a useful tool for social research but
it has not often been used for this purpose. By addressing this question, the study
therefore aims to contribute to the knowledge about the role gaming~simulation can
play as a research instrument.
l.7 Outline of the book
Chapter 2 presents a theoretical outline of what complex policy issues are, what
problem structuring is, and how it relates to the policy-making process. In Chapter 3,
five methods of problem structuring will be discussed and compared. A choice will
be made to investigate a particular one further, namely, Strategic Option Develop-
ment and Analysis. The chapter concludes with a discussion of quality criteria for
problem structuring. Chapter 4 discusses gaminglsimulation which will serve as a
method for quasi-experimental research in which the chosen problem-structuring
method will be tested. BANS, the game~simulation which will be used as an experi-
mental environment, is briefly addressed. It simulates participatory policy-making in
a municipality and lasts 2 days. The research design as well as the validity of BANS
are discussed. Chapter 5 gives a more detailed description of the Strategic Option
Development and Analysis method and how it will be introduced in BANS. An
overview of the six municipalities which participated in this research is presented in
Chapter 6. It also briefly discusses the structure of BANS. To give further insight
into the gamelsimulation and prepare the reader for the Chapters 7 and 8, a close
account is given of a run played by one of the municipalities. In Chapter 7, the
results for the first day of BANS are presented. Chapter 8 gives an overview of the
results of the second day of the game!simulation. Finally, in Chapter 9, conclusions
will be drawn.
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2. Problem structuring in participatory
policy-making processes
2.1 Introduction
The previous chapter sketched the contours of this book. It deals with problem
structuring within participatory policy-making processes initiated by a governmental
organization.
In this chapter, some of the central concepts of this study are introduced and
discussed. First, policy issues will be defined and distinguished from policy
problems. The complexity of these issues will be addressed. Subsequently, a
(participatory) policy-making process is characterized. Finally, we will explain in
greater detail what problem structuring is and how it relates to participatory policy-
making.
2.2 Policy problems and policy issues
2.2.1 Defrnitions
What constitutes a policy problem? The answers to this question are manifold and
have changed over time. For some, policy problems refer to facts that are part of the
real world. In their perspective, problems are visible or audible, or may come to us
by our other senses so they can be known objectively. According to this
`ontological' view of problems, policy makers have the delicate task of defining the
policy problem in such a way that their definition mirrors reality. In the perspective
of traditional systems analysis, for example, there is a strong inclination to look at
problems as objectively definable (Dery, 1984). It is an approach which
`...deliberately expands and complicates the statements of problems until all the
significantly interacting components are contained within it' (Ackoff and Rivett, in:
Dery, 1984: 7). Ontological views of problems have given way to a'constructivist'
approach to policy problems. In the eyes of constructivists, policy problems are
always subjective entities. They are constructed in social interaction. Policy makers
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often have different perceptions and definitions of a problem. By their actions and
interactions, they determine its meaning, and they try to influence the prevailing
view of that problem. Experiences, beliefs, values and the types of relationships
between actors will all influence the emerging definition.
The fact that policy problems and issues are socially constructed does not mean
that the social problems which lay at the root of policy problems cannot have
objective characteristics. Dery (1984: 4) writes: `The view that problems are not
inherently objective should not be taken to mean that difficulties do not objectively
exist, as if the existence of hunger, death and fear were determined by some kind of
cognition agent.'
An example of social constructivist thought in policy science is the study of
Cobb and Elder (1972: 172) into agenda-building processes: `To appreciate the
stakes in the agenda-building process it is necessary to recognize the indeterminate
nature of most public policy problems. Policy problems are not simply `givens', nor
are they simply matters of the `facts' of a situation. They are matters of
interpretation and social definition. Policy problems are socially constructed. They
arise not so much from events and circumstances as from the meanings that people
attribute to those events and circumstances.'
So, according to Cobb and Elder, a policy problem is a social product; policy
actors give meaning to a situation and judge whether a situation is cause for action.
The observations and interpretations people make of a particular situation are
compared with a standard they have set themselves. When the judgement is
negative, the gap between the perceived and desired situation constitutes the policy
problem (Dery, 1984; Van de Graaf and Hoppe, 1992; Joldersma, 1993).
Although it expresses an undesirable situation, another important characteristic
of a policy problem is that it entails a promise for a better future. The fact that
various actors have put it on their agendas and thus have invested time and energy in
it, implies that, in their understanding of the situation, they envision opportunities for
improvement.
2.2.2 Social carstructions and societal context
Policy problems are social constructs and `...not inherently objective entities in their
own right, `out there' to be detected as such, but (they) are rather the product of
imposing certain frames of reference on reality' (Dery, 1984: 4). These frames can
be influenced by individual actors' experiences, beliefs, goals, and interests, but also
by the social, political, and economic context of a particular period or geographic
unity and vice versa (cf. Bovens and 't Hart, 1996). Hence, what is perceived in one
country or at one point in time as a problematic situation may, in another country or
another period where different political ideas prevail, be interpreted very differently.
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For example, the bombing of the Greenpeace ship in New Zealand waters in 1985
was perceived by the Netherlands and New Zealand as a serious breach of human
rights and national integrity, but France, which was responsible for the action,
perceived the incident as a badly planned exercise of their secret service to safeguard
their nuclear testing programme.
2.2.3 Policy issues defined
In this study, a social constructivist approach to policy problems has been adopted.
A policy problem is seen here as a discrepancy between a given situation or trend
and a standard or desired trend, both defined by the policy actors which have a stake
in the problem. In most cases, policy actors will be drawn to a particular policy
problem by policy issues.
Policy issues are part of a larger policy problem which, according to policy
actors (who may be politicians, interest groups, or civil servants), call for public
action. They are perceived as susceptible to positive change and have, therefore,
been placed on the public agenda (cf. Cobb and Elder, 1972). What distinguishes
policy problems from policy issues is that the latter are current manifestations of
policy problems. For example, unemployment can be viewed as a policy problem. A
momentary call to fight the unemployment of ethnic minority women can emerge as
a policy issue. Furthermore, a policy issue presupposes that policy actors disagree
about which activities to pursue ( Dunn, 1994: 85). So, policy issues make manifest
social, political and organizational difficulties and dilemmas which arise when
policy actors act upon their problem perception and try to co-organize their actions.
For example, a civil servant tackling a local traffic issue will not only have to
consider various technical matters related to the issue, but will also have to deal with
various actions through which stakeholders express their opinions. Furthermore, the
way these stakeholders are organized and their mutual relationships will affect the
issue: e.g., the broader party-political constellation within the city council and the
board of alderman may be an important parameter in defining and solving the issue.
In conclusion, policy problems can be defined as perceptions and
interpretations of situations which are judged negatively when they are compared to
a standard which people define. They presuppose the possibility of improvement. A
policy issue is a current manifestation of a policy problem which addresses a
particular part of that problem. Policy issues are characterized by perceptual
conflicts which cause social, political and organizational difficulties among policy
makers. These difficulties, which arise in the interactions following the agenda
setting of an issue, are part of that issue.
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Before discussing the policy-making process and the way actors define policy
issues, we first will look at the complexity of policy issues, for methods to structure
these complex issues are the object of this study.
2.2.4 The cornple.riry ofpolicy issues
In the preceding section, a distinction was made between policy problems and policy
issues. In this subsection, we take a closer look at the complexity which
characterizes policy issues. Different dimensions of complexity are distinguished.
Complexity has become a frequently used term among analysts of public policy
as well as in organization and management studies. For many, the exponential
growth of the number and size of organizations, of their tasks, rules and
technologies, are important indicators for societal and policy changes and the
increasing complexity of social reality. Growing awareness of the complexity of
various aspects of society may, consequently, cause complexity to be used as catch-
all independent variable, explaining all sorts of developments and thus rendering it
meaningless (Dery, 1984: 69-70). A detailed description of the complexity of issues
is necessary.
What makes policy issues complex or, as others prefer, 'messy', 'illstructured'
(Mitroff and Sagasti, 1973; Dunn, 1988, 1994; Geurts and Vennix, 1989) or
`wicked' (Van de Graaf and Hoppe, 1992)?
Eden, Jones and Sims (1983: x, 15) see policy issues as `predominantly set
within politics, interpersonal considerations, idiosyncratic values and personal
perspectives.' What makes policy issues often complex in their eyes is the fact that
issues largely result from mental frameworks of personal beliefs, attitudes, biases,
perceptions, etc.. These are rather diffused variables which are not at all easy to
retrieve. If there are several actors who play a role in a particular policy issue,
finding a common definition is a rather complicated task. So complexity, according
to Eden, Jones and Sims (1983 ), refers to a lack of consensus among policy makers.
Table 2.1 Dimensions of contple.rit~
certainty of knowledge
consensus on standard substantial little
substantial tame issues wicked scientific issues
little wicked ethical issues wicked political issues
Source: Van de Graaf and Hoppe (1992: 48), after pouglas and Wildavsky (1983: 5).
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In addition to the level of consensus, the certainty of knowledge policy actors have
on the issue also influences its level of complexity (Van de Graaf and Hoppe, 1992).
A distinction is made between situations where there is little certainty and situations
where there is substantial certainty about the issue. The following matrix presents
four types of policy issues which can be distinguished on the basis of the two
dimensions mentioned above.
'Tame issues' refer to situations in which there is a strong consensus on
standards and substantial certainty about the knowledge regarding the existing and
foreseeable situation. Issues with these characteristics are easy to solve.
'Wicked scientific issues' are marked by a strong consensus on ethical standards but
considerable uncertainty about the knowledge that is available. These issues can be
solved through scientific methods under certain conditions. However, there is no
certainty that the scientific approach will be successful.
Diagonally opposite to `wicked scientific issues' are the `wicked ethical issues',
which are marked by certainty of knowledge regarding the existing and foreseeable
situation. The wickedness is caused by lack of consensus on normative standards.
These policy issues may be solvable. They require a certain level of consensus or
coexistence.
The fourth category comprises `wicked political problems, in which both
ethical standards and knowledge are strongly contested. No step has been taken to
solve the problem, and it is rather doubtful if it will be solved. So, for Van de Graaf
and Hoppe, the complexity of policy issues is determined by the level of consensus
and the certainty of information.
A different typology of complex issues distinguishes `well-structured
problems', `moderately structured problems' and `ill-structured problems' (Mit roff
and Sagasti, 1973; Dunn, 1994: 146). The typology is determined by five variables,
which are presented in Table 2.2. Ill-structured policy issues involve many different
policy makers whose utilities (values) conflict. There are many alternatives they can
choose from. But since their outcomes are often unknown, it is difficult to assess
possible risks of certain interventions. Hence, probabilities of success or failure are
difficult to calculate.
This approach to complexity is more elaborate than the approach of Van de
Graaf and Hoppe. It does take into account the level of consensus. However, for
certainty of knowledge it differentiates between the uncertainty of the outcome on
the one hand, and the calculability of its probability on the other hand. Moreover,
there are two additional variables: the number of decision makers and the number of
alternative solutions for the issue.
Koppenjan (1991) defines three aspects of complexity which underwrite some
of the ideas of the authors discussed above. Firstly, he points out that many policy
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issues correlate and seem to be interdependent (cf. Geurts and Vennix, 1989).
Secondly, different ethical standards are used by different actors to define the policy
issue (cf. Eden, Jones and Sims, 1983; Dery, 1984). Thirdly, policy issues are
dynamic. They keep changing as a result of different perceptions of the societal
problem, the ethical standard, or changing priorities between policy issues. Policy
issues can be compared to clouds which can change form and size very rapidly; and
there are always many clouds competing for their very own place in the sky
(Koppenjan, 1991).
Table 2.2 Three levels ofcomplexity
structure of problem
Element
well sb~uctured n:oderately stn~ctured ill-structi~red
dec. maker(s) one or few one or few many
alternatives limited limited unlimited
utilities consensus consensus conflict
outcomes certainty of risk uncertainty unknown
probabilities calculable incalculable incalculable
Source: Mitroff and Sagasti (1973) and Dunn (1981) in: Geurts and Vennix (1989: 7).
In the approaches discussed above, some authors refer to knowledge and, therefore,
the more cognitive aspects of complex issues: e.g., (un)certainty of knowledge,
(un)certainty of outcome, probability estimates, precision of definition, and
information level of strong variables. Others refer to social characteristics of policy
issues: the level of consensus or the effects of social interaction on issue perceptions.
This twofold distinction is also made by Geurts and Vennix (1989: 37-38) and
Hickson et al. (1986).
Geurts and Vennix (]989) distinguish between the analytical and social
complexity of an issue. Analytical complexity refers to cognitive aspects of policy
issues. Cognitive complexity often implies that issues involve many variables which
are often interdependent and connect several policy issues into a cloud of policy
issues. It is difficult for policy actors to get insight into one particular issue.
Furthermore, it is difficult to assess possible consequences of ineasures aimed at
changing the issue since there is little certainty about how its various variables are
interrelated. Interventions can cause all sorts of unforeseen feedback loops. In fact, it
is the lack of certainty of knowledge - the dimension Van de Graaf and Hoppe
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adopted - which makes the policy issue analytically complex (Geurts and Vennix,
1989).
The other dimension is social complexity and refers to conflict among policy
actors about the aims, solutions, or regulations which a particular solution for a
policy issue requires. A highly socially complex policy issue is marked by a lot of
contention among the actors.
A distinction based on empirical research is offered by Hickson et aL (1986).
They conducted a large empirical study comparing 150 cases of decision-making in
both the public and private sector. They concluded that there are three main
variables influencing policy-making: the complexity of the policy issue, the
politicality of interests, and the norms and values that set the context in which
different stakeholders operate. A distinction was made between the complexity of
the policy issue and the way different interest groups interact with regard to a
particular policy issue. The latter is referred to by Hickson as the politicality of
interests. Table 2.3 gives an overview of the subvariables which constitute issue
complexity and politicality of interests. The two concepts are not directly linked.
However, processes involving highly complex issues also tend to be highly political.
Processes involving issues that are of average or little complexity tend to be least
and less political, respectively.
Table 1.3 Indicators of the complexity ofpolicy issues andpoliticality of interests
Politicality of interest
- intervention from outside the organization
- imbalance of influence
- contention of objectives
Complexity of policy issues
- the rarity of the matter: is the issue at stake a familiar one for the organization or not?
- consequentiality: how radical, serious, widespread, andlor long-term are the consequences
of certain decisions? For consequentiality there are four indicators: radicality, seriousness,
diffusion, and endurance.
- percussiveness: what are the consequences of the decision for future decisions? Or, in
other words, does it set precedents?
- involvement (what is the number of interests involved?)
Source: Hickson et al., 1986.
These two main variables are seen as rationalities that are influenced by a third
rationality, the rationality of control, which refers to the rules of organizations which
13
shape the policy-making process. This last rationality adds a new dimension to
complexity.
Z.2.5 Three dimensions of complexiry
In our approach to complex policy issues, we distinguish a continuum with non-
complex issues at one end and complex issues at the other. There are multiple levels
of complexity that do not necessarily fit the threefold distinction of Mitroff and
Sagasti ( 1973). This continuum has three dimensions: cognitive complexity, socio-
political complexity, and normative complexity.
Cognitive complexiry
Cognitive complexity concerns questions of knowledge about an issue: what are its
variables, how does this issue relate to others, and what are possible feedback loops?
Cognitive complexity involves uncertainties regarding the effects of certain
developments that characterize the issue. The more information cues are necessary
to grasp the issue, the more complex it becomes. Information will not always be
available. Furthermore, the way information cues relate to one another can influence
the cognitive complexity of an issue. If various information cues can be connected,
this will reduce uncertainty. So, cognitive complexity can be defined as the level to
which an issue involves substantial and~or highly specialized information that is
partly difficult to obtain or judge.
Cognitive-psychology research has demonstrated that humans have limited
cognitive abilities, which curtails the information load they can absorb: `We have a
small but fast short-term memory, not large enough to hold all the facts and
algorithms necessary to solve complex problems' (Volkema, 1983: 641). People also
have limited faculties as far as their memory is concerned. It is impossible for us to
remember every bit of information that reaches us. In fact, forgetting things can
indeed be very useful at times. In our memory, we reconstruct past events on the
basis of fragments we remember and integrate these into our own image of the past.
Furthermore, information selection and interpretation is very much a product of
people's perceptions. Perceptions are influenced by the fact that people seek
information which is consistent with their beliefs and experiences. They will
trivialize information which runs against their beliefs (Hogarth, 1980). Information
handling, therefore, is thus not without difficulties, and facilitating policy-making




Our second dimension ofcomplexity is socio-political complexity. Whereas Hickson
et al. (1986) make a distinction between the complexity of the policy issue and
politicality of interests, we also consider the latter as a dimension of complex issues
(cf. Geurts and Vennix, 1989). Issues are socio-politically complex when they
involve many actors who form complex social networks and have many different
institutional interests to defend. The higher the number of parties which become
involved in a policy-making process, the more difficult it may become to align the
various perceptions of the issue. More parties could easily mean more different
interests. Hence, the number of policy actors contributes to its social and political
complexity since it will become more difficult to organize the various perceptions
and interests. Yet, more policy actors may also contribute to a more cognitively
complex issue if they add more diversified information about the issue to the
process.
Nonnative complexity
The third dimension of complexity we introduce here, is partly influenced by the
third rationality Hickson et al. called the `rationality of control'. Normative
complexity concerns the contention of norms and values which lie behind the
various actions and perceptions of policy actors with respect to a complex issue
(Joldersma, 1995). Policy actors will develop norms and values which determine
how they will deal with policy issues. The way different actors interact, the
expectations they have, and their attitude are all determined by the belief systems
which are dominant in the organization or network they are part of. The more
contention there is between beliefs, the more complex an issue will become. So,
normative complexity determines the rules within which the policy actors make
choices regarding cognitive complexity and the social political complexity (cf.
Hickson et al., 1986: 250).
Z.2.6 The relationship betweerr the three dimensions of complexity
Both Termeer (1993) and Joldersma (1995) emphasize the interconnection of socio-
political aspects and cognitive aspects in policy-making. Termeer argues that these
two dimensions are interdependent. A cognitive `fixation' demands for a socio-
politically oriented intervention and vice versa.
Joldersma (1995) suggests that the three dimensions are in fact cumulative.
Socio-political complexity presupposes cognitive complexity because, if there is no
agreement on the perception of an issue, then there is also discussion about facts.
Normative complexity presupposes social-political complexity and cognitive
complexity because competing values imply that there is disagreement on issues. So,
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for instance in the case of conflicting underlying values, the policy network will be
polarized, and the content of the policy issue will be complex as well. Although this
conclusion seems to be a valid one, it calls for differentiation. Take, for instance, the
policy issue of whether and how euthanasia should be made legal. This is by all
means normatively very complex since it refers to strongly opposing fundamental
human values of people and organizations. In the Netherlands, legalizing euthanasia
has been discussed by opponents and proponents extensively and in great detail. The
issue is cognitively complex because of its percussiveness and consequentiality: it
would have far-reaching consequences for the medical profession and the way they
define their task. It is socio-politically very complex because it involves a number of
organizations with strongly competing goals (churches, political parties, patient
organizations, organizations of the elderly, the handicapped etc.). However, what
dominates the issue is the fact that it involves norms and values that are fundamental
to our belief systems. In the case of euthanasia, normative complexity seems to be
the main source of contention that feeds the other dimensions of complexity.
Alternatively, other policy issues - e.g., organizational issues regarding the police
and the lega] system - may be predominantly cognitively complex or socio-
politically complex or possibly score high on two or three of the dimensions.
In conclusion, we have selected three dimensions of complexity of policy
issues. These three dimensions, the cognitive, socio-political, and normative
dimension, are interrelated. Depending on the characteristics of a particular policy
issue, the three dimensions of complexity will differ in how important they are for
the issue. Some issues will be dominated by social-political complexity whereas
other issues are more cognitive in nature. Hence, there is no general sequence in the
way the three dimensions are connected.
2.3 The policy-making process and the need for problem structuring
Problem-structuring activities can be differently understood, depending on the nature
of the policy-making model (Lyles and Thomas, l 988). The particular perspective of
policy-making one supports, affects the way a policy issue as well as problem
structuring are perceived. For example, proponents of a rational policy-making
model assume that there is an objectively definable issue that can be structured by
means of a cognitive exercise in collecting and analysing all information that can be
known objectively. In other words, the view one takes of the policy-making process
has implications for how problem structuring is understood.
In the next section, the emphasis will be on participatory approaches to policy-




Policy-making is compared by Hickson et al. (1986: 252) with a game of American
football. Many groups participate in policy processes and try to defend their group's
interests. Some are better equipped than others. They wear thicker protective
padding and harder helmets andlor have more team members. Policy-making is a
game in which it is often not quite clear how exactly to find the goal. Eventually,
one team or coalition of teams pushes its way through, holding the ball to where it
says the goal is. A policy game is never the same since (numbers of) teams and
playing modes differ. `Organizations are therefore less the result of deliberate design
than it is the only partly intended accumulated result of decision-making games over
the years' (Hickson et al., 1986: 9).
The above metaphor of the policy-making process combines Lindblom's theory
of incrementalism, the arena theory, and the garbage-can model of policy-making
and takes a participatory perspective of policy-making. Participatory policy-making
processes are the object of our research because the policy issues we are interested in
involve various policy actors. Participatory policy-making refers to processes that
involve policy actors who have a stake in the issue and actively take part in
structuring it, developing policy and implementing that policy. This style of policy-
making has also been denoted as co-production (Bekkers et al., 1996) and more
commonly as interactive policy-making (Van Woerkum, 1997). Below, we present
different theoretical perspectives of the policy-making process that inspired the
Hickson model and our understanding of participatory policy-making.
Irtcrententalisnt
In Lindblom's (1965) view, policy-making is basically an incremental process. It is
the art of muddling through: policy makers proceed by taking little steps, one after
the other and try to make progress with one or the other policy issue. Lindblom's
theory of incrementalism was a response to the synoptic theory of policy-making.
This traditional approach to policy-making processes assumed that policy makers
could obtain a complete overview of a societal problem and contemplate all possible
solutions and choose the best one to implement. Government was perceived as the
central actor, and relatively little attention was paid to the role other actors might
have in the process. The rational ideal of deciding on the basis of perfect information
is an illustration in the view of the incrementalist. Instead, policy makers only
examine a few alternatives and try to achieve small changes, one after the other, and
thus, in the long run, many small changes will amount to a genuine improvement of
a situation. Policy makers are not able to seek perfect solutions. They lack the time
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and information to enable them to make exact predictions about societal
developments and effects of policy action. Furthermore, they also lack a world in
which it is self-evident what constitutes good and bad. There are often competing
interests and not seldom diverse belief systems which produce different perceptions
of the issue and different preferences regarding policy development and
implementation (Lindblom in: Van de Graaf and Hoppe, 1992). These interests and
beliefs are susceptible to change brought about by negotiation and persuasion. This
approach to policy-making acknowledges the presence of many actors in the
process. Nevertheless, it recognizes the special role of government in the process
and, hence, takes the individual governmental actor as its main object of study.
The garbage-cm~ model
The garbage can is a metaphor for policy-making in an arena (Cohen et al., 1972;
Kingdon, 1984 in Teisman, 1995: 41). It refers to a collection of three flows
consisting of policy issues, interests, and solutions which are `churned around until
solutions become attached to problems' (Hickson et al. 1986: 12). These three flows
are relatively independent and policy is made when the three are connected. The
garbage can model is a rather radical break away from the traditional model. The
traditional approach views policy-making as a sequence of agenda setting, policy
formulation, policy adoption, policy implementation, and policy assessment (Dunn,
1994). Phases models have analytical advantages: they can help to categorize the
various activities of policy actors and offer useful heuristics for policy makers.
Nevertheless, they also have limitations. The garbage-can model differs from
traditional models of policy-making where the latter take a sequential perspective of
problem structuring, policy development, and implementation. Following the
garbage-can model, these categories of actions coexist simultaneously.
Issues, solutions, and participants are independent flows which meet by chance
when participants put issues and solutions in a garbage can. A garbage can is a
metaphor for a moment of choice. The central assumption of the model is that policy
makers can only spend limited time and attention on the policy issues they are faced
with. There are too many issues that call for attention, and hence they are not in a
position to balance arguments and interests and weigh information very carefully.
Nevertheless, choices have to be made. Consequently, the process is often irregular
and chaotic. Whether problems, issues, and policy makers are connected depends on
content and composition of the garbage can, the production of garbage, and the
presence of other garbage cans. Policy actors do not determine the process, but
issues and solutions are also relevant for the realization of a connection. `It is not
only problems which seek solutions but also solutions which seek problems,
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moments of choice seeking actors and policy makers seeking work' (cf. Koppenjan,
1993: 25-26).
The garbage-can model is in essence a multi-actor approach. How the various
policy makers contribute to the realization of a connection between issues and
solutions remains unclear. Therefore, it offers limited insight into the participatory
side of policy-making processes involving multiple actors. Its merit is that it
illustrates the irrational characteristics of processes which evolve around complex
policy issues. Policy-making is more than making rational choices on the basis of
selected and ordered information. It is an interplay of conflicting interests, emotions,
interpretations of past events, and expectations regarding future events (Koppenjan,
1993: 31).
A network approach: the model oJrounds
Another approach to policy-making, which is more participatory in outlook and is
founded on the policy network approach, is the model of rounds (Teisman, 1992;
1995). It combines different perspectives on policy-making. The traditional model of
phases of policy-making presupposes, according to Teisman, the presence of a
central actor who prepares problem structuring, policy development, and policy
implementation. Thus it leaves little room for the contribution of other policy actors.
In the model of rounds (see Figure 2.1), which can be viewed as an example of a
participatory policy approach, different stakeholders play a central role, and
solutions and policy issues only arrive on their instigation. The arena it describes is
the activated part of a policy network, and it involves those actors who are actually
influencing policy-making. Networks involve many dependent and more or less
equal policy actors. The notion of dependency between actors is crucial for
understanding how policy networks function (Teisman, 1992; Smits, 1995). Since
resources are limited, organizations need each other to realize their goals. They have
to interact with others and organize support in order to achieve their aims. The
relationships between actors in a policy network are subject to change and hence
dynamic, but they are not casual or without obligations (Klijn and Teisman, 1992;
Teisman, 1992: 51). Although actors are considered to be relatively equal, they do
differ in the resources (e.g., status, power, financial means, knowledge) they have at
their disposal. In this respect, policy-making can be compared to a game which
evolves in several rounds of decision making, and where policy actors meet in
several parallel arenas. The rounds in one particular arena are clusters of decisive
actions taken by actors.
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The quality of their outcome is determined by the correlation of these actions. There
are different roles in a policy game. The initiator is the actor who lays the foundation
for a policy. Supporters are actors who take an interest in the policy and are willing
to give their support. Critics oppose the policy. Sometimes there is an intermediary
who becomes the driving force behind a project. In cases where conflict is
continuing, a broker can be of use in building consensus. If he does not succeed and
the conflict intensifies, a referee is needed to settle the matter. Finally, there are
facilitators, who are actors who contribute their knowledge without having a
particular interest. Policy makers can change role. Furthermore, since they may be
involved in different arenas at the same time, they may have different roles in
different policy processes. It is possible, therefore, to follow a game of policy-
making horizontally during a specific period of time span, and at the same
diagonally through the different policy games in which actors are involved.
The model of rounds differs from the garbage can model where the latter
suggests that policy-making processes can be explained by objective characteristics
of issues, actors, and solutions (Teisman, 1995:41). The model of rounds takes a
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somewhat more constructivist perspective: the perceptions and actions of policy
actors determine where policy issues and solutions meet. Policy-making is thus the
result of interacting perceptions, and it is an iterative process. Like the garbage-can
model, it does not reserve problem structuring, policy development, and
implementation for a specific time span, but activities contributing to either of these
factors can (re)appear at different moments in the various rounds.
The model of rounds is participatory in outlook and takes account of different
policy makers who vary in the resources they can mobilize. However, it does not
recognize the special role government often plays in public policy-making. Although
they are dependent on other organizations, there will always remains instances, of
government organizations not opting for a participatory approach but forcing their
preferences on the network.
An alternative participatory approach to policy-making
Some participatory policy theorists consider government as one among a network of
relatively equal policy actors. However, government can also hold a dominant
position in a network. In many public policy-making processes, government
organizations tend to have a special responsibility for defending common interest.
Where other policy actors pursue the interests of a particular community (be it
business people, sports people, the education sector, or grass-root organizations),
government organizations are obliged to weigh the different interests that have a
stake in policy issues. The role of promoter of the common good is often laid down
in constitutional law. Given their special position, government organizations tend to
be better equipped to perform the role of organizer and coordinator of policy-
making. In the model described below, government can play the different roles of a
promotor and coordinator, as well as that of an equal partner amidst an inter-
organizational network. The model was designed for the game~simulation BANS,
which will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 6. It takes a participatory approach to
policy-making. Figure 2.2 illustrates this model. It represents a process in which
interacting policy actors - with diverse interests - engage in constructing a policy.
The policy actors are organizations or groups that have a stake in a particular issue.
Together they are part of a network around that issue. The organizations can be
representatives from the public and~or private sector. However, it is a governmental
organization which is formally responsible for tackling the issue which has reached
the policy agenda. The various organizations or groups try to influence the policy-
making process. There is a wide variety of actions from which they can chose: from
writing letters to informal talks, from interviews with journalists to protest meetings,
and from financial support to legal claims. In their effort to influence policy, actors
are bound to undertake different (re)actions and thus acquire a portfolio of different
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actions which can be directed at one or more of the other participants in the network.
They will attempt to persuade others of their preferences regarding the issue and or
the way it should be dealt with. As indicated in section 2.2, an issue has both content
characteristics and process characteristics. Policy actors have to make choices both
regarding content and process. Through interactions, they aim to influence the
dominant perception of the policy issue. Furthermore, they will also aim to influence
the choice of options and the way these are implemented. Problem structuring,
policy development, and policy implementation are categories of actions which
constitute the policy-making process. Problem structuring concerns activities which
contribute to the way the policy issue is defined. Policy development refers to the
choice of and development of a solution. In Figure 2.2 policy development is
represented by the plan of action which captures the option which is chosen from
probably a number of alternative options. Implementation refers to activities which
bring about the execution of the plan of action. The three categories of activities
which together constitute the policy-making process are interrelated: a change in
perception of the issue may affect choices regarding policy implementation or policy
development and vice versa. A governmental organization will play a more central
role in the process. It will lay down the dominant perceptions of the definition of the
issue, the possible options, and the way policy will be implemented. Other
organizations will try to influence one or more of these perceptions directly or via
fellow participants in the network.
If the responsible government is, a municipality as Figure 2.2 suggests, one or
more civil servants will be made responsible for the policy-making process and
develop a portfolio of activities and interact with the other stakeholders. These other
stakeholders can be companies, health or welfare organizations, sport clubs, pressure
groups, neighbourhood councils, individual citizens, local politicians, or even other
governmental organizations. Policy actors can participate in problem structuring,
policy development, and policy implementation. It will be the city council who
probably determines the level of participation. Various instruments have been
designed in the past decade to facilitate a more participatory approach to policy-
making, e.g., problem-structuring methods like SAST, which will be discussed in the
following chapter, consensus conferences, scenario workshops and
gaming~simulation (for an elaborate account of participatory methods see Mayer,
1998: 82-116).
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Source: Joldersma and Geurts, 2000.
2.3.2 Problem structuring
This study will address only a specific part of the policy-making process, problem
structuring, which refers to those activities in which different actors - here different
organizations - try to reduce the complexity of the policy issue. When an issue is
placed on the political agenda, policy actors will engage in activities directed at
defining the policy issue. With these activities they structure the issue and construct
a definition. Policy issues will continue to announce themselves and may be
redefined. Problem structuring is therefore not an activity which only features at the
beginning of the policy-making process and then gives way to policy development,
like the model of phases and Dunn (1994: l7) suggest (cf. Joldersma and Pegman,
1999). Here, problem structuring is viewed as an ongoing activity which at times is
at a low with little input and hardly any changes in the position of the different
actors. At other times, however, new input from one or more of the actors, or the
environment they operate in will provoke new activity, and as a result the issue may
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be restructured (cf. Bovens and `t Hart, 1996). Problem structuring is part of a
participative, iterative, and dynamic process. Our perspective of the policy-making
process is that of ongoing construction efforts directed at making sense of and
solving complex policy issues which either contribute to problem structuring, policy
development, or implementation. However, as Figure 2.3 indicates, problem
structuring is more present in the first part of a policy-making trajectory. The
following figure shows how problem structuring is an integrated part of the larger
policy-making process.
Figure ?.3 Policy-making andproblem structuring
2.3.3 A defi,t~tiorr ofproblem structuring
In the literature, problem structuring or, as others prefer, problem-setting is defined
differently. Here, we present a selection is presented of descriptions which provide
the building blocks for our definition of problem structuring.
First, according to Mason and Mitroff (1981: 24), problem structuring refers to
a set of activities which, depending on their specific aim, can be subdivided in
problem sensing, problem defining, and formal modelling as opposed to activities
directed at solving a policy issue. Problem sensing refers to `recognizing or feeling'
that there is a problematic situation. Problem formulating means that the issue is
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looked at from several distinct and different macro points of view. Formal modelling
implies that a single micro view of the problem is operationalized and examined. A
scientific model of the issue, therefore, contributes to a further specification of a
policy issue. Mason and Mitroff offer a prescriptive approach of problem
structuring, for they specify that the modelling of the issue should be a product of
scientific insights and comparison.
A similar prescriptive account of problem structuring is presented by Dunn
(1994: 148-149). For Dunn (1994: 161, 185), problem structuring is `the process of
generating and testing alternative conceptualizations of a problem situation', and it
involves `the use of higher-order methods (metamethods) to discover the critical
elements of the problem, their causal arrangement, and value implications'. He
distinguishes four interdependent phases of problem structuring for policy analysts:
problem sensing, problem search, problem definition and problem specification. The
process of problem structuring starts when a problematic situation has been sensed.
A problem search will be conducted, and several problem representations of
different stakeholders will be collected. This cloud of problems is referred to by
Dunn as the 'metaproblem'. Subsequently, the most basic and general terms of the
problem are defined, and the result is a'substantive problem'. Next, the problem is
specified further and defined in greater detail, resulting in a'formal problem'.
Both Mitroff and Mason, and Dunn distinguish different types of activities of
problem structuring. They differ where the latter distinguishes between problem
search and problem definition, whereas for Mitroff and Mason this is one phase.
Dunn's problem specification concerns the formalization of the problem with
scientific means, which corresponds with formal modelling. Both (prescriptive)
approaches of problem structuring emphasize its iterative nature. They aim to
contribute to a more analytical approach of policy-making. Mitroff and Mason
(1981: 13) as well as Dunn (1994: 29) advocate the importance of participatory
approaches to the policy-making process, but they tend to focus more on cognitive
complexity. Another approach, which pays somewhat more attention to problem
structuring as a social process, is offered by Eden, et al. (1983). For them, problem
structuring concerns a line of activities set `within politics, interpersonal
considerations, idiosyncratic values and personal perspectives' (Eden, Jones and
Sims, 1983: X). In policy-making processes directed at complex policy issues,
opinions of policy actors are often too far apart to be easily merged into a definition
which is accepted by all actors involved. Problem structuring is therefore also an
activity of disjointed and sometimes competing actors and agencies (Bovens and 't
Hart, 1996). They compete for the dominant view of what constitutes a certain
problem situation and these views are, by definition, biased. Rein and Schtin (1977)
also emphasize the interactive nature of problem structuring, but this is not reflected
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in their definition. They define problem structuring as the finding, building, and
selecting of a framework in which uncertain situations can be organized. They
emphasize that these activities should contribute towards transformation of the issue
and encompass a potential for positive change. This captures an additional
characteristic of policy issues. The fact that actions are taken to affect an issue
positively presupposes that conditions which mark the issue can improve.
Consequently, problem structuring presupposes that there is an opportunity for
improvement. It involves defining differences between the existing and the desired
situation (cf. Pound, 1969: 5, Dery, 1984: 5-9).
Our definition of problem structuring includes a set of activities directed at
creating order in the various complexities which mark the issues we are interested in.
These activities include a moment when actors become aware of an issue and
possible characteristics of the issue are searched. Problem structuring also involves a
selection of the ideas that are considered relevant for the issue, for it should involve
both divergent and convergent thinking. The ideas that are selected are subsequently
ordered and connected. Secondly, our definition ought to voice the participative
nature of the policy-making process of which problem structuring is a part. Finally,
it ought to express a possibility for positive change.
Summarizing, problem structuring is defined as a process of activities and
interactions directed at sensing and searching, selecting and building aspects of the
policy issue with the aim to create order and transparency.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, the main theoretical concepts that are relevant for this research were
explained. The object on which we will focus is a policy issue. It can be defined as
a situation perceived by policy makers as in need of positive change. Three different
types of complexity of policy issues have been distinguished. These are cognitive,
socio-political, and normative complexity. It is around the policy issue that the
policy-making process evolves and a network of actors gather and enter into
relationships. It is through these relationships that they structure the issue, develop
policy, and implement policy. Our study addresses participatory policy processes
that are characterized by an iterative and game-like process in which policy actors
define and redefine their object and thus contribute to problem structuring, policy
development, andlor implementation. They operate in an arena-like environment and
aim to promote their interests.
The policy-making process at large will not be the object of this research, but it
will concentrate on problem structuring. Problem structuring is defined as a process
of activities and interactions directed at sensing and searching, building and
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selecting aspects of the policy issue in order to reduce its complexity. It is an
integrated part of the larger policy-making process.
In the Chapter 3, methods of problem structuring will be described which were
designed to tackle complex policy issues. Furthermore, we will introduce six criteria




In the previous chapter, the nature of the complexity that characterizes a policy issue
has been discussed. In order to assist policy makers in handling complex policy issues,
methods have been designed which can support actors in problem structuring during the
policy-making process in various ways. There are many methods which have been
designed or could be used to support problem structuring (cf. Rosenhead, 1989; Flood
8c Jackson, 1991; Mayer, 1997). The five methods which will be discussed in this
chapter present not an exhaustive summary of the field. They are methods which are
reasonably well established in the Anglo-Saxon and Dutch domain concerned with a
methodical approach to complex problems. Strategic Option Development and Analysis
(SODA) and Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) are included in Rosenhead (1989) who
gives an overview ofsix soft Operational Research approaches which are participative
in outlook and aim to structure complex issues. They are still in use. SAST is one ofthe
oldest methods and is often referred to. In the Netherlands, Vennix developed group
model-building further in the nineties and has become an authority in the field of
System Dynamics. DeTombe published recently on the method Compram. All methods
have in common that they present a clear outline of the procedure they advocate.
Section 3.2. presents a typology of problem-structuring methods and briefly describes
the disciplinary traditions from which these methods stem. Section 3.3. addresses the
methods Group model-building, Compram, SODA, SAST and Soft Systems
Methodology. The theoretical background, mode ofapplication, and the aims ofthese
methods are discussed and compared. The methods are compared in section 3.4. In
section 3.5, a choice is made for one method which will be further assessed in this
study. Besides the method used, there are other factors that influence the
problem-structuring process. These will be discussed in section 3.6. Section 3.7
addresses quality criteria for problem structuring. Finally, a summary is given in 3.8.
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3.2 Typology of inethods
A great number ofinethods have been developed to aid problem solving in andbetween
organizations. In the Operational Research tradition, these are often categorized as
either hard or soft methods. These qualifications refer to theoretical perspectives about
methodology and the ontology ofpolicy issues and problem structuring. Hard methods
are a product ofa more quantitative, cognitively oriented, and positivistic tradition. Soft
methods are influenced by the behavioural sciences and emphasize the importance of
assisting social interaction in order to facilitate problem structuring (cf. Jackson, 1982:
7; Forrester, 1994:249-251).
Disciplines that have contributed to the development of problem-structuring
methods are operations research, system dynamics, systems engineering, and systems
analysis. All disciplines originally encouraged hard systems thinking. Operational
research (OR) is very much exemplary of 'rational comprehensive planning'
(Rosenhead, 1989: 3). It aims to contribute to finding optimal solutions for all sorts of
complex issues in large systems of people, materials, machines, money, etc. in both
public and private organizations (cf Duckworth, Gear and Lockett, 1977; Huisman,
1985). In the traditional hard OR approach, a model of a system is developed.
Quantitative and computer-based techniques are used to identify the optimal solution
for a specific issue. It is an interdisciplinary approach which strongly emphasizes the
merits of rational thinking and is associated with a strong planning orientation.
System dynamics as a discipline started in the mid-fifties with Fonester's
mathematical models for processes in industry and for the military. Forrester was
dissatisfied with the traditional operational research approach ofmodel building which
concentrated on open-loop thinking and producing models which seemed to be oflittle
practical use. A dynamic approach to system thinking was necessary which
concentrated on the modelling of closed systems by presenting a holistic view of an
issue, thus comprising all possible and relevant elements and the relationships between
these elements. The behaviour of a system is `primarily determined by the
characteristics of the whole and not by the characteristics of its individual parts'
(Forrester in: Vennix, 1996: 45). The dynamic models show how changes flow through
the system and, via loops, feed back the effects of these changes into core elements and
thus induce a new pattern of change (System Dynamics will be discussed further in
section 3.1.1).
Another discipline which contributed to the development ofproblem -structuring
methods was Systems Analysis. It was originally developed by the Rand Corporation
and combines theories from the fields of engineering and economics in order to assist
policy makers who are responsible for complex projects. It is originally goal-oriented
and tries to define systems ofcosts and resources which can bring about this aim. It uses
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models showing the interdependency ofobjectives, systems, resources and environment
(Hitch, 1955).
Finally, System Engineering originated from the field ofengineering and takes the
problem-solving approach of the engineer as a starting-point. It too is objectivistic and
positivistic about how issues and goals must be perceived. Its thinking is oriented
towards goals rather than issues.
In the seventies, criticism ofthe rationalistic outlook on operational research and
other hard system approaches mounted: the field was oriented too much on industry and
businesses. Furthermore, the unconditional faith in planning was notjustified by results.
The positivistic approach of operational researchers did not deliver its promises. The
political ideology also turned increasingly against the notion of planning, and a new
faith in market forces was propagated. The awareness grew that human interaction
between policy actors mattered as did power and conflict: aspects that were neglected
by traditional hard system thinking. These rational~traditional or hard approaches
presupposed that policy issues were clearly defined. It became apparent that the hard
methods needed to be complemented by softer approaches. A more participatory
approach was needed that would not only result in products like plans, designs, and
recornmendations, but also in more mutual understanding and a better relationship
between policy actors (Rosenhead, 1989: 16). Soft method approaches like Strategic
Option Development and Analysis (SODA) and Soft Systems Methodology (SSM)
were developed to encompass these aspects ofproblem solving. They are influenced by
cognitive and social psychology, and organization and policy sciences and emphasize
the importance ofinterpersonal relationships and the building ofconsensus (Tomlinson,
1990: 179).
In this study, we will concentrate on soft approaches because they are obviously
more susceptible to the socio-political and normative complexity ofpolicy issues and
the policy-making process as we see it. Before describing some soft methods in the next
section, a distinction is made between methods, methodology, tools, and models (cf.
Tomlinson, 1990: 179-188).
Methods: problem expansion and problem reduction
Methods are general approaches to policy issues which include a certain sequence of
steps and the use of several techniques and tools. A distinction can be made between
the use of problem expansion and~or problem reduction techniques. The former are
more directed at divergent thinking and exploring the boundaries ofthe issue. Problem
reduction techniques are based on a rational and efficient approach to an issue: they
focus on a limited number of solutions. They quickly narrow down the parameters of
the policy issue andlor divide the problem in sub-problems.
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Methodology
Methods are based on a methodology, i.e., theoretical assumptions that are often derived
from various scientific disciplines as well as ideas about how issues should generally
be solved. Soft systems thinking can be viewed as a methodology that assumes that a
policy issue cannot be known objectively. Its subjective nature is a common
characteristic of the methods described in this chapter.
Tools
Tools are aimed at aiming specific tasks or results. For instance, brainstorming
techniques are tools used for generating information. A useful distinction can be made
between:
- hardware tools, e.g., whiteboards, soflware, slide projectors, computers, computer
wide screens, paper and markers, magnetic hexagons, etc.;
- software tools like: analogical reasoning,~ creative thinking techniques like
brainstorming, visual images, or bisociation,Z and more practical tools like the
arrangement ofseatings, or computer software program like COPE and STELLA.
Models
Models are representations of reality: they describe (some part of) an (in-
ter)organizational process or institution. Examples of models are: system models,
cognitive maps, flow diagrams, gamingl simulation, and metaphors. Different types of
models describe different elements of a policy issue.
The next section addresses various methods. These methods make a selection out
ofa number of tools, and, depending on their methodology, they build a certain type of
model.
3.3 Problem-structuring methods
In this section, five methods are discussed which claim to contribute to problem
structuring.
3.3.1 Group model-building
Group model-building is a method that is used to facilitate groups in making decisions
on strategic and very complex policy issues (cf Vennix, 1990, 1995, 1995). `It focuses
on building system-dynamics models with teams in order to enhance team learning, to
I This involves drawing comparisons between known facts and unknown issues that require clarification
and may enhance insight into possible answers to the issues.
2 The issue is related to unconnected elements to stimulate a sense ofestrangement.
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foster consensus and to create commitment with a resulting decision' (Vennix, 1996:
3). The groups are small and represent public and private organizations. The method
primarily facilitates group interaction processes. It is in the interaction that the
performance ofa group is decided.
Group model-building is not an appropriate strategy for every imaginable policy
issue. Vennix (1996: 107) gives three preconditions which need to be met in order for
group model-building to be successful in managing policy issues. Firstly, a system-
dynamics-oriented approach aims at tackling consequences that are difficult to predict
due to the underlying feedback mechanisms that characteristize complex policy issues.
Group model-building is therefore qualified for non-transparent complex issues that are
marked by various effects that are hard to predict. Secondly, System Dynamics is
especially suitable for identifying long-term effects ofpolicies and policy issues. The
third point that needs to be addressed is whether it is possible to generate a reference
model of behaviour or whether the client's question provides insufficient information
in this respect.
Goals
Group model-building is primarily aimed at diagnosing a policy issue and at assessing
various aspects of the issue and the possible impacts ofpossible future policies (Vennix,
1996: 107). The method aims to build a shared understanding of a particular policy
issue in a small group. In order to achieve this, both the analytical aspect ofthe problem
as well as the attitude of the policy actors need to be addressed. A learning environment
must be created which encourages actors to understand the issue. Consensus must be
built and, furthermore, acceptance of the ensuing decision and commitment to this
decision should be stimulated. These three components, learning, consensus, and
acceptance are the three main goals of group model-building in Vennix' view.
Theoretical background
Group model-building is based on System Dynamics theory. Additional sources are
theories about human information processing, organizational learning, and group
processes.
The cognitive simplification strategies, which were briefly introduced in the
previous chapter are the building blocks ofcognitive-psychological theories ofhuman
information processing and part of the frame of reference which inspired the
development and design ofthe group model-building method. It is because people have
a tendency to look only at parts of problems and make simple cause-and-effect rules
without interrelating all the different relevant elements, that system dynamics seems to
be a useful approach as it aims to build holistic models. It assists policy actors in
integrating the various elements that are relevant for a policy issue. Like other methods,
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group model-building is designed to block the human tendency to simplify the meaning
of sets of information, and it challenges people to take a different approach to
information handling by a group. The way information processing proceeds strongly
influences the cognitive models people make ofreality. Because ofthe subjective nature
ofinformation selection and interpretation, these models may differ quite substantially
for people who are part of one and the same organization. Group model-building aims
to align the different models individual policy actors have of a specific policy issue (cf.
Vennix, 1996: 24).
System dynamics as a problem-solving approach was already briefly introduced
in section 3.2. It is a discipline that concentrates on model building of closed systems,
in which feedback effects receive a lot of attention. The structure ofa system-dynamics
model consists of four hierarchical levels:
- the closed boundary;
- feedback loop as the basic system component;
- levels and rates;
- goals, observed conditions, discrepancy between goals and observed conditions,
and desired actions (Vennix, 1996:45).
The closed boundary refers to the fact that all possible elements that influence the
causes and symptoms of a particular issue are considered as part of the system.
Elements for which this is not the case are viewed as external factors. The elements
included in the model are all relevant, as are the relationships between them. The
changes within this closed system are the result of feedback loops. If these loops are
positive, they will reinforce the system state. Negative loops will eventually stabilize
the system. The variables in the systems that represent accumulations can reach
different levels at different points in time, depending on the changes that occur. These
changes are a result of actors defining goals and observing conditions and reacting to
possible discrepancies between these two in order to achieve the situation they desire.
Feedback loops show the consequences of their behaviour for certain variables. It is
important to realize that the relationships between variables are not always linear, and
non-linear functions increase the variety in systems behaviour. They cause the effects
of feedback loops to change considerably in strength.
Mode of application
The group model-building method aims to build a system dynamics model with a group
ofpolicy actors that face a particular policy issue. (Figure 3.1 gives an overview of the
different steps of the method). The ultimate goal is the construction of a model on
which the different group members agree and which is an adequate representation of the
policy issue they wish to tackle. In addition, it ought to provide sufficient information
about what the best option will be.
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At the start, when the facilitator and a potential client group have their first encounter,
it is important for the facilitator to decide whether in the given circumstances system
dynamics is an appropriate method for dealing with the issue the client seeks to solve.
Once it has been decided that the method is suitable, the next question to be answered
is whether it should be a quantitative or a qualitative model. The first option has the
advantage of tending to be more informative on various aspects, but it is also more de-
manding. It requires more time and is often more difficult to establish.
Next, the facilitator has to consider how the group should be composed: how many
and who will be asked tojoin the model building session(s). Some guidelines proposed
by Vennix (1996: 111-1 12) are that it is important to involve participants who have the
power to implement the decisions that are taken and that the group has to be able to
generate sufficient commitment in the organization they represent. In larger groups,
there is less opportunity for group members to participate and this may influence the
sense ofownership ofthe model and feeling ofcommitment. Vennix therefore suggests
that if groups are larger than 10 to 12 participants, special attention has to be paid to the
level of participation of the various group members.
As a following step, the facilitator has to decide whether it is useful to work with
a preliminary model or to start with the group from scratch. A preliminary model is
useful if time is limited and the model-building process needs to be stepped up. A
second advantage is that it makes it easier for the group to start discussing the issue
(Vennix, 1996: 113). However, there is also the danger that this preliminary model,
which is constructed by the facilitator(s), is not accepted by the group members, in
which case the model should be adapted. There are different tools to establish a
preliminary model: interviews, document analysis, questionnaires, or workbooks (a
more flexible way to present information and ask questions than questionnaires
traditionally provide). Quite often, combinations of these tools are used for acquiring
the right information to build a preliminary model. In some cases, the facilitator will
start building a model with the group without the aid of a preliminary model (if this is
the case, it is wise to speak to the participants individually beforehand in order to get
an impression of the nature of the complexity of the issue involved). A useful way to
start directly with the group is to have its members brainstorm about relevant variables
for the policy issue and to ask them to contribute one of these variables for the
construction of a causal loop diagram on a flip chart or with hexagons.(Vennix, 1996:
130
In most cases, the diagram will be elaborated in a few group sessions. In between
the sessions, the model probably needs some tidying up. If there is a second session, a
workbook that includes a summary of events from the previous session, a drawing of
the model, and questions the model raised with the model builders, is an effective
means of helping participants to prepare for this session.
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Figure 3.1 Overview of the Group ~11ode1-Building approach
Relevant questions:
- Is the problem dynamically ~
complex?
- What are short-term effects?
- Reference mode of behaviour?
- Quality or quantity of the model?



































Quite often, a facilitator who guides the client group in building a system dynamics
model will need the support of assisting facilitators. Richardson and Andersen (in:
Vennix, 1996:133) distinguish the following roles. A recorder, assists in registering the
information the participants provide. The history of the process needs to be recorded.
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The process coach observes the dynamics within the group and aids the facilitator in
deciding on strategies for keeping the participants involved. The modeler is the expert
on building system-dynamics models. The gatekeeper is a member of the client
organization and responsible for the project. His task is to attend to the relations
between the client and model builders. In addition, hardware tools are needed in the
process: e.g., computers, flip-overs, paper, copying machines, tape recorders, white-
boards, hexagons, and pens, and overhead projectors. Software tools are: brainstorming
techniques, a system dynamics soflware program, questionnaires, and delphi techniques.
3.3.2 Compram
Compram is the'Complex problem handling method' developed by DeTombe (1994).
It is an interdisciplinary approach to cooperatively handling technical policy issues, or
social problems in general. Compram only gives a rather general indication ofthe steps,
methods, and tools that might be appropriate for tackling a specific issue. It is a
participatory method in which different people with a wide variety ofexperiences and
backgrounds in groups try to come to grips with a policy issue, especially its more
cognitive aspects. The process centres on the exchange ofdifferent types ofinformation
(both scientific and everyday experiences) in groups but also by individuals. The
information is fed into a communication model with the aid of the different tools and
(sub) methods which the facilitator has selected (DeTombe, 1994). The selection of
tools and methods is based on the available time, the financial resources, the
characteristics of the issue, and the client group (5 to 15 people).
Goal
Compram is a method that aims to provide a framework for analysing and solving all
sorts ofcognitively complex policy issues. It guides the policy actors through the whole
process, from the initial sensing of a policy issue to the evaluation of the solution
chosen. The initial design ofCompram focused mainly on the first sub-cycle ofdefining
problems and primarily assists information handling (cf. DeTombe, 1994). Since then,
the method has been further developed to encompass aspects of problem solving,
implementation, and evaluation (cf. DeTombe, 1996). The idea ofthe method is that it
only defines the different steps that need to be taken and leaves room for using different
tools and methods. Maximum flexibility is its aim. It is a more time-consuming process
than Vennix' group model-building method and may involve up to ten sessions.
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Theoretical background
Compram is based on various theoretical approaches to problem solving, varying from
cognitive psychology, computer science (theories about artificial intelligence), theories
about group processes (e.g., theories about group think, collective blind spots, etc.),
ideas ofsystem dynamics modelling (which have been discussed above), and the social
sciences in general (DeTombe, 1994: 242). From cognitive psychology, important
notions on problem handling processes are derived. Selz, (1923) demonstrated that
thinking is an active process supported by the use ofrules. Furthennore, it is not a linear
process: ideas about goals can change as a result of the positive or negative effect of the
problem-solving methods that are applied. Newell and Simon (1972) DeTombe, 1994)
compared the way humans process information with the way computers process
information and indicated that problem solving is a search within a problem space that
contains the different components of an issue. DeTombe argues that the notion of
problem handling based on the functioning ofthe computer is too limited when it comes
to handling complex issues. The issues cognitive psychology studies tend to be ]ess
complex, that is, they require less time, there is a start and end of the problem-handling
process, and it is more clearly defined. Two concepts are derived from cognitive
psychology that describe the thinking process: mental idea and conceptual model. The
former refers to a rather vague idea of an issue, and the latter concerns a carefully
formulated description of issue characteristics and the relations between them.
Modelling can play a role in transforming the conceptual model into an empirical model
(i.e., intervention).
Mode of application
Compram uses a step-wise process with seven layers to support the construction of a
conceptual model ofthe issue, which is the main aim of the first sub-cycle of problem
handling (see Figure 3.3). The model contains the following seven layers:
In the second sub-cycle, the emphasis is on changing the problem. Compram aims
to create consensus about the conceptual model among group members. DeTombe
distinguishes six moments in the issue-handling process which contribute to this aim.
During the first step, the issue is approached as a knowledge problem. In order to be
able to find adequate solutions for an issue, it is essential that one has a good
understanding of it. Substantial knowledge of and insight into the different elements
which together form the policy issue is required, as is knowledge of the impact of these
elements on society. Experts are therefore invited to share their knowledge of the
particular issue, with the facilitator. DeTombe (1996) points out that it is important for
the experts to be neutral as far as the outcome ofthe policy issue is concerned. Once the
experts have brought in information about the issue, it ~~~ill be evident which the
different parties~organizations involved are. Then, in the second step, these different
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organizations are invited to join the discussion and share their views of the issue.
System dynamics modelling is used in the first two steps.
Figure3.2 The seven-tayer model
I Description in words of the problem
II Definition of the concepts and phenomena of the problem
III Verbal description of the theories, hypotheses, assumptions
IV Graphica] representation of the knowledge in knowledge islands
V A semantic model, which is a graphic representation of the relations between the
concepts and the phenomema
VI A causal model, which is a graphic representation of the causal relations between the
concepts and the phenomena
VII A system dynamic simulation model. The system dynamics model is used in this sub-
cycle as a discussion vehicle
Source: DeTombe, 1994: 246.
In the third step, attention is redirected from the more cognitive aspects to the
socio-political ones. Both experts and representatives of stakeholders are invited to
analyse the issue together and try to find a shared solution in terms of a problem
definition, a policy goal, and a policy plan. The fourth step is an analysis by experts of
the possible effects the policy plan or interventions may have. The expert analysis will
partly be based on the information the stakeholders can provide. The fifth step involves
the implementation of the policy plan. The experts, assisted by the stakeholders, will
guide the implementation process. Finally, in the sixth step, the implementation will be
evaluated. Figure 3.3 gives an overview ofthe two sub-cycles ofthe problem-handling
process which entail the various steps described above.
Different methods like literature search, interviews, surveys, brainstorming, or a
delphi method can be used to gather information and to assist the group-decision
process in creating consensus on the definition, action plan, and implementation.
Requirements
A facilitator can use the following hardware tools: group support room, computers, flip-
over, overhead, whiteboard printer, copy machine; and software tools like the hyper text
system, system dynamic simulation software, spreadsheet, database, text-writer, and
electronic mail.
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Figure 3.3 Tlte subseguent phases of the proólem-haitrilittg process of Compram
First sub-cycle: Defining the proólem
phase 1.1 becoming aware of the problem and forming a mental idea of it
phase 1.2 extending the mental idea by hearing, thinking, reading, talking, asking questions
phase 1.3 gathering data and forming hypotheses about the problem
phase ].4 forming the conceptual model of the problem
Second sub-cycle: Changing the problem
phase 2.1 constructing the empirical model and the desired goal
phase 2.2 defining the action space
phase 2.3 developing hypotheses and suggesting interventions
phase 2.4 constructing and evaluating the scenarios
phase 2.5 implementing interventions
phase 2.6 evaluating interventions
Source: DeTombe, 1996: 3.
3.3.3 Strategic Options Developntent and Analysis
Strategic Options Development and Analysis (SODA) is a method designed by Eden
et al. (1979, 1983, 1989, 1998a), to assist small groups (4 to 12 participants) in tackling
both the qualitative and quantitative elements of complex problems. The single most
important element ofSODA (in its original form) is the technique ofcognitive mapping:
individual group members are assisted in developing their representation of a policy
issue, its background, and its problematic character. So, a cognitive map is a model that
represents how an individual perceives an issue. The map is a drawing ofa web ofideas
that are linked to each other. The pattern shows how these ideas are related: what are
causeslmeans and what are consequences~goals.
In the second part ofthe process, SODA tries to unite the various cognitive maps.
The method focuses on making people feel confident with a particular definition and
policy option, more than on actually solving it. It is important for participants to extend
their sense of ownership. So it is not only the content of the issue with which the
method concerns itself. At least as important are the social aspects ofpolicy issues (cf.
Eden, 1994: 253). Eden argues that a careful balance needs to be struck between
'negotiated social order' and 'socially negotiated order'. Order has to be created in
complex policy issues through negotiations. This implies that negotiations have to take
account of `the social history and anticipated future relationships between key actors'
(Eden, 1994: 259). SODA pays a lot of attention to social relationships in order to
succeed in bringing order to complex issues.
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Goal
The method is directed at bringing together two sets of skills: traits of the facilitator
which guide the process in such a way that the team works efficiently and effectively
together, and, secondly, skills to construct a model and make an appropriate analysis
of the information content the team members share (Eden, 1989: 21).The method aims
to create commitment among policy actors to work together on a strategic map and
together try to `find' a`portfolio ofactions', `goals systems', and `key strategic issues'.
The complexity ofthe policy issues is not reduced, for the method aims to broaden the
detínition of the issue team members have and to order it.
Theoretical background
The method is developed within the operational research paradigm, but it can be
classified as a soft approach to O.R. SODA's policy issue orientation is constructivist
in its outlook. The method draws heavily upon social-psychology, cognitive-
psychology, and organizational theories. Kelly's theory ofpersonal construct (in e.g.,
Eden, 1989: 25) provided the outline for the approach of SODA. This theory was
originally developed for psycho-therapeutical purposes, but it is also useful for other
problems where information handling by individuals or groups plays a role. It deals
with individual information handling and the way individuals make constructions of
reality in their minds. In these constructions, the individual gives meaning to events in
order to make sense of his experiences and to acquire a sense of control of what is
happening. SODA assists people in communicating their beliefs and values regarding
a particular policy issue and captures them in a cognitive map. It is by making sense of
situations that ideas for intervention are triggered.
Organizational theory has also contributed to the methodology. For example,
notions about individual decision-making in an organizational context have been
derived from organizational theory as well as the idea that organizations are often
marked by conflicting coalitions that compete for power and position.
Mode of application
The facilitator who has been asked by a client to assess a specific policy issue will, if
possible, start the process by assembling the cognitive maps of individual team
members. Important phrases are selected from interviews held with individual team
members, and contrasting concepts are defined as a means of clarifying ideas.
Subsequently, the main concepts are linked: arrows are drawn on a map, and thus the
meaning of concepts is further clarified. Figure 3.4 gives an impression of a cognitive
map. The concepts are phrased in such a way that they indicate a possible action.
Furthermore, for every pair of linked concepts it must be clarified what is the
goal~outcome~end and what the action~optionlmeans (Eden: 1989: 29). In this way, a
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clear order of concepts is established with the main goal at the top combining strings
ofconcepts which are interlinked. A concept is both a goal for the previous concept and
an action contributing to the following concept. Building models by means ofcognitive
mapping has the advantage that maps can be drawn and discussed while the clientlteam
member is being interviewed. This enhances the sense of ownership and enables the
facilitator to ask for clarifications. The designers of SODA have developed
a computer program, called COPE, which enables them to store and analyse the often
complicated cognitive maps with relative ease. COPE has become a very useful tool for
the SODA method (Eden, 1989:37).
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Once the model is sufficiently specific and encompassing, the facilitator will start
working with individual clients and their cognitive maps. Eden developed a top-down
approach and a bottom-up approach for discussing the maps. The first approach is a
further exploration of the goal system, the concepts that are highest in the hierarchy.
Possible higher goals are discussed and, subsequently, facilitator and client gradually
work their way down the pattern of options for action.
In the bottom-up approach, the analysis of the map will commence at the bottom
of the hierarchical pattern, and the facilitator and client gradually work their way up
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towards the main goals, exploring each concept as a potential action. This first phase
aims to help individual clients to `change their minds' about the nature of the issue
through a combination ofself-reflection with respect to the map, and gentle negotiation
with the consultant (Eden, 1989: 33).
Once the individual cognitive maps are sufficiently clear, they will be merged into
one strategic map. This map is used in a workshop to negotiate a problem definition
andlor necessary actions. Attention must be paid to the fact that the map should be a
'balanced representation ofkey team members'.
In order to be able to analyse the very extensive strategic map, the facilitator must
cluster the different concepts in issue-arenas of 15 to 30 related concepts, representing
one aspect of the policy issue. While clustering, the facilitator must not only pay
attention to the structure but also to the content and process captured by the strategic
map.' Furthermore, every single cluster ís tested by suggesting a sensible sub-issue
(Eden, 1989: 38). With the aid of these clusters, the agenda for the workshop will be
prepared. The agenda should reflect the idea that problem structuring is a cyclical
process.
Sometimes it may not be clear whether concepts that seem similar can be merged.
The facilitator can ask for clarification in the workshop. This is why Eden suggests that
the facilitator should start with a brief introduction to the system of key goals, the
interrelated issues, key options, and assumptions. This activity aims to make clear to the
group members that their thoughts are part of the larger map and hence part of the
process. The facilitator will work at extending their sense of ownership to the whole
model. Afrer this round, the second part of the workshop will address the various
clusters that have been analysed. The facilitator can again opt for one ofthe two modes
(goal-oriented or action-oriented) of working with the team on the cluster maps. In this
round, discussion is encouraged, and the maps will be elaborated and extended in the
session. Quite often, a cluster map may call for further analysis of, for example,
financial flows or market developments.
Requirements
Two facilitators, are needed as well as a suitable environment with hardware tools like
a large computer display, personal computers, blank wall space, large sheets of paper,
waterbased pens, COPE (software) and associative and creative thinking techniques.
3 The COPE software system offers various methods for analyzing and clustering concepts.
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3.3.4 Strategic Asszrrnption Stirfacing and Testing
Strategic Assumption Surfacing and Testing (SAST) is a method developed by Mason
and Mitroff (1981). It focuses on the analysis of key assumptions of particular policy
plans. SAST aims to tackle complex policy issues in both public and private
organizations.
There are four important principles that determine the design ofthe method. First,
in order to be able to handle complex policy issues, there needs to be an adversarial
context to elicit creative and good ideas. The second principle is that participative action
is necessary to acquire as much relevant information as possible and to create the
necessary backing for implementing the solution. The difference in perceptions and the
adversarialness should ultimately be overcome, and unity should be established in order
to develop one integrated and coherent action plan which carries sufficient commitment
for a successful implementation. This is the third principle. Finally, the fourth principle
is that SAST aims to increase managers' insight into their own assumptions about their
organization, the policies they develop, their planning strategy, and their strategic policy
issues.
Goal
SAST aims to elicit information from key stakeholders who are involved in a policy
issue, and it aims to give them insight into the underlying assumptions of policies,
plans, andlor strategies. Furthermore, it assists the negotiation between representatives
of the organization on the various strategic assumptions and their relevance for the
particular policy issue.
Theoretical backgrou~td
SAST is very much a product of different disciplines. It is set in the traditions of
planning and policy-making theories. But also behavioural sciences like social-
psychology are among the sciences that influenced the designers of SAST. Dewey's
ideas about the uncertainty that characterizes the world we live in are also relevant, an
uncertainty that can never be fully tamed. Hence, the need to discover means to find the
minimum certainty necessary to `get the job done' (Mason and Mitroff, 1981: 19). A
scientific method is viewed as the appropriate way. This method is based on systems
thinking and is inspired by the ideas ofChurchman and Ackoff, e.g., about the different
stages in a problem-solving process. These stages, 'problem sensing, problem defining,
formal modelling, solution derivation, implementation monitoring', are all viewed as
part of an interactive process.
However, like the other methods discussed here, the design has also been




At the initial phase ofthe process (phase 1), the right people need to be selected who
can provide the necessary inforniation. Key figures are invited to join the group.
Depending on the size of the group, it might be subdivided into smaller ones because
those perform better according to Mason and Mitroff (1981: 39). Care should be taken
that in the smaller groups interpersonal similarity is maximized in order to reduce the
chance of conflict, whereas between groups a maximum difference in perspectives
should be realized. There are different means by which individuals can be clustered.
Mason and Mitroff (1981: 41) refer to techniques based on multivariate analyses of
individual preferences for tasks and fellow-group members and a personality test based
on Jungian psychology. Once the groups have been selected, they all are given an
introduction to the main goals. The idea behind this is, that, generally speaking,
organizations do not like members to contest the basic assumptions. So, by giving
different groups adversarial orientations, they are more likely to contest basic
assumptions of others. Furthermore, the fact that people work in a group bolsters their
self-confidence and makes it easier for them to present deviant ideas or plans. Group
sense is stimulated by inviting group members to give their group a name and briefly
present their main point of attention.
In phase 2, the different groups meet separately and start identifying all the
stakeholders who are a party in the policy issue. Subsequently, the group is asked to
assign assumptions to these stakeholders, based on the idea that these assumptions
would benefit strategy of one's own group.
Next, in phase 3, in every group the different assumptions are tested on their
relevance for the policy issue. Each assumption can also be phrased negatively, and if
this opposite does not make a difference for the chosen strategy, then the assumption
is not relevant for the issue (cf. Mason and Mitroff, 1981:45-46). Each assumption can
be rated on its importance for the policy issue and on the variable of `certainty'. These
scores can be drawn in a quadrant. Sometimes more sophisticated scales and rating
techniques are used. If there is insufficient agreement among group members, the group
discussion leader will encourage a dialogue to find out whether some members perhaps
lack information. Then the group is asked to identify 6 to 8 pivotal assumptions.
In ph~se 4, there is a joint meeting of the different groups in which a dialectic
debate takes place: every group gives a presentation of the policy ofits preference and
pictures the implications this policy may have. The other groups are given the
opportunity to ask for clarifications of certain points. When all the cases have been
presented, a round of discussion is opened and people are asked to challenge the
underlying assumptions of other groups. The charts with the assumptions are then
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The charts give a good insight into the prevailing beliefs and values regarding the policy
issue and~or organization(s) the group members represent. In an assumption-negotiation
process, assumptions that were being objected to by other groups are discussed and
modified. First, the most threatening ones are modified, and the owner group is asked
to check whether this modification is acceptable to them. This process proceeds until
only assumptions remain on which no agreement is reached. These assumptions are then
further tested and broken down into components, data (hard facts), and warrants
(assumptions that link the data and claim).
The final phase, phase 5, aims at creating consensus among the group members.
Cooperation is stimulated by asking the individual group members to suggest
assumptions, which could resolve issues of contention.
The session(s) are followed by an analysis of the key assumptions, and additional
data are gathered through other sources like: research approaches (e.g., financial
analysis, econometric analysis, simulation models), judgmental approaches (e.g., delphi
panels, scenario writing, focussed discussion group) and monitoring approaches (e.g.,
social indicators, event monitoring). However, these types of information are needed
for a better understanding of the issues central to the organization. But they are not easy
to interpret, which is why a'planning information book' can be important. Apart from
a prioritized list of the most critical issues SAST has uncovered, this book contains an
assessment of the state of knowledge with respect to the solution of these issues, and
an overview ofcurrent and planned activities to generate knowledge that contributes to
solving the most important issues.
Requirements
A facilitator, various rooms where groups can meet, hardware tools like large sheets of
paper, a slide or overhead projector, software tools like various techniques that can
assist in splitting the group (e.g., personality test, multivariate analysis), brainstorming
activities, additional information gathering-tools like scientific research, judgmental
approaches (e.g., delphi's, expert conferences).
3.3.5 Soft Systems Methodology
Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) is perhaps one of the first methods that was
developed to overcome the inadequacies of hard systems like O.R. and systems
engineering. Since traditional systems engineering was unable to cope with highly
complex policy issues, Checkland (1989) developed a method that would encompass
the more socio-political and normative aspects of complexity. SSM aims to assist
people in learning about the various aspects of a complex issue because often it is not
at all clear what the issue involves. By offering new insights into an issue, SSM paves
the way for action.
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Goal
SSM aims to assist representatives of organizations in clarifying policy issues. By
modelling the complex issue, conflicting objectives, needs, purposes, interests, values,
and perceptions can be discussed and shared. SSM does more than only facilitating
problem structuring. It explicitly focuses on defining solutions for certain problem
situations. Moreover, SSM can be used for implementation purposes as well. Checkland
(1989,1998; Checkland and Scholes, 1990) emphasizes that SSM is `a learning, not an
optimizing system'.
Theoretical Background
Soft Systems Methodology is inspired by systems engineering, which is a hard systems
approach. Systems engineering involves objectivistic and teleological thinking. Systems
are viewed as entities which refer to parts ofreality. Systems engineering focuses on the
purpose ofa system or object and will then start building the system or object for which
answers have been specified. So, first a specification of an issue is made, and then the
engineer will develop the most effective and efficient way to tackle it. In the case of
systems engineering, it is evident from the start what the characteristics ofthe issue are.
It is not concerned with structuring complex policy issues in particular. As an example
of a product of system engineering, Checkland (1989: 73) refers to the first landing on
the moon. Although this was in many ways a very complex project involving highly
sophisticated scientific knowledge and a complicated network of organizations, the
main goal of the project had been clearly defined by the US president. However, the
objective is not always as clear-cut. Soft Systems Methodology was developed to clarify
these issues and assist people in learning about the various aspects of `reality'. The
systems SSM is concerned with, are not objectivistic in their outlook but are the product
of human interaction and interpretation. They are learning devices. SSM is a means to
learn about what people define as purposeful action. The purpose people ascribe to
actions is determined by their `Weltanschauung'. Weltanschauung refers to personal
values that are a product of people's experiences. So different people can have different
perceptions ofsystems, due to differences in their weltanschauung. Because perceptions
are often diverse, SSM focuses on group processes in order to give people an
opportunity to familiarize themselves with the views of others. Preferably, various
representatives ofthe client organization(s) actively take part and work together on an
issue that needs clarification. SSM teaches by comparing models of purposeful action
with activities that are going on in the real world.
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Source: Checkland, 1989: 84.
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Mode of applicat~on
SSM was introduced in the seventies, but its designers never stopped adapting the
methodology. In Figure 3.6, the traditional seven stages of SSM are presented.
However, since it suggests that these seven stages are always followed in this sequence
Checkland and Scholes ( 1990) presented a more recent style of working (see Figure
3.7).
In the more traditional application of SSM, a distinction is made beriveen the
stages one, two, five, and seven, which focus on the real world as such, and stages three
and four, which concentrate on systems thinking about the real world.
Figure 3.7 presents an issue with a particular history and two interacting streams
of inquiry for improving that issue: a logic-based stream and a cultural based stream.
Both will be discussed below.
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The logic-based stream ofanalysis assumes that a number of human activity systems
that characterize the issue are `named, modelled and used to illuminate the problem
situation. This is done by comparing the models with perceptions ofthe part of the real
world being examined' (Checkland and Scholes, 1990: 28). In order to facilitate the
naming of sub-systems, the mnemonic CATWOE is used in order to define root
definitions. CATWOE stands for:
C- customer: Who would be victimslbeneficiaries of the purposeful activity?
A- actor: Who would do the activities?
T- transformation process: What is the purposeful activity expressed as:
input - T - output?
W- weltanschauung: What the world makes this definition meaningful?
O- owner: Who could stop this activity?
E- environmental: Wat constraints in its environment does this system take as
constraints given?
Source: Checkland and Scholes, 1990.
The transformation process is the heart of the root definition. The other elements are
important in order to enrich the understanding of that which needs to be transformed.
A root definition has the following form: "a system to do X by Y in order to achieve Z'
(Checkland and Scholes, 1990: 36). After naming human activity systems,4 models are
made of verbs that indicate the various activities that are necessary to achieve the
transformation process as it is defined with the aid of the CATWOE elements. As a rule,
7 t 2 activities are defined for one transfotmation process. Subsequently, different
activities can be further assessed as a source for a root definition. Activities are
connected by means ofarrows. The activities are linked in order of contingency. These
human activity systems should be monitored as far as their effectiveness, efficacy, and
efficiency are concerned. So, for each system the participants have to define what
constitutes purposeful action: what are the criteria for effectiveness, efficiency, and
efficacy. With these criteria, it is possible to observe the system and see whether it
works in accordance with the criteria. Human activity systems are inter-linked in a
stratified order. The assembled systems, which consist of various layers of
(sub)systems, may contain as many as 200 activities. Discussion can also be encouraged
by comparing models based on different world views. The aim is to find a divisor for
the various interests it represents.
4 Checkland and Scholes cefer to human activity systems as holons.
~1
The second parallel stream of analysis is the cultural analysis: the following three
analyses are carried out and their results combined. Analysis one concerns the
intervention in the issue: the client and would-be problem solvers are listed and help
choosing the relevant systems in the logic driven stream of enquiry. Analysis two
concerns the issue as a social system. Different social roles are discussed, as well as
their expected behaviours (norms), and judgement is passed on the performance of
social actors in their roles (value). In the third analysis, the political aspects ofthe issue
and the disposition of power are examined. These three analyses are complementary to
the logical stream of thinking. They are on-going activities, for the three analyses
concern dynamic entities.
The two streams ofanalysis result in a definition ofthe transformations that need
to take place, and subsequently their implementation is debated. The SSM cycle can
also be used for this.
Requirements
Hardware tools which are used are whiteboards, flipchart, pencils and paper. An
important software tools is the CATWOE analysis.
3.4 Comparing methods
The five problem-structuring methods described in the previous section are all examples
ofsoft method approaches. Rosenhead (1989: 13) sees such soft methods as examples
of a new paradigm in the operational research tradition. All five methods are influenced
by system thinking. Group model-building and Compram use system dynamics; SODA
is inspired by operational research; SSM has systems engineering as its source of
inspiration; and SAST refers to system thinking in general. They combine the system
approach with theories from social and behavioural sciences. In addition, they assist
group-decision making. Anothercharacteristic they share is theirparticipative approach.
The methods directly involve the policy makers who are responsible for the policy
issue. They assist and direct group processes which involve formulation, debate,
thinking, and rethinking a policy issue. All five methods prescribe which route to follow
by a sequence ofstages, but they do not necessarily have to be followed in a set order.
Flexibility is allowed and even desirable, as especially Eden (1989) and Checkland
(1989) point out.
Another important feature of the methods discussed here is that they model the
issue they are interested in. These models are important means of communicating
complex issues to participants. The graphical language that is used is more accessible
than mathematical notations would be, but they differ in what they represent. For
instance, in SODA cognitive or group mapping is used as a tool to construct a model
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that represents the meaning people attach to concepts, whereas the system dynamics
models ofgroup model-building and Compram use causal diagrams. The arrows in the
maps represent causal relationships between variables (Vennix, 1996: 117, 125). The
modelling approaches are similar, but the models represent different concepts and
relationships between these concepts.
There are additional distinctions between the methods. Whereas most methods
involve actors which are stakeholders, Compram includes experts in the process of
problem structuring. More than the other methods Compram is oriented towards
structuring the cognitive aspects of the policy issue. SODA and SSM seem to be more
concerned with interaction and encouraging a shared understanding of the actors
involved than with the information exchange as such. All methods, however, combine
a process- and content-orientation, but some are more content-oriented, and others put
more emphasis on process aspects. There are also differences in emphasis on tangible
outcomes (concrete decisions ancUor actions) and other effects (individual learning,
mutual acceptance).
The methods differ to some extent in their scope on the handling of complex
policy issues (cf. Hofman,1995). Group model-building addresses problem structuring
but also looks at potential solutions. Compram, originally developed as a device that
concentrated on problem structuring, has been developed into a tool that can cover the
whole policy-making process. SAST concentrates on assumptions regarding potential
solutions to policy issues, before addressing the initial problem definition. In SODA,
the emphasis is on problem structuring, but like SAST, the method takes the participants
from problem structuring to exploring solutions. SSM is an action-oriented approach
that covers the entire process from problem structuring to the implementation ofplans.
None ofthe methods exclusively addresses problem structuring as such.
The five methods have been developed in reasonable isolation. The designers of
SODA and SSM do not see the theoretical foundation of the other's theory (Eden, 1990:
91). SSM emphasizes a holistic and system approach to policy issues, whereas SODA
focuses more on the micro-level of policy-making activities by individuals and groups
in organizations. Facilitators who tend to be experts in one method are rather sceptical
about the merits of combining theirs with other methods (cf. Vennix, 1996). They are
also inclined to believe that learning to use one method is already such a difficult task
that it would be impossible to try and become an expert in several methods. There are
nevertheless proponents who believe that combining elements ofvarious methods can
be productive. Lane and Oliva (1994), for instance, advocate combining SSM and
systems dynamics in order to overcome their respective weaknesses. They detect an
increased interest among proponents of systems dynamics to incorporate tools or
aspects ofother methods. Recent projects of action research in which two methods are
combined are an intervention in which Ackermann, Eden and Williams (1997)
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combined SODA and System Dynamics modelling. The SODA-map was used as a
blueprint for the SD-model which provided more detailed and quantitative information
about the issue. In another case SODA was combined with a multi-criteria evaluation
approach. With SODA data was gathered and alternative options were chosen and the
software package VISA was used for evaluating implementation (Belton, Ackermann,
and Shepherd, 1997).
Although methods should be flexible enough to adapt to particular circumstances
of a policy issue, there are limits to this elasticity. Some methods are more useful for
certain problem issues and certain styles ofpolicy making (as set by the culture of the
organization(s)) than others. For instance, SAST presupposes that there is sufficient
liberty among the stakeholders to discuss openly underlying assumptions ofa particular
policy plan. This presupposes a certain level of open-mindedness and acceptance of
criticism. This is not always feasible. In addition, Rohrbaugh and Eden ( 1990: 47) point
out that facilitators ought to have insight into (inter) organizational processes and
various methods to be able to adequately match these two.
To complicate things even further, Cropper (1990: 30) points out that there are
significant differences in practice in how one method is applied by various facilitators.
As Cropper points out `method, then, is not all'. There are sources ofinfluence like the
facilitator and the surroundings, which affect problem-structuring interventions. These
will be discussed in section 3.6.
3.5 Choosing a method
Five methods have been described which can assist policy networks with structuring
complex policy issues. In our study, gaming~simulations will be used as a research
environment (see the next chapter). Hence, the method we will assess should comply
with the conditions a gamelsimulation stipulates: time will be an important constrain.
The Compram and SAST methods seem to be the least appropriate for this study.
Compram combines different techniques. It focuses predominantly on cognitive
complexity and demands a substantial time investment. Furthermore, experts play an
important role in it, which probably makes it more costly. Compram has been developed
more recently which is why there is limited experience with its practical use, an
additional reason for an alternative choice. SAST focuses more on solutions than on
problem structuring in the strict sense. It first assesses policy options and their
underlying assumptions, and subsequently, discusses the participants' perceptions ofthe
issue. SAST is therefore a method that reconstructs rather than structures policy issues
and is therefore less appropriate.
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This leaves us with three alternatives. The above table presents an overview of
important characteristics of the other three methods. The system dynamic models that
are constructed in group-model-building sessions are more specific than those of SSM
and SODA. Furthermore, SSM and group model-building require more rules in order
to build their maps. The SODA approach has the advantage that its mapping style
conforms more to the way people think and express themselves than the other two
methods. This is more in accordance with constructivist theory and has practical
advantages for its application. Furthermore, SSM focuses more explicitly on the
transformation of the issue and, hence, on policy development whereas SODA is
oriented more on problem structuring, although it also includes policy development.
Given the three dimensions of complexity, SODA is also to be preferred over group
model-building because system dynamic models emphasize cognition more. The
method we wish to examine will be tested in a gaming~simulation, and an intervention
based on SODA can be introduced in an experiment more easily.
3.6 Intervening variables when applying problem-structuring methods
In situations in which a method of problem structuring is introduced to aid the policy-
making process, there are, apart from the method itself, some additional variables which
may influence the problem structuring. These will be briefly discussed here.
The facilitator is the person who applies the method, and as such he or she is an
important source of influence to be reckoned with. His personal qualities and skills
influence the outcome of the intervention strategy. No matter how sophisticated a
learning method may be, a bad teacher can spoil everything. It is therefore evident that
the person of the facilitator matters. As pointed out above, facilitators using the same
methods differ in the way they apply them. Moreover, `there are certain significant
features of practice that may be shared by consultants using different methods' (cf.
Cropper,1990: 30). Facilitators have different skills, knowledge, and views, so their use
of intervention methods and tools will partly depend on such individual characteristics.
A choice can be made for an internal or external facilitator. A possible advantage
of an internal facilitator may be that he is familiar with the different participants and
knows the context in which the issue and policy process is set. However, as
Mayon-White (1990: 81) points out, an external facilitator is to be preferred because
assisting group processes is a very demanding task and requires persons with special
knowledge and experiences in this field. Moreover, an external facilitator has the
additional advantage ofbeing more independent and will therefore probably be viewed
as more trustworthy than a network participant.
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Another factor concerns the physical surroundings in which groups meet. In the many
sessions of group problem solving they facilitated, Eden (1990), Huxham (1990), and
Hickling (1990) experienced, that the physical surroundings are an important factor to
be taken into consideration. For instance, SODA (Strategic Options Development and
Analysis) hard- and software can be used to assist group-decision making. The ideas of
the participants are fed into the computer and projected on to a big screen, where a big
map is constructed of the issue that is being discussed. This screen is important in
making participants feel that the map they built, is owned by them and not something
handed out to them by some expert advisor. So the screen aids in acquiring a sense of
ownership and hence stimulates commitment and consensus. Apart from the screen,
computers, and software, the ideal environment for SODA will also require facilities
like flip charts and~or whiteboards. These facilities can be instrumental in documenting
the history of the process, which is also important for building ownership. The use of
colours and symbols in mapping problems is also important. They not only help the
participants in managing the complexity of content but also have a decorative and
entertaining function and thus assist in keeping participants interested and attentive
(Eden, 1990:158). Lighting and darkening rooms can assist in drawing people's
attention to a particular aspect of the process. For example, spotlights can be used to
draw attention to the round table where social interaction takes place and thus stimulate
communication rather than draw attention to the screen and hence the model. Indeed,
if a table needs to be used, a round table should be preferred. All these facilities can
give people a sense of being away from their daily workplace. A real move away from
their usual surroundings can give them an additional `breath of fresh air' (Eden,
1990:156). Not only the tools facilitators use are relevant but also the design of the
room itself. Facilitators have experienced all too often that the room they were working
in was either too small or too large for the group or was lacking facilities to attach the
whiteboards or flip-overs to, or its furniture could not easily be moved around. These
may seem trivial aspects, but they influence the performance ofboth the facilitator and
participants engaged in any group-decision process. These aspects are `interwoven with
the philosophical, and hence the intellectual basis of the approaches' (Huxham, 1990:
167). The problem-structuring method alone, therefore, does not determine the outcome
of the intervention.
3.7 Quality criteria for problem structuring
The complexity ofpolicy issues is a reason for policy actors to use a formal method as
an intervention instrument to assist the problem-structuring process. There seems to be
a growing awareness that problem structuring - which has been a rather neglected topic
for a long time (see also Chapter 1) - plays a decisive role in policy-making. Dunn
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(1994: 182) sees problem structuring as the most crucial but least understood aspect of
policy analysis. Dery (1984: 2) also emphasizes that problem structuring, although
acknowledged as essential by methodologists, is neglected by most public-policy
analysts and policy makers. Problem-structuring methods claim they reduce or manage
complexity and thus improve the quality of problem structuring in policy making both
in terms ofthe process and policy outcome. In order to be able to assess methods that
assists problem structuring, it is necessary to define quality criteria to measure the
effects of inethods.
Van de Graaf and Hoppe (1992: 433, following Dery, 1984) suggest the three
following criteria for problem-structuring products:
1. the problem definition must be solvable and fit a solution that is realistic;
2. the problem must be defined with an intervention perspective in mind; it must be
brought into line with what is meaningful action for organizations;
3. the problem definition should offer a genuine chance of improvement of the
(problem) situation in future.
These rather general criteria focus on the outcome of problem structuring. They do not
differentiate between alternatives that satisfy all three criteria. Furthermore, they are
insufficiently sophisticated to deal with the different types of complexity which mark
policy issues.
Other criteria are offered by Geurts and Vennix (1989). They define the follo-wing
criteria for analysing complex policy issues. First, analytical criteria deal with the
cognitive side ofthe issue. Premature closure of the issue should be avoided. Further-
more, a broad policy perspective is required. Methods dealing with complex issues have
to be both flexible and hybrid in order to adapt to changing perceptions of policy
makers and to arrange for more scientifically based information and more subjective
information. Deductions need to be logically sound. A second category Geurts and
Vennix define are process criteria, which are better tuned to influencing the social-
political and normative complexity ofpolicy issues. Complex issues require a step-by-
step approach and the active involvement ofthose who have a stake in the issue so they
can contribute information. Communication ofthe different perceptions ofstakeholders
is also essential. Finally, the most important criterion, which is the intended result of
every problem-structuring method they mention is, `problem-solving rationality'.
Methods should encourage thinking (cf. Mason and Mittrof, 1981).
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Table 3.2 Criteriafor analysing complex policy issues
analytical criteria - broad view of the content
- broad policy perspective
- flexible and hybrid method
- lo ical deductions
process criteria - step by step approach
- pluralistic participation
- communication is stimulated
intended result - support of thinking: improving the rationality ofproblem
solving
Source: Geurts and Vennix, 1989: 48.
The analytical criteria correspond with the `harder' approach to problem structuring
mentioned in section 3.2 whereas process criteria correspond with the softer approach.
The recommendation that the methods used should be hybrids implies that they should
contain elements of either of these two approaches. Reality is often too rigid for an
unequivocal application ofall these criteria (Geurts and Vennix, 1989). Depending on
the sort of policy issue, policy makers and analysts will make a selection that fits the
issue they are dealing with. Their choice is determined by conditions like financial
means, time, and normative complexity, that is, the norms, values, and rules that
determine the settings for policy-making processes in inter-organizational networks.
Another set of criteria was introduced by Joldersma (1992, 1993). These were
inspired by the main characteristics ofpolicy theory and related to criteria Hoogerwerf
(1987; 1992) has defined for the quality ofpolicy: namely, rationality and legitimacy.
Rationality refers to purposiveness, efficiency, effectiveness, value rationality, and
empirical causal thinking. Legitimacy refers to the level ofacceptance ofthose who are
involved in some way or another.






- fundamental character (ofpolicy).
These five influence both the rationality and the legitimacy ofpolicy (Joldersma, 1992:
156). They are more oriented on cognitive aspects of policy issues than on socio-
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political or normative aspects. In our perception, content, scope, precision, and
fundamental character can be considered as aspects of cognitive complexity.
A third approach that could be valuable in grasping which quality criteria can
indicate an improvement ín problem-structuring, is offered by Lyles and Thomas
(1988). They researched in which way successful issue formulators differ from
unsuccessful ones. Table 3.3 gives an overview of their results.
Table 3.3 Characteristics of (wt)successful strategic issue formulaters
contextual definin res ondin
successful - generate multiple - multiviews of - past success pro-
scenarios of worst case problem's nature grammes
- many past experiences - strong discussion or - newly designed
with unanticipated debate programmes




unsuccessful - formalized environ-ment - single view of pro- - past success
scanning and low blems' nature programmes well
scenario generation - consensus or man- developed
- few past experiences dated - rigid
with unanticipated - strong need to reduce - poor discrimination
events ambíguity skills
- centralized
Source: Lyles and Thomas, 1988: 141.
Policy makers who are successful in problem structuring have had many past
experiences with unanticipated events, which helps structure a new issue. Furthermore,
regarding the realization of an issue definition, they use inquiry methods that generate
a multiview of the issue, encourage discussion, and tolerate ambiguity. Overall, their
responses are overall directed at adopting past success programmes, designing new
ones, and unlearning past programmes. They use different thinking frameworks.
Depending on the situation, they make a selection from their repertoire. Although these
criteria that used for strategic intra-organizational issues and, in part, focus on
characteristics of policy makers themselves, they nevertheless provide useful
information for establishing quality criteria for problem structuring of other complex
issues. The criteria address predominantly, but not exclusively, cognitive compexity.
6Q
In accordance with Geurts and Vennixb, a broad perspective of the issue is advocated.
Furthermore, Table 3.3 indicates that an effective problem-structuring method should
stimulate debate and tolerance ofambiguity.
In addition to more theoretical perspectíves, criteria can also be deduced from the
aims and experiences ofinethod designers. In this chapter five methods were discussed
that support problem structuring. They advocate approaches that have some common
characteristics. They can be identified as criteria of problem structuring. All advocate
the relevance ofa participatory approach: it is important to actively involve the different
stakeholders in the process. Mason and Mitroff explicitely add to this the importance
of a democratic nature of the process. Moreover, the methods use models to represent
various ideas policy actors have of an issue in order to obtain a rich view of the issue,
and share experiences and ideas. Modelling involves not only generating ideas but also
linking ideas to make clear how variables are related and certain developments affect
others.' Commitment and consensus are mentioned by Vennix (1996) and Eden (1994,
et al. 1998a) as important goals of their methods.
The quality criteria we wish to use in this research should be responsive to the
different types of complexity defined in section 2.2.4 .
Various criteria have been defined above that relate to cognitive complexity.
Virtually all approaches, whether they are predominantly inspired by theory or practice,
indicate that a problem-structuring method should broaden the participants' view ofthe
issue. Geurts and Vennix (1989) - following Mason and Mitroff - refer to it as a`broad
view of content' and Lyles and Thomas (1988) advocate `multi-views of problem
nature'. We will redefine this criterion as `aspect differentiation' (cf. Rohrbaugh and
Eden, 1990). Policy makers need to acquire a rich perspective of the issue that
encompasses the various aspects and ideas stakeholders hold of the issue. Aspects are
building blocks that can be combined into ideas, and ideas constitute an issue. The
greater the diversity of aspects that are attributed to an issue, the higher the level of
aspect differentiation. The criterion of aspect differentiation captures the need for
divergent thinking when a group of actors is trying to unravel a particular issue. A
narrow perception ofan issue may lead to group think and hence to a type ofpolicy that
does not genuinely match the issue one faces.
Cognitive complexity cannot be managed by divergent thinking and richness of
aspects alone. Order and transparency require that divergent thinking is balanced by
integrating forces aimed at bringing together the different aspects and making sure that
6 Both the criteria Lyles and Thomas and Geurts and Vennix present are partly based on the work of
Mitroff.
7 In system dynamics models feedback loops play an important role. They refer to the linking of variables
whích indicate that the affected behaviour in turn has consequences for the initial behaviour.
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the very broad map which is being drawn of an issue will change and transform itself
into a more focussed and cohesive representation of the policy issue aspects. The more
the problem-structuring process proceeds, the more centrifugal motions should replace
the centripetal motions and result in a map ofthe policy issues that is more meaningful
to the policy actors. Our second criterion which addresses cognitive complexity is
`aspect integration'. This refers to the extent to which various aspects are combined and
linked into ideas and ideas into an issue. In the definition ofproblem structuring that we
introduced in Chapter 2, the notion of `building aspects' was introduced. The criterion
of aspect integration concerns these `building' activities. By selecting and combining
aspects, more encompassing strings of ideas arise. By linking aspects effectively, order
and transparency are created. The need for integration is recognized by both method
designers and theorists (cf. Mason and Mimof, l 981; Hart, 1985; Rohrbaugh and Eden,
1990: 45; Massey and O'Keefe, 19938).
Besides cognitive complexity, a particular method needs to address the socia-
political complexity ofan issue. Criteria which concem the social-political complexity
of an issue and which were introduced above are pluralistic participation (Geurts and
Vennix, 1989), broad participation and democracy (Mason and Mittrof, 1981),
commitment and consensus (Vennix, 1996; Eden, 1994), and strong discussion~debate
(Lyles and Hammer, 1988). These various criteria address the contribution different
stakeholders can make to problem structuring. Methods of problem structuring should
ensure that the different interests which have a stake in the issue are being considered.
Furthermore, they intend to increase the level of involvement of a stakeholder.
`Balancing interests' and `participation' are the two criteria that can be derived from the
qualities problem-structuring methods require.
`Balancing interests' can be defined as the level at which the actors in the policy
network consider and weigh the various interests involved. Ignoring particular interests,
or immediately paying skewed attention to one particular interest is not in accordance
with the participatory nature of the problem-structuring methods discussed in this
chapter. In their deliberations, the interests need to be addressed and weighed. In a
participatory policy process, premature disproportionate attention for one particular
interest at the expense of other interests involved is undesirable. The organizations or
people behind the interests involved represent valuable information andlor support
which can contribute to policy making. Hence, it is important to pay attention to the
various interests. It is not the realization ofwin-win solutions which is its goal but the
avoidance ofa disregard of interests. Summarizing, `balancing interests' refers to the
8 Massey and O'Keefe defined five attributes to assess problem structuring. One of which is structure and
includes integration of aspects.
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level at which policy makers weigh the interests of the various stakeholders involved
in the issue. Problem-structuring methods aim to stimulate sharing perceptions ofissues.
`Participation' can be defined as the level at which a policy network actively
supports the policy-making process in general, and problem structuring in particular.
This ínvolvement can have different forms: people can contribute in terms of ideas,
investing energy and~or offering financial support. Methods and techniques, like the
oval mapping technique, aim to raise the active involvement ofstakeholders in problem
structuring. A higher level of participation contributes to possibly more complete
framing of the issue (more ideas may be generated as a result of a more intense
involvement) and a wider support for the policy.
The third dimension which characterizes complex policy issues is normative
complexity. If an issue is highly normatively complex, the norms and values the
participants hold conflict strongly. Rules and regulations organizations hold are
expressions of norms and values. In order to manage normative complexity, policy
actors have to be persuaded to recognize each others position. Lyles and Hammer
(1988) point to the importance of `tolerance of ambiguity'. The quality of problem
structuring is raised when opposed norms and values are acknowledged. Furthermore,
`strong discussion~debate' can also affect normative complexity, for it also aims to
juxtapose extreme positions and thus contrasting norms and values (cf Mason and
Mittrof, 1981). A debate is of little effect if participants do not listen to each other.
Furthermore, mutual understanding is a requirement for reducing the level ofcontention
between opposing norms and values. Our fifth criterion is therefore `communication'.
It refers to the level of cognitive and mutual understanding among participants.
Participants need to comprehend the debate to be able to make a valuable contribution
to it. However, debates are never information interchanges pur sang, but they also - and
perhaps more profoundly - involve an exchange of emotions. There needs to be a
readiness among the participants to accept and respect each other as valuable
contributors. Through good conununication, trust is raised. Without trust, the
effectiveness and legitimacy of the process is jeopardized.
Furthermore, normative complexity can be influenced by managing the debate.
Related criteria which were mentioned above, are `a step by step approach' (Geurts and
Vennix, 1989) and `managerial mind supporting' (Mason and Mittrof,1981; Geurts and
Vennix, 1989). The sixth quality criterion is `process management'. This is the level at
which a debate is organized and structured. A well managed process involves offering
participants opportunities to contribute, challenging them to define and~or pursue the
goals, and to check whether there is support from the rank and file of the various
organizations involved (cf. Gray and Wood, 1991). Process management can be fruitful
for a good policy. A parallel can be drawn with the role of a facilitator who is important
to the application ofSODA. Policy making also requires organization and coordination.
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The way the process is managed is therefore an important characteristic of problem-
structuring.
3.8 Summary
In this chapter, methods for facilitating the structuring ofpolicy issues were discussed.
A distinction was made between hard and soft methods. Hard methods fail to grasp the
different aspects of the complexity ofpolicy issues; therefore, only soft methods were
discussed. The methods which were addressed are Group model-building, Compram,
Soft systems methodology (SSM), Strategic assumption surfacing and testing (SAST),
and strategic options development and analysis (SODA). The methodology for all five
methods is based on combinations of various systems thinking approaches and other
theories from the social and behavioural sciences. They all involve a sequence ofstages
which do not have to be followed strictly but, depending on the characteristics of the
policy issue, can be applied in different sequences. They all make use ofdifferent tools
and modelling techniques. They differ, however, in what they model. In this research,
SODA will be used to assist problem structuring. (This choice will be further discussed
in Chapter 5.)
When introducing methods to facilitate problem structuring, there are other factors
which influence the process. An important factor is the facilitator. Different facilitators
will obtain different results on the basis of the same method. Furthermore, a greater
number ofenvironmental conditions, like the space(s) in which the meetings take place,
are also relevant to the outcome. Finally, six quality criteria for problem structuring
were defined which will be used for testing SODA in a gamelsimulation.
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4. Gaming~Simulation as an experimental
environment: the research design
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter introduced some characteristics of problem-structuring meth-
ods and described five of these methods in detail. The aim of this research is to
examine whether and how a problem-structuring method based on Strategic Option
Development and Analysis, affects the quality of problem structuring in inter-organi-
zational policy networks. In order to assess the quality of problem structuring, six
criteria were defined.
This chapter addresses the question of how we will explore whether a tech-
nique based on SODA contributes to the quality of problem structuring in participa-
tory policy processes. Gaming~simulation will be used in an experimental design in
which the effect of an intervention based on SODA will be tested. The research
design has implications for the way the method can be applied which is why this
chapter precedes a more elaborate description of SODA in Chapter 5.
First, section 4.2 introduces gaminglsimulation which provides the experimen-
tal environment in which a SODA-based intervention will be introduced and in
which the data on problem structuring are collected. In section 4.3, the game~simu-
lation BANS is discussed briefly. Section 4.4 presents the outline of the research
design. Section 4.5 discusses the data analyses. The external validity of BANS is
addressed in section 4.6. Section 4.7 gives a brief summary of this chapter.
4.2 Introducing gaming~simulation
4.2.1 The many faces ofgaming~simulation
Gaming~simulation is an interdisciplinary method which is used for research, and
organizational change or to support policy development, training, and education
(Peters et al. 1995). The method is directed at modelling a system by letting persons
in different but coherent roles play the processes in that system in a more abstract
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form (Geurts and Vennix, 1989: 65). It is thus part of the family of inethods which
conceptualize complexity by modelling it. It can also be used as a problem-structur-
ing method. By modelling new or existing structures of policy-making and letting
professionals work with those structures, flaws can be uncovered (cf Office for
Public Management, 1990; cf Joldersma and Pegman, 1998).
The gaminglsimulation tradition dates back centuries when war games were
introduced to gain insight in strategic issues in warfare. Gaming~simulation gained
popularity during and after the Second World War. The introduction of computers,
and the development of operations-research, mathematical game theory, simulations,
and the first business games stimulated its development. Gaminglsimulation thus
became increasingly popular in a number of disciplines where it served both theoret-
ical as well as applied purposes (Duke, 1974: XI).
Its multi-disciplinary nature is reflected by the many different types of games
and simulations which exist, from the popular management game - often used as a
training device in management courses - to flight simulators, which mimic all possi-
ble weather and technical conditions in order to offer pilots the opportunity to learn
to fly, to computer simulations which are used to research atmospheric changes.
Considering this wide range in form and purpose, it is probably not surprising that
scientists involved in the field of gamingisimulation disagree about the exact mean-
ing of `game' and `simulation' (Lane, 1995: 605-607). Here, simulation refers to: `a
dynamic model of essential characteristics or elements of a real or hypothetical
system, process or environment'. A model is built which imitates a system or pro-
cess in order to offer insight in the way that system or process works. Game is
defined as: `exercises which work (partly) on the basis of decisions of players. The
players play roles, try to reach goals, perform activities, experience limitations and
arrive at results as a consequence of their activities in relation to other players or
elements' (De Caluwé et al., 1996: 22). Some refer to the two concepts as synony-
mous. Here, both terms will be used in combination since we are interested in both
characteristics. A game~simulation of a policy process involves both the design of a
model of a process and of the complementary roles of those who construct that
process. It is the people who play the roles that demonstrate how the model works.
4.2.2 Gaminglsimulation as communication
A gamelsimulation can be seen as a workshop-like environment in which people
meet and exchange information and experiences by playing roles defined by a
scenario which centres on a policy issue and leaves the players plenty of latitude to
create their own role, within the rules of the simulation (cf. Geurts and Vennix,
1989: 65-67). A game~simulation is thus characterized by interacting people who use
different means to communicate with each other. For Duke (1974) the communica-
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tion aspect is its most distinctive feature. He sees gaminglsimulation as a mode of
communication in which integration of language, the interaction patterns of partici-
pants, and communication technology together offer the opportunity for a
`multilogue', the most sophisticated pattern of human interaction and communica-
tion~. An important characteristic of gaminglsimulation is thus that it offers players
the opportunity to communicate on a sophisticated level and convey messages that
are rich in meaning. Secondly, gaminglsimulation is essentially about conveying a
Gestalt, a holistic image of a certain problem (cf. Duke, 1974). A third characteristic
of the device is that it is very specific; each gamelsimulation uses its own phrases
and can hence be tailored to a particular problem. A simulated system or process will
be the foundation for the roles and rules of play. Furthermore, it is also a medium
which leaves maximum opporiunity for spontaneous communication. This contrib-
utes to making gaminglsimulation an authentic experience for players. A fifth char-
acteristic is its chameleon-like ability to change if circumstances so require, for
gaminglsimulation involves actual communication between sender and receiver. It
makes it possible to adjust quickly to changing perceptions. The leverage players
have to adapt and change within a simulated environment offers them a sense of a
relatively safe environment in which they can experiment. In sum, gameslsimula-
tions provide a relatively safe environment that mirrors a reality in which various
people can communicate and contribute to a holistic view of the future.
4.2.3 Functions ofgaming~simulation
Gaminglsimulation is used in training and education as a method which offers
people a safe environment in which they can experiment with new roles and in
which people learn by doing. Gaminglsimulation can also be used as a method to
analyse and solve policy and organizational issues. Together, participants can ex-
plore possible policy options. These types of gameslsimulations belong to the family
of policy exercises and are related to methods like delphi, strategic conferencing,
scenario workshops, and consensus conferences (cf. Geurts, 1993: 22; Mayer, 1997:
83, 117). There is a third function gameslsimulations can have: they can be used for
research purposes.
Simulations are widely used for research in the natural sciences, but this is not
the case for gaminglsimulation in the social sciences (cf. Nees, 1983: 75; Lane,
1995). Most social scientists involved in gaminglsimulation tend to concentrate on
its design and application for educationltraining or organizational change and policy
1`Gaming the futuré s language' was the title of the book published in 1974. The title refers to the author's
view that gaming~simulation is an ímportant instrument to acquire knowledge about the future in order to
assist people in making choices for their future.
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development. In addition, the fact that scientific thought on gaminglsimulation is
fragmented across a wide area of disciplines implies that the field has in some way
the appearance of a diaspora. Consequently, a dialogue is difficult to sustain because
scientists often only speak the dialect of their discipline, which hampers the building
of a robust body ofknowledge of inethodological aspects of gaminglsimulation. The
fact that there are relatively few scientists in the social sciences who could contribute
to that dialogue is an additional drawback.
Those who are interested in gaminglsimulation from a research perspective
engage in either research into gamelsimulations, for instance, Dukes and Waller
(1976), who evaluated six games (ef Stoll 8c Inbar, 1970, Martin, 1979, Wolfe ác
Roberts, 1993; De Caluwé, 1997), or they do research with the aid of
gaminglsimulation, like Gilles et al. (1991), who explored the validity of a test for
schizophrenia (cf Keys et al., 1988; Teach, 1993; Vissers, 1994, Dórner, 1996). In
the first type of research, gaminglsimulation is the object of research, whereas in the
other two it provides a context for research.
Both types of research can contribute to different scientific goals (Vissers et al.,
1995: 180):




This fourfold distinction is a tentative one, and all kinds of combinations are possi-
ble. Gaminglsimulation could serve these different purposes, but, as indicated above,
it is not often used in the field of social sciences in general.
4.2.4 Gami~ig~sinutilation for policy sciences
In this study, gaminglsimulation will be used for research in the field of policy
sciences. Vissers et aL (1995: 181-182) distinguish the following contributions
gaminglsimulation offer researchers in this field. Firstly, gameslsimulations can
offer an opportunity to experiment with policy processes. They are useful for study-
ing certain aspects of change because gameslsimulations reduce detail and complex-
ity and have a condensed time-span. Another advantage is that conditions can be
varied between the different runs in order to compare, for example, different policy
options, or to see whether different conditions in the context of the policy have
implications for the outcome. Conditions that can be varied are the policy itself, the
roles, the policy environment, for example, financial or legal conditions, or the
participants. Gaminglsimulation thus offers a possibility to conduct future studies. It
allows for a way to look at future scenarios by playing them under different precon-
ditions and analysing the outcomes. A third advantage is that gaminglsimulation can
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assist in cases where access to field research is very difficult, such as in areas which
are very sensitive for security reasons, for example, elites in politics and industry, or
in other situations where people are very protective about information and not
willing to cooperate with researchers (cf. Eden and Ackermann, 1996). In
gameslsimulations, people are said to feel more protected because a simulation only
lasts a maximum of a few days and choices they have made in the game~ simulation
do not have long term repercussions. It is therefore less threatening for participants
to fill in questionnaires, be observed, filmed or taped than in real-life situations.
Because gaming~simulation provides an opportunity for multilogue and interac-
tion, it is very suitable for studying participatory forms of policy-making (cf. Van
der Meer, 1983b; Joldersma et al. 1995: 155). In this study, gaminglsimulation will
be used to serve research. A game~simulation will be used as a quasi-experimental
environment for testing SODA. A method of problem structuring will be introduced
in the game~simulation to facilitate a complex policy issue for the participants. So, it
is not the game~simulation itself which is the object of this research, but the
problem-structuring that is part of the policy-making process it simulates.
The reason gaming~simulation was chosen as a research method is because it
has, as was indicated above, the advantage that the time-span of the policy-making
process ís condensed. Following network actors in their problem-structuring activi-
ties in real-life situations is very difficult: it would mean that we have to follow
representatives of a number of different organizations. Also, it would be very time
consuming because policies often take a very long time to develop (cf. Koppenjan,
] 993; D~rner, 1996: 3). In most instances, real-life policy-making processes will be
far less accessible than gameslsimulations are. In the latter, the interacting policy
makers will be concentrated in time and space. Informal encounters can play an
important part in policy-making and would be difficult to observe in real-life set-
tings. Furthermore, a gamelsimulation has the advantage that it allows for conditions
to be changed during the process. Thus, it can serve as an experimental setting that
is, in essence, a laboratory environment.
4.3 Introducing BANS
The game~simulation which will be used in this research to measure how a technique
based on SODA affects problem structuring is called BANS. BANS is the Dutch
abbreviation of `Beleidsadviseur Nieuwe Stijl' (policy adviser new style). It simu-
iates policy-making in a large municipality (Beneveld) in the Netherlands. There are
14 players: representatives of the city council and of organizations which are part of
the municipal network of policy makers. BANS was specially designed as a training
method to assist civil servants in becoming more familiar with participatory styles of
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policy-making.Z Players are offered various tools to assist them in participatory
policy-making. BANS lasts two days: on the first day the players work on a process
architecture (i.e., a plan specifying the process of how to tackle a policy issue) for
four policy issues, and on the second day they concentrate in more detail on the
content of one issue, and design alternative strategies for how they intend to deal
with this issue.
BANS was designed with the aid of a systems analysis of municipal policy-
making in the Netherlands. The data for this systems analysis consisted of interviews
with civil servants and a former city councillor who is now a consultant, who were
all advocates of participative policy-making. In addition policy-making theories with
participatory focus, such as the garbage-can model and Teisman's model of rounds
(1995) were used. The three issues in the gamelsimulation concerning welfare,
transport, and public order, were based on real cases. The fourth policy issue -an
environmental issue - was modelled on a real-life environmental issue. A more
elaborate description of BANS will be given in Chapter 6.
Below, we discuss whether BANS can indeed serve as a valid experimental
environment which allows for conclusions about the real-life policy-making pro-
cesses which it models (cf. Roelofs, 1998).
4.4 The research design
4.4J Intf-oduction
BANS will serve as a type of laboratory experiment. Since we are interested in how
a method will affect the quality of problem structuring, a stimulus based on SODA
will be introduced in BANS at the beginning of the policy-making process of both
days of the gamelsimulation. (A more specific description of how this will be done
will be presented in the following chapter, which gives a more in-depth account of
SODA). The game~simulation will be played six times. In three of the runs, the
method will be introduced. In the other three runs, the participants will be left to
their own devices. In both conditions, the game facilitator will play an important role
in guiding the participants through the game~simulation. The results of the runs will
be compared. They will be scored on the six quality criteria we presented in Chapter
3.
2 It was developed by the Department of Policy and Organization Sciences of Tilburg University and IVA
Tilburg (a research institute) in cooperation with a civil servants training institute. The researcher was part
of the design team. BANS was not specifically designed for this research.
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4.4.2 Research subjects á design
As discussed in the previous section, a choice was made to recruit groups of policy
makers to participate in the research. Our assumption was that an experiment with
real-lífe policy makers rather than students would increase the external validity of
the experiment.3 As Dbrner (1996: 190-192)4 pointed out, there is a clear difference
in performance between professionals and students in the policy games~simulations
he carried out: more experienced professionals perform better. Two mailings, a few
hundred letters in total, were sent to civil servants in local government.s The
game~simulation was offered to their municipality as a training in participatory
policy-making. Four municipalities responded to the mailing and another two were
recruited via personal contacts. The municipalities were asked to draw up a team of
ten experienced civil servants, two representatives of a profit organization, and two
from a non-profit organization. It was our intention to simulate a municipal network.
The order of recruitment determined whether a particular municipality would
alternatively play a run without or with the stimulus. Hence, the way the experimen-
tal group was selected from the different municipalities was reasonably random.
However, since we did not randomize the individual subjects across the two groups,
they are referred to as non-equivalent groups (Cook and Campbell, 1979). Whether
and how the groups indeed differed is discussed in Chapter 6.
Tabte 4.1 A post-test only design with non-equivalent groups
control group
3 runs of BANS
experimental group
3 runs ofBANS with SODA
Another characteristic of the design is the fact that we were not able to perform a
pretest and thus establish the level of problem structuring, prior to the introduction
of the stimulus. Our design is a post-test only design. The nature of our research
object does not allow for a pretest. We are interested in the way groups of policy
makers structure a policy issue they are confronted with. Individual structuring
3 An additional reason for recruiting groups rather than individuals is the fact that it made it more easy to
organize the runs. Considering the time investment BANS requires from potential participants who often
have busy time schedules it would have been more difficult to recruit sufficient subjects.
4 Dbrner explains the difference between students and experienced professionals with the concept `opera-
tive intelligence'. Practitioners have experience in handling complex situations. They are more familiar
with rules of decision making, know them better and know when best to apply them.
5 The first mailing went out to the members of a network of civil servants involved in strategic policy-
making. A larger mailing was sent to all sorts of civil servants as part of additional offers and information
on the courtesy of a large advice bureau. We received only one positive response.
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skills, even if they could have been relatively easily assessed, are not necessarily
good indicators for the problem-structuring skills of a grouplnetwork.
4.4.3 Facilitators
On the first day of the game~simulation, there are four issues and the 14 players
concentrate on one of these four issues. In order to avoid a difference in experience
with the SODA-based technique on the second day of the game~simulation, all four
sounding boards - which were established around the policy issues - work with the
method. Hence, four facilitators are required for this first part of the experiment. On
the second day, the participants tackle one issue and only one facilitator is required.
As facilitators we chose two advanced students, the researcher and the game facilita-
tor who had many years of experience in facilitating groups. The latter was also
facilitator of the entire game~simulation on both days. The facilitators worked on the
same issue in every run of BANS. For instance, one facilitator worked every run of
the experimental group with the policy makers who were involved in the environ-
mental issue. Thus, we tried to ensure that there was a certain level of homogeneity
with regard to the facilitators' influence in the process. Due to circumstances, the
period in which the data were collected was prolonged. Consequently, the facilitator
for the welfare issue had to be replaced in the third run in which the SODA-based
technique was introduced.
The researcher trained the facilitators to work with the problem-structuring
method in four sessions of approximately 2-3 hours~. Furthermore, a pilot was
organized with third-year students playing BANS so that the facilitators could
practice facilitating the groups using the method. They were observed, and their
maps were discussed afterwards (see Appendix 12).
4.4.4 Collectifig data
Two types of data were collected during the runs of BANS: observation and survey
data. The six quality criteria served as the basis for the design of the observation
book (see Appendix 1 I) and the questionnaires (Appendices 2-9).
On the first day, four observers - three students and the researcher - followed
the participants through the game~simulation. Each observer concentrated as much as
possible on one issue. Conversations were written down and questions in the obser-
vation book, relating to the six criteria, were answered by them. Due to the fact that
6 Phd-students volunteered in discussing the subject of their thesis and the difficulties they experienced in
their research. The facilitators built a cognitive map with them. Furthermore, the former also carried out
brief role plays with the role scripts of BANS which offered the facilitators experience with a setting
similar to the one they would have in the experiment.
72
the recruitment of municipalities and the planning of the runs took longer than
expected, two observers had to be replaced after the fourth run.
The observers - two were also facilitators - were trained by the researcher in
two one-hour sessions with the aid of a video tape of ineetings designed for a train-
ing in negotiation skills. In order not to inhibit the participants, it was decided not to
tape or film them, for this would have made the game~simulation less realistic.
Furthermore, experience with previous runs and other gamesl simulations made it
clear that people would move around and have tête à têtes at various instances and in
various locations which made it difficult to film all formal and informal meetings.
Altogether, approximately 280 pages of observation protocol were collected
during each run. In addition to observations, surveys were camed out to collect
additional data. The participants received seven questionnaires on the first day and
five on the second day. They were asked to answer them either from the perspective
of the policy maker they were in real life, or alternatively, from the perspective of
the role they were playing. The results of these questionnaires were used in the
debriefing of the game~simulation. For a more elaborate account of the data collec-
tion and analysis see Appendix 12.
The questionnaires provided during the game consisted partly of closed ended
questions and partly of open ended questions. The former related to the level of
interest, influence, and cooperative behaviour of the various stakeholders involved in
a particular issue. The latter type were related to the nature of the issue and to ideas
for tackling these issues. Furthermore, questionnaires 5-9 consisted of Likert-type
items with 5-point scales related to the six quality criteria of problem structuring.
These six variables were measured by one item only. Although this does not benefit
the validity and reliability of the instrument, given the busy agenda of the players, it
was not possible to provide them with more elaborate questionnaires (cf. Ng-A-
Tham, 1999: 103).
4.5 Analysing the data
The emphasis in the analysis is on qualitative data. This study is of an exploratory
nature. Little (empirical) research has been conducted on problem structuring in
policy processes and the effects of inethods of problem structuring. Using sophisti-
cated and advanced quantitative techniques would not be very appropriate.
The results of the more quantitative data we collected, are analysed by means
of (repeated measures) (M)ANOVAS and T-tests.
The more qualitative data consisted of 280 pages of observation protocols for
each run. These were condensed into reports of, on average, 45 pages. In order to
assess the six quality criteria of problem structuring on the basis of the observation
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transcripts, both the original protocols as well as the reports were used. How the six
quality criteria are operationalized and measured is described in Chapters 7 and 8
which present the results for one of the issues and for the second day of BANS.
Furthermore, Appendix 12 presents an overview of the indicators which were used
to measure the quality criteria.
4.6 The issue of validity
4.6.1 Internaland external validiry
The advantages games~simulations are said to have for research purposes have only
been validated to a limited extent (cf. Lane, 1995). Since scientific interests in
gaming~simulation is limited, methodological questions regarding the use of gam-
inglsimulation are still in their infancy. A more thorough analysis of the methodol-
ogy of gaming~simulation would contribute not only to its scientific use but also to
its practical applications. Furthermore, validity assessment might provoke a better
understanding of gaminglsimulation by the wider scientific community.
Two types of validity are commonly distinguished: internal validity and exter-
nal validity. In experimental methodology' - we are here predominantly interested in
the use of gaming~simulation as a type of laboratory experiment -, internal validity
refers to the extent to which the observed effect is caused by the experimental treat-
ment condition only and not by other extraneous variables such as, for instance, the
experience of the subjects (cf Christensen, 1994: 213). External validity is the extent
to which the results of an experiment can be applied to and across different persons,
settings, and times (Christensen, 1994: 455). So, internal validity concerns the
variables within the experimental condition, and external validity concerns the
degree to which the results are generalizable to the situation the experiment simu-
lates.
The internal validity of a game~simulation can be assessed by distinguishing
the treatment from the characteristics of the game~simulation, or from the character-
istics of the subjects which may influence the behaviours or processes which are the
object of the research. An experiment with a gamelsimulation may be defined as
internally valid, when there is certainty that a change in the dependent variable is the
result of the independent variable (stimulus) and not of characteristics of the
game~simulation or the subjects. The characteristics of BANS will be addressed
below. In Chapter 6, characteristics of the research subjects are discussed.
7 Vissers et al. (1998) make a provoking and interesting plea to abon the traditional methodological
perspective of validity. They question the validity of validiry and the way social scientific thought on
validity has evolved.
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4.6.2 Four types of external validit)~
External validity concerns the level at which a gamelsimulation represents its refer-
ence system. External validity has been operationalized by students of
gaming~simulation in various ways. For instance, Wolfe and Roberts (1986) view
external validity as a correlation between performance in a business game and
performance in business in real life. For them external validity concerns the question
whether a game is a good predictor of real-life situations. Terhune and Firestone
(1970) studied international relations and interpreted (external) validity as the level
at which the patterns their gamelsimulation produced corresponded with those of
real international affairs. Their aim was to generate new hypotheses. Alternatively,
when a game~simulation is directed at training and education, external validity may
be defined as introducing new knowledge to the game's~ simulation's reference
system. External validity means different things to different people (cf. Norris,
1986). This line of thought is ascribed by Raser (1969). He distinguishes four types
of validity that are relevant for gaming~simulation. These are:
- structure validity: the extent to which the structure in the gamelsimulation
represents that ofits reference system accurately;
- psychological validity: the extent to which the environment appears to be
realistic to the players;
- process validity: the extent to which the processes which develop in the game
are isomorphic to the processes which can be observed in the reference system;
- predictive validity: the extent to which the game can produce data which pre-
dict future events or retell past events;
All four types can be perceived as aspects of what Christensen has defined as exter-
nal validity: they all draw a line between the experimental condition, in other words,
the gamelsimulation, and that which it simulates. How do these four types ofvalidity
relate to one another? Structure and process validity concern the generalization of
two sets of aspects of gaming~simulation. They are two dimensions of the informa-
tion which the game~simulation and its reference system have in common. Structure
and process validity are both relevant for achieving some kind of predictive validity.
It should be noted that predictive validity is difficult to obtain with
gaminglsimulation (cf. Raser, 1969). This will probably be more true for the policy-
making processes we are interested in because of their socio-political complexity.
The game~simulation involves various organizations which play a role in these
processes and as a result one has to deal with the behaviours of multiple actors who
interact and react, and are influenced by their often complex environment. These
processes are more difficult to model. They incorporate greater uncertainties than the
more controlled experiments which are more common in psychological research. For
instance, Tomikura (1998) describes a gamelsimulation of the hostage crisis at the
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Japanese Embassy in Peru. The outcome of the game~simulation differed from the
outcome of the real-life event. Tomikura explains this on the basis of the fact that
two of the stakeholders were not simulated. It is, however, also important to note
that gameslsimulations offer players reasonable freedom in communication. Thus,
players in part shape the system games~simulations model. Consequently, behav-
ioural patterns differ because different people will make different choices given their
personality, ability, norms and values, and expectations. Forecasting the outcome of
social and political behaviours and processes with great accuracy is difficult. This is,
however, not only true for gaming~simulation but also for other research methods,
like, for instance, the case study.
Psychological validity is perhaps even more crucial for achieving predictive
validity than process and structure validity are. After all, when a game~simulation is
perceived as unreal by the players, they are not likely to accept the context it offers
and this is bound to affect their behaviour. As a consequence, structure and process
validity will be undermined. Part of what constitutes the process and structure of a
gamelsimulation is the result of the players who interact. Figure 4.2 describes how
structure, process, and psychological and predictive validity can be related.
Figa~re 4.1 Foa~r ttpes oJe.rternal validity
High structure, process, and psychological validity do not guarantee high predictive
validity. As suggested above, it is difficult to capture the richness of social behaviour
at the meso and macro level in theories and to make detailed forecasts.
4.6.3 External valirliry and opeit sn-treture
Gameslsimulations differ in the degree of leverage they offer players in making
rules, taking decisions or dealing with the task or problem they are presented with.
Both Vissers (1994) and Van der Meer (1983a, 1983b) have argued that games~
76
simulations with an open structure provide an appropriate context for social science
research. They leave substantial freedom to the players to shape the social structure.
This, Van der Meer argues (1983b), enhances the sense of reality of the players.
They have ample possibility to partly construct that reality, and hence can better
identify with it. Following this argument, a relatively open structure implies that the
game~simulation scores higher on psychological validity. However, the open charac-
ter of the gamelsimulation does not imply that structure did not matter in Van der
Meer's setting. He emphasizes the relevance of a setting in which the structure
mirrors that of the reference system. Thus, in his view, structure validity is also
important and in a way essential to achieving psychological validity. Furthermore,
there are feedback loops from psychological validity to structure validity, because
players, in part, determine the structure. In their perspective, process (and hence
process validity) is also a product of the open structure that is modelled by the
designers, and the interacting players which give meaning and constitute structure in
addition to the structure the gamelsimulation offers. Following this argument, exter-
nal validity is threatened when one tries to capture the reference system in a detailed
pre-set structured model. Too much structure will make players hesitant to interact
and will affect process and psychological validity.
BANS, the game discussed in section 4.3, does provide its players with more
structure than the gamelsimulation Vissers en Van der Meer used in their research.
BANS was developed as a training device. Players are restricted by the game cycles,
which specifies for a substantial amount of the available time who will be meeting
whom and what the aim of the meetings are. Formal meetings in which it is deter-
mined who will meet whom are alternated by informal meetings in which the players
can decide for themselves if and whom they want to contact. Players can change the
rules if they wish to do so, but in practice, they tend to follow them. Furthermore,
the players are asked to fill in a number of forms on the day which are designed to
help them analyse the policy issues and the stakeholders involved. In addition to a
stakeholder analysis, additional policy instruments are introduced in the
game~simulation and people are challenged to work with them. The designers de-
signed this rather elaborate structure, in order to provide an optimal learning envi-
ronment to the players, since BANS was initially designed as a training tool.
Following Van der Meer's (1983b) argument, BANS does not seem to be a
very open gamelsimulation and consequently would lack verisimilitude, which
would not be a problem if the game~simulation was used for training only. However,
BANS is played with a research purpose. It is not only a training in participatory
policy-making for the players, but also provides an experimental context for this
research.
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According to Peters et al. (1995), the purpose of the gamelsimulation is a factor
which needs to be considered when discussing its external validity. They argue that
the purpose of the gamelsimulation determines whether the four types of validity
Raser defined are all relevant. They scored them for the three functions
gaminglsimulation can have and which were introduced in section 4.2.3.
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Source: Peters et al., 1995.
Since BANS serves research purposes, Peters et aL (1995) claim it ought to accom-
modate all four types of validity. Given the fact that we have introduced substantial
structure and rules to facilitate learning - BANS was designed as a training -, it is
questionable whether all four types of validity are applicable here. Certainly, its
predictive validity seems questionable.
4.6.5 The validiry of BANS
BANS' structure, roles, and steps-of-play were based on a system analysis. Inter-
views with practitioners and policy theories provided the data for the design. Both
the construction of the analysis, the roles, the steps-of-play, and the policy issues
were extensively discussed by the three designers of BANS. The structure follows
policy-making on the level of local government. Civil servants, the aldermen, mayor,
and representatives of two interest organizations, and a neighbouring village are
simulated. The political constellation w-as also modelled on the basis of its reference
system. The contextual variables for the municipality are based on that of the city of
Tilburg. Furthermore, issues were adapted from real-life policy issues: interviews
with key-figures in two issues and reports provided the data for their design.
However, some additional elements were introduced in BANS so that the
players could learn a new (participatory) style of policy-making which was in com-
pliance with the simulation requirements of the client. For instance, on the first day
of the gamelsimulation, the participants were divided over four so-called sounding
78
boards. A sounding board can be regarded as a policy instrument which offers local
government the opportunity to involve external interest organizations in an early
stage of the policy-making process. Thus, it is not an existing institution in local
politics in the Netherlands. Consequently, both structure and process are not identi-
cal to that of its reference systems. Although not identical, considering the design
process and the various elements of BANS viz., systems analysis, roles, issues,
institutions, political constellation which were modelled after the reference system,
structure and process seem sufficiently similar to regard BANS as reasonably valid.
The experiment was conducted with groups of civil servants and representa-
tives of interest organizations in existing municipal networks. We thus aimed to
simulate an existing policy network and tried to enhance its psychological and
process validity. As will be indicated below, the network was not a genuine network
constructed around a particular issue. The groups of players were seen more as
abstractions from municipal networks. Nevertheless, participants did bring their
frame of local policy-making into the game.8 They were not randomly assigned but
were all employed by one municipality. Consequently, participants brought their
ideas, experiences, and images of the municipality and its public to the game. The
choice for existing municipal groups should enhance the psychological and process
validity ofBANS.
A means of testing whether BANS is psychologically valid is asking the partic-
ipants how they experienced the gamelsimulation. It is often the case that people
experience game~simulations as realistic (cf. Van de Meer and Geurts, 1995: 172).
This suggests that psychological validity can be realized.
A first preliminary assessment was provided by the experiences of civil ser-
vants from the Ministry of Agriculture, Fishery, and Nature Conservation who
played a similar gamelsimulation which was adapted from BANS. The results from
these runs and the first runs of BANS for the experiment showed that participants
experienced the gamelsimulation as fairly realistic: they considered the issues,
contention of interests and diversity of interests realistic, but the time constraint
unrealistic. The participants also argued that their role play was inspired by their
own real-life experiences. The answers of the participants suggested that the psycho-
logical validity of BANS was sufficiently valid to continue the experiment.
In retrospect, a second assessment can be made on the basis of the data of all
six runs. The perceptions of the research subjects which participated in the quasi-
experiment are presented here. Altogether, there were 82 people divided over 6 runs
8 A pilot played with students demonstrated that there is a difference in outlook. Students tended to have a
more simplistic víew of the world and opted for choices professionals would have perceived as rather
unrealistic and out ofcontext.
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of the game~simu]ation who participated in this research. They answered several
questionnaires during and after the game~simulation. The following table presents
the factors the participants considered realistic and unrealistic regarding BANS.
Table 4.3 presents the most frequently given answers.9 (to open ended questions).
Table 4.3 Participauts'assessment of realistic aud ur:realistic characteristics of BANS (n- GZ)
- the issues (25)
realistic - the conflict of interests (IS )
- the contribution of the representatives of profit and non-profit orga-
nizations (4)
- the available time between the meetings (9)
unrealistic - the play of some participants (8)
- the absence of budgets (3)
There is more consensus about what is realistic than about what is unrealistic. Again,
the issues and the way the conflicting interests were portrayed were perceived as the
most realistic characteristics of the game~simulation. Time-constraint is a typical
characteristic of gaminglsimulation, and thus, it comes as no surprise that people
perceive this as unrealistic. Four of the participants who considered the way some
fello~~~ participants played their role as unrealistic came from the same municipality.
This particular run was characterized by strong polarization of positions on the part
of some of the representatives of the interest organizations. This was perceived by
some as unrealistic. In a number of instances, participants had contradictory ideas
about whether an event or behaviour was realistic or unrealistic.
These outcomes suggest that BANS does differ from real-life experiences.
However, it also captures a number of characteristics of real life policy-making
processes which are realistic in the eyes of the players. The interactions between the
various policy actors evoked by their position on the issues they are involved in,
resemble those of the world the game~simulation tries to simulate. BANS provides a
context for policy-making which is familiar in terms of the issues and interacting
interests. The psychological and process validity BANS provides seems quite ac-
ceptable, as does its structure validity, albeit to a lesser extent. Its predictive validity
appears to be limited.
9 The response for this questionnaire was 7604,. Howe~-er, not all respondents answered all questions.
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4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, gaminglsimulation was introduced as a basis for our research design.
The gamelsimulation BANS serves as an experimental environment in which a
technique based on the problem-structuring method SODA is tested. BANS simu-
lates local policy-making on policy issues which involve various stakeholders. The
extent to which BANS provides a valid environment which sufficiently resembles
the real-life policy-making processes it simulates was discussed. Its external validity
is not beyond question. The groups participating in the experiment were not genuine
policy networks. Nevertheless, the design of BANS and the issues which feature in it
were based largely on real-life issues. The participants themselves experienced the
issues and the conflicting interests as realistic. The psychological and process valid-
ity seem sufficiently valid and structure validity is acceptable. There are no indica-
tions suggesting BANS has high predictive validity.
BANS will be played with representatives of six municipalities, three of which
will be supported by a SODA based intervention. The design of the experiment is a
post-test only design with nonequivalent groups. During the experiment data will be
collected by means of observations and questionnaires. Content analysis, repeated
measures (M)ANOVA's, and T-tests will be used to analyse the data collected.
Chapters 7 and 8 and appendix 12 provide a detailed account of the way the data
were analysed in terms of the six quality criteria for problem structuring we distin-
guished.
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5. The TAO of Strategic Option
Development and Analysis
5.1 Introduction
Strategic Option Development and Analysis (SODA) is one of a number of inethods
which support problem structuring and~or other aspects of the policy-making process
by means of a mapping technique. In Chapter 3, some of these methods were
introduced briefly, and a choice was made for SODA. SODA emphasizes the
structuring of policy issues in their own right more than the other methods, which
tend to focus more on policy development. Furthermore, it not only aims to bring
about transparency at the cognitive level but also contributes to the social-political
realm of policy issues. The method thus pays close attention to the different
dimensions of complexity which characterize a policy issue. Cognitive or group
mapping are mapping techniques used in SODA and its most outstanding feature.
Not the map itself - which addresses predominantly the cognitive complexity of a
policy issue - is what the method is about. The road which gives rise to a map is
more relevant. In other words, the drafting of the map is perhaps more of a change
agent than the map itself ~ Perhaps that is one of the reasons why Eden and
Ackermann have introduced the term `JOURNEY making' for the use of SODA for
developing strategies.Z
Before explaining in more detail what SODA is and how it will be introduced
as a stimulus in BANS, its theoretical notions will be discussed. (This chapter is
largely based on Eden et. al. (1983) and Eden, 1992b; 1994 which explain SODA in
more detail, and on Eden and Ackermann, 1998a; a recent update ofthe approach.)
1 Hence, it is the way (tao) and not that which lies at its end which is most valuable: the title of this chapter
was inspired by this notion.
2 In their book `Making Strategy' (1998a) Eden and Ackermann introduced the name JOURNEY making
for their approach: JOintly Understanding, Reflecting and Negotiating strategy.
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5.2 The theoretical background of SODA
SODA has been developed to assist decision-making on strategic issues in
organizations. Eden places his approach somewhere between traditional operational
research, a management science approach, and organizational development. These
are disciplinary traditions which are (also) interested in decision-making in groups.
Whereas the operational researchers and management scientists have been
predominantly concerned with improving their model-building abilities, the
organizational development (OD) proponents have concentrated on how they could
obtain data from a group of people facing an issue that they wanted to solve (Eden,
1983: 61). This involves data which are by definition messy and difficult to obtain or
assess straightforwardly. Issues are often difficult to solve without the information
and involvement from those who define the issue in the first place. However, Eden
(1994) criticizes the OD tradition for not presenting the data very well to the group
they were elicited from. The information an OD intervention extracted from a group
was not presented to them in a clear way so that it gives them a good insight into
their organization's problem or policy issue.
SODA's organizational perspective is influenced by the work of March and
Olson who introduced the garbage-can model to describe how individuals in
organizations try to put forward a problem which matches their own interest (Eden,
1989: 25-26). Negotiation plays a central role in determining which problems are put
on the organization's agenda. Organizations are thus the product of continuous
negotiation about rules and roles.
Additional disciplines and scientific theory, which have strongly influenced the
development of SODA, are clínical, social, and organizational psychology and
ethnomethodology. As pointed out in Chapter 3, at the heart of the approach lies the
personal construct theory of Kelly from which Eden and collaborates derived their
cognitive-mapping technique (Eden, 1990b). Kelly's theory can be placed in the
epistomological tradition of social constructivism. Individuals construct their own
reality by giving meaning to events and defining whether it is an issue which
demands action or not.
Kelly's (1955) theory centres around meaningful activities people engage in,
and he applied it for psycho-therapy. The basic principle of his theory is that the
individual tries to make sense of events by comparing them with similar andlor very
different experiences. People construct their own view of a situation, by comparing
it to similar experiences or to experiences that are very unlike the one they are trying
to make sense of. These sense-making activities are directed at controlling or
predicting an event or the behaviour of human beings (Eden, 1994). Constructs are
thus characterized by their bipolar nature. These two poles are not logical opposites
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but opposites defined by the individual who construes a substance. For instance, an
example Kelly uses is that an individual can refer to someone as `gentle' versus
`aggressive' or, differently, `gentle' versus `tactless' or alternatively `assertive'.
Events are defined differently by different people. Depending on their personal
frame of reference, individuals may define an event in terms of an issue. So the point
of departure for the SODA methodology is the individual with his or her own
idiosyncratic ideas of an issue. Kelly devised a way to visualize the constructs
people make of events. Language plays an important role in SODA. Verbal and non-
verbal language are analysed and captured, by means of various techniques and
tools, in meaningful concepts. To be able to assess the language with which people
describe events and detect what, for them, are reasons to desire change, it is
necessary to make a distinction between values and beliefs (Eden, 1994). This
distinction contributes to understanding `the subjective world of policy-making in
organizations' (Eden, et a1.1979: 15). Beliefs `describe attitudes, assertions and
theories about the world of a person'. A value a person holds can be defined as `an
enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end state of existence is
personally and socially preferable to alternative modes of conduct or end states of
existence' (Rokeach, 1973 in: Eden et al. 1979: 39). It is this system of values an
individual holds that serves as a frame of reference and provides the impetus for
action. The belief and value systems interact with each other. They are causally
connected. The distinction between values and beliefs contributes to our
understanding of cognition and action in terms of preference and intervention (Eden,
1994: 263). How the belief and value systems influence cognition is described by
Eden in the figure below.
Figure 5.1 Belief and Yalue systems and cognition
belief system value system
I ?
events ~ selective perception ~ construal -! defining -1 problem definition
(filtering in) "making sense" the situation
Source: Eden, 1994: 263
Perceptions, which are by nature selective, are followed by the process of sense-
making (construing) of an event. This process is influenced by the belief system of
an individual. The individual compares the event with similar or contrasting
experiences. It is in interaction between the beliefs a person holds regarding a
particular event and his values concerning this matter that the situation is defined.
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Subsequently, the definition of the situation will often be an incentive to act and an
impetus for change along the lines the value system indicates.
Now that we have touched upon some of the theoretical notions which have
inspired the development ofthe SODA method, the method itself will be described.
5.3 Strategic Option Development and Analysis
5.3.1 SODA: A set of tools and techniques
SODA consists of a set of tools and techniques which are used to assist groups in
`problem finishing' ( Eden, 1987). Depending on the characteristics of an
assignment, the facilitator will select a number of tools and techniques to assist the
problem-structuring process. The method is directed at creating order, a sense of
direction, and commitment among the participants. In the problem-structuring
process, SODA aims to strike a balance between efforts directed at creating a
`socially negotiated order' and a`negotiated social order' (Eden, 1989, 1992a,
1992b; Eden ói Ackermann, 1998a: 48-51). The first aspect ofnegotiated order is the
outcome of a negotiation process in which the social history and future relationships
between the key actors are taken into account. Negotiating change is a social
process. In addítion, negotiated social order concerns the negotiation of new social
relationships. Discussing organizational change is bound to affect existing
relationships, communication patterns, and the way people relate to each other in an
organization. Relationships need to change in line with the new organizational goals
and hence are the subject of negotiation. These two aspects of negotiated order of
organizations need to be balanced. The balance can be brought about with the aid of
a number of tools and techniques such as cognitive mapping, oval mapping,
stakeholder analysis, role plays, snow cards, attribute maps and grids, and the
software programme Decision Explorer (formerly Cope) which can be used for
building cognitivelgroup maps. The cognitive mapping technique is the most
important technique within the SODA approach.
5.3.2 The art of SODA
A SODA trajectory always starts with a facilitator who is asked by a client, often a
senior manager, to look into a specific policy issue. In close deliberation with the
client, the contours of the issue are decided on and a group of people who are key
figures (3-12 people) with regards to the issue is formed.
Provided the circumstances allow it, the facilitator will first interview the group
members individually to draw their cognitive maps of the policy issue. While
interviewing the facilitator will draw a map: he models the policy issue as it is
perceived by the interviewee. It is a hierarchical model which is drawn, connecting
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chains of goals and options through arrows which often indicate `causality, influence
or implication' (Eden and Ackermann, Z000; see Figure 3.4). From among the
phrases with which the interviewee descríbes his view of the issue, the facilitator
selects central concepts which seem crucial for the interviewee's understanding of
the issue. The map is drawn in the language of the interviewee. By asking question
like: `What are the alternatives for a given situation?'or `How does it affect you?'
people are encouraged to tell freely about their idiosyncratic ideas. Since the
concepts are written down in the imperative form, they indicate an action
orientation. Concepts which are insufficiently clear are presented in a bipolar form.
Psychological opposites are then written down (see section 5.2). The interviewee is
asked what contrasts with the concept he or she mentioned. An example of a concept
written as a bipole is: `improve qualiry of life' rather than ~n mapping script `rather
than this' is indicated by three dots: ... ) `increase economic performance'. As
indicated above, concepts are linked through graphs which often show means-end
relationships. Yet, they are `not taken to be causal in a precise way' (Eden, 1988: 5).
They draw a line from a construct which has consequences for the construct the
arrow points to. The latter receives explanatory meaning through the graph.
The map that is being drawn is visible to the interviewee. Subsequently, the
facilitator discusses the concepts on the map and the way they are linked. This gives
people an idea of what mapping involves and how the map illustrates their
perception and what, to them, is important about the issue. `Cognitive maps can be
seen as a picture or visual aid in comprehending the mappers' understanding of
particular, and selective elements of the thoughts of an individual, group or
organization'(Eden, 1992a: 262).
When the individual maps have been drawn, the facilitator will tidy the various
(individual) maps and, depending on the case, discuss and elaborate them in a
second interview. While discussing the map with its `owner', the facilitator can opt
to do this either in a top-down manner or vice versa. In the top-down approach,
participants are invited to expand the chain of goals by moving to successively
higher levels in the hierarchy. The facílitator continues asking questions until the
goal at the top is good in its own right (Eden and Ackermann, 1998a: 314). In the
bottom-up approach, the facilitator gradually works with the interviewee from the
mean at the bottom of the map to the highest goal. First, the attention is focussed on
the tails and the interventions the interviewee considers. A better understanding of
the map is obtained and new information which surfaces will be integrated in the
map. The facilitator will spend time discussing feedback loops. People are often
unaware of the loops in their view of particular issues. Discussing these loops can be
an important step in the learning process of participants.
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When a second interview round is finished or absent, the maps are analysed and
merged by the facilitator and presented to the group. Figure 5.2 shows the
hierarchical structure of a cognitive map, which refers ideas and values of an
individual. The structure is similar to that ofa group map. It shows the core elements
of a map. It contains goals which are the highest objectives an organization or group
of policy makers have; these are referred to as heads. Key (or strategic) issues or
themes are the core element of a cluster of concepts. They are connected directly or
indirectly to goals and are irreversible on the longer term and involve substantial
means in terms of people, energy, time, and money (Eden and Ackermann, 1998a:
404-405). Furthermore, clusters are groups of concepts which are linked and share a
common or similar context. The distinction between heads, issues, and clusters is
useful for discussing the map with individuals (and groups). Analysing these
characteristics of a cognitive map is the starting point for merging individual maps
into a group or cause map. If there was more than one interviewer, all interviewers
should partake in building the group map. Only thus can the value and belief systems
which cognitive maps try to capture be fully appreciated (cf. Eden and Ackermann,
1998b). All concepts from the different cognitive maps which deal with a particular
subject area are entered in the group map. By giving the different concepts particular
numbers sets of the various individuals can be retained. Concepts which are identical
are merged. All links of the concepts are retained as well as the language of the
interviewed participants (if possible). Links need to be checked however, whether
they have not changed because of a possible positive or negative quality of the link
in one cognitive map as opposed to another map. All heads, even if they are
contradictory are included in the group map. They will be later discussed with in a
group session.
Figure S.l Hierarchicalstructure ofa cognitive n:ap
Source: Eden and Ackermann, 1998a: 410
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When the group map is ready, its structure and content are analysed. Feedback loops
are traced and an agenda is drawn up for a(first) group meeting. The aim of the
meeting is often discussed with the client or senior group member. In this meeting,
the map is briefly introduced. Subsequently, the facilitator will encourage a more in-
depth group discussion about the map. As described above, the discussion can
follow a bottom-up or top-down approach. The participants are given time to absorb
the changed meaning which results from the integration of the various individual
maps. They need to familiarize themselves with new chains of concepts which may
put their own concepts in a different perspective. In the discussion, the map will
probably be elaborated. A more detailed discussion will start on the issues or themes
in the group map. Through negotiation or voting, choices can be made regarding
particular goals ancUor actions. Generating and structuring concepts and discussing
the structure form a cyclical process during both individual interview and group
sessions.
The mapping trajectory sketched here can be adapted according to the demands
of a particular issue and~or organizational characteristics. In those cases where it is
not possible to opt for individual interviews as a point of departure, mapping can
start with a group. The facilitator can opt for a manual approach called the oval-
mapping technique. In this case, participants of a group session are asked to write
down their ideas of the issue on oval-shaped cards and stick these on the wall. A
question capturing the issue is written on the wall by the facilitator. It should trigger
ideas of how the participants view and relate to the issue. The oval-mapping
technique emphasizes the direct participation of the group members in the building
of a joint map. The facilitator has the important role of encouraging people to come
forward with their ideas but also to structure and tidy the map and link the ideas.
Often there will be a break in the session in which the facilitator tidies the map and
analyses its content.
There are additional tools which can be introduced in the SODA approach,
such as a stakeholder analysis and a software program. The Stakeholder Analysis
aims to provide insight into who the relevant players are with regard to the
organization's future or, in our case, the future of a policy issue. The software
program Decision Explorer (previously Cope) can be used for both construing group
maps with participants or analysing and merging cognitive maps. Maps can be
drawn on the computer screen and projected on the wall so that a group of people
can see directly what is changing (for additional instruments, see Eden et al., 1979,
1983, 1998a). There are two modes of applying computers in interventions. In the
one case it is an assistant facilitator who works with the computer. The group map is
projected on a wide screen and the participants engage in a discussion on the map
led by the facilitator (single-user group support, cf Ackermann and Eden, 1998).
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Alternatively, all participants work with their own laptop and contribute concepts
directly to the projected map (multi-user group support). Technological development
has greatly benefited the practical usage of hard and soft-ware in the past decade.
The workshops which are organized as part of a SODA trajectory often
combine the above tools and techniques in various ways (cf. Ackermann and Eden,
1994; Ackermann, Belton and Shepherd, 1997; Ackermann and Eden, 1998).
Manual techniques, e.g., oval mapping or individual interviews are followed by
computer supported interventions with decision explorer. Although computer
supported interventions have become a common feature of a SODA-trajectory,
Ackermann and Eden (1994: Eden, 1995) emphasize that SODA is basically a
facilitator driven group decision support system which makes use of computers. In
contrast to computer driven systems such as group systems, computers in SODA are
used to support the process and should determine less the design of the meeting.
Eden (1995) argues that facilitator driven systems have ambitious objectives: they
aspire to realize commitment to future actions. Furthermore, they take account of
group dynamics.
Although combinations of techniques are a common feature of SODA, a
facilitator can also opt for a strictly manual approach (cf: Eden and Ackermann,
1998a: 266).
The choice between the various techniques depends on the specific situation.
The facilitator will tailor tools, techniques, agendas and physical arrangements of the
location (Bryson, Ackermann, Eden and Finn, 1995). Factors which influence these
choices are the available time and financial resources, the experience intended
participants have with computers or with consultation, and the client's wishes. The
goal of the intervention may also have implications for the design of the workshop.
A focus on structuring a policy issue requires a different design and facilitation than
a focus on making decisions. For instance, Ackermann and Eden (1998) found that
facilitating decísion processes is more time consuming. More attention has to be paid
to the practicality of ideas. Also, ensuring the involvement of specific participants is
more crucial in order to obtain support for the intervention outcome. With making
decisions, as opposed to problem structuring emotiona] outburst are considered less
desirable and hence greater effort is made to avoid confrontations. Depending on
particular characteristics of the case, a particular design for a SODA trajectories is
chosen. However, they will all involve cognitive mapping, i.e., making maps of the
ideas of an individual, and~or group mapping and a meeting which brings together a
team of policy makers.
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5.4 Oval mapping in BANS
5.4.1 Oval mapping
The gamelsimulation BANS will provide the context within which a mapping
technique based on SODA will be tested. Given the time constraints the
game~simulation poses to us, the oval-mapping technique is chosen as the focus of
our research. The advantage of oval mapping is that it can be productive in a
relatively short time span. The condensed form in which policy-making and hence
problem structuring is shaped by BANS makes it difficult to draw cognitive maps at
an individual level. With oval mapping a group of policy makers immediately starts
working on a group map. An additional argument for choosing the oval-mapping
technique is that since problem structuring is more present in the first part of the
policy-making process (cf. Chapter 2) a problem-structuring intervention should
focus on that part. Hence, the choice for oval mapping which is a concentrated
approach to issues. The following section discusses how characteristics of the oval-
mapping technique will be introduced in BANS.
5.4.2 Oval mapping as a stimulus which ftts the BANS structure
ln round 1 of BANS, four policy advisers are responsible to elicit from fellow
sounding-board members the various perceptions of how they would like to be
involved and involve others in planning the process of policy-making for the four
issues. After a first round of introduction in which participants receive their role
scripts and familiarize themselves with their `job' and the issues, the participants
meet in four sounding boards in the second round. In these meetings, which last one
hour, characteristics of the oval-mapping technique are introduced in the
experimental group by facilitators. An average oval mapping session as applied by
its designers may last between 1-3 hours (Eden and Ackermann, 1998a: 303).
However, the design of the gamelsimulation does not allow for a longer intervention
period than 1 hour because the runs with the control group require a matching time
schedule. A meeting of more than one hour for the control group would hamper the
dynamics of the policy-making process of the municipalities in this group.
The following presents the guidelines the facilitators were given: they are
based on Eden and Ackermann's (1998a: 301-320) basic instruction for oval
mapping. They do not include the additional steps which can be useful as well.
1. The facilitator starts the intervention with a brief introduction in which he~she
explains what he~she will try to achieve, what is expected of the participants
and what they, on their part, may expect of the sessions. He~she:
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- points out that the aim of the session is not to reach consensus, but to get
a clear picture of the different views of the participants of the policy
issue;
- hands out the ovals, markers, and blu-tack;
- makes sure the flip-over sheets are already on the wall;
- invites the participants to come and sit in a semi-circle facing the flip-
over sheets on the wall.
2. After formulating what, according to the facilitator, seems to be the key
definition of the `policy issue, the various group members are invited to
respond. The question should stimulate the minds of the participants. Helshe
- writes on the flip-over sheet, a question (clearly) which captures the
policy issue in order to maximize response. This question should be fairly
broad but not ambiguous.
One of the questions we used for one of the four issues (the light pollution issue)
was as follows: Which aims do you want to achieve? Which actions need to be taken
in order to achieve therrt and with whoni?
3. The facilitator can assist the participants in writing down ideas on the ovals:
He~she
- assists the participants in writing down the concepts;
- encourages the participants to write their concepts in the form of
infinitive verb forms to give the ideas on the ovals an action orientation
(for example: `intprove the quality of problem structuring' rather than
`the city council should intprove the qualiry ofproblem structuring )
- asks participants to write down the contrasting poles of a concept if ideas
are unclear (for example: ' improve the guality of health care ' rather t{tan
'agree on the needfor a tnore e~cient health care ')
- rewrites concepts which are unclear, or asks the participant to do so.
- points out that there should not be more than approximately 8 words per
oval
4. Participants are invited to stick their ovals on the wall. The concepts on the
wall will trigger new ideas or responses. The facilitator manages the group
process and discussion. Helshe:
- makes clear to the participants that only ovals which are on the wall will
be taken into account when developing policy strategies;
- makes clear to the participants that they should not pile up ovals: when an
oval is written, it should be stuck on the wall;
- encourages people to follow up on ideas of others;
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- encourages the debate between participants but makes sure that all ideas
are written down on the ovals;
- splits ovals containing two viewslconcepts;
- pays attention to people who seem to be not really involved and makes
sure every- body contributes. If people are reluctant to join, helshe talks
to them, writes their concepts on ovals and sticks these on the wall;
- manages time;
- gets participants active again if the process slows down, by asking, e.g.,
how, people think they will achieve some of their views or values.
5. A second main task for the facilitator is to structure the material. Concepts
which are related are placed if possible in the same area on the wall. The group
map that is being built should be hierarchical with the single most important
goals of the participants at the top. The facilitator
- encourages the participants to cluster their concepts themselves. If they
are uncertain about in which cluster concepts belong, they can put them to
the side;
- separates ovals which form potential clusters and places them in such a
way that there is plenty of space around them;
- breaks up the old clusters, if new material indicates the existence of new
clusters (themes);
- places broadly based ideas towards the top of clusters: works towards
hierarchically organised cause maps;
- numbers the ovals.
6. The map will be reviewed and the facilitator will make sure the concepts are in
place. The clusters are labelled. With the aid of the map, the facilitator
discusses the issue with the participants. The new information which results
from this discussion is also written down on ovals and integrated in the map.
The facilitator:
- goes through the draft clusters and makes sure the concepts are in the
relevant cluster;
- discusses with the participants whether the ovals at the top are really the
most superordinate and the ones nearer the bottom the most subordinate;
- draws links when the oval are repositioned, keeping in mind the
hierarchical nature of the map;
- encourages participants to write down new information which emerges
from the discussion on ovals and stick them on the map;
- labels clusters;
- tries to integrate the ovals which were put on the side or capture their
meaning.
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7. The meeting is ended by the facilitator who:
- thanks the participants for their hard work and willingness to cooperate;
- emphasizes the relevance of the map for feeding the policy table or
process architecture, instruments which will be used later on.
In the pilot study we learned that it was quite practical to first have a brainstorm on
which actors have a stake in the issue before addressing the main question. That is
why the making of a list of actors who had a stake in the issue, was added to the
process above. Identifying stakeholders is an optional activity which Eden and
Ackermann may do at the end of an oval mapping session.
After the session, the various participants go back to their offices and the
policy adviser makes a draft proposal for the process architecture with the aid of the
map which the participants have constructed. The facilitator leaves and participants
in both the control and the experimental groups will follow the same steps of play. A
second sounding-board meeting will follow in, which this draft is discussed and
amended. After another round of more informal talks on the basis of which the
policy adviser will rewrite the proposal, the final draft is prepared and, subsequently,
presented to all participants in a city meeting.
Table 5.1 gives an overview of the first round of BANS and how the
intervention relates to steps-of-play.
Table S.1 BANS steps oJplay~: rouud 1
BANS BANS f oval mapping technique (OMT)
Introduction (9:45-10:15) Introduction (9:45-10:15)
1. Analysis policy issue (10:15-11:00) 1. Analysis policy issue (10:15-I 1:00)
2. Ist sounding-board meeting (11:00-12:00) 1. lst sounding-board meeting (11:00-12:00)
in which the facilitator introduces OMT
2. Design process architecture (12:00-12:30) 3. Design process architecture (12:00-12:30)
4. 2nd sounding-board meeting (14:00-14:45) 4. 2nd sounding-board meeting (14:00-14:45)
5. Design final process architecture and
evaluation policy issue (14:45-15:15)
5. Design final process architecture and
evaluation policy issue (14:45-15:15)
6. City meeting 15:15-16:15 6. City meeting I5:15-16:15
7. Evaluationldebriefing 7. Evaluation~debriefing
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Table 5.2 BANS steps ofplay.. rouird 2
BANS BANS f oval mapping technique (OMT)
Introduction Introduction
1. Orientation (9:15-9:45) 1. Orientation (9:15-9:45)
2. Prepatory consultation for lst city meeting
(9:45-10:30)
2. Prepatory consultation for lst city meeting
(9:45-10:30)
3. lst city meeting (10:30-12:30) 3. lst city meeting with OMT (10:30- 12:30)
3b. break 3b. break
3c. 1 st city meeting- part 2 3c. 1 st city meeting- part 2 with OMT
4. strategy meeting (13:45-15:00) 4. strategy meeting (13:45-15:00)
5. Second city meeting: presenting strategies
(15:00-15:45)
5. Second city meeting: presenting strategies
(15:00-15:45)
6. Evaluation 6. Evaluation
The second day is similar to the first day (see Table 5.2). All fourteen participants
will become involved in making a policy, viz., 3 policy strategies for one issue, the
light pollution issue. The group will be assisted with an intervention based on the
oval-mapping technique in steps 3, 4. Subsequently, the policy advisers use the
group map to prepare a policy table3 which will be used in subsequent meetings to
design three strategies. At the end, the strategies are presented in a plenary city
meeting. Table 5.2 presents an overview of the second round of BANS with the
intervention for the experimental group.
5.5 Summary
This chapter describes the problem-structuring method Strategic Option
Development and Analysis in greater detail. An overview is presented of the theories
which influenced the development of the approach. The various techniques which
can be used in a SODA trajectory are discussed. Cognitive or group mapping is
central to the approach. Both the design of our research and our understanding of
problem structuring presents us with time constraints for the intervention. As a
result, characteristics of the oval-mapping technique were chosen as our stímulus. It
3 The instrument of the policy table will be described in Chapter 6.
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is a manual mapping technique: a facilitator assists a group of people in writing and
structuring ideas on a particular issue on oval-shaped cards which are stuck on the
flip-over sheets on the wall. The intervention procedure is described in detail.
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6. A tale of six cities and one game~
simulation
6.1 Introduction
This chapter is a prelude to the following chapters, in which the results of this study
will be presented. It offers information on the gamelsimulation BANS and its
participants. First, the six municipalities which participated in the game~simulation
will be discussed (section 6.2). Next, the main characteristics, roles, issues and steps-
of-play in the game~simulation BANS will be introduced (section 6.3). In section
6.4, an in-debt account, based on the observation transcripts, will be given of the
interactions during the game~simulation. Given the great quantity of observation
data, the choice was made to present a summary of the run played by municipality 6.
The developments concerning one of the four issues - the coffee shop issue - on the
first day is described. Next, the second day of the game is described, in which all
participants become involved in one issue: light pollution. In section 6.5 we will
reflect upon the differences between the intended application of the oval-mapping
technique and the actual characteristics ofthe applied technique. Section 6.6 presents
the conclusion.
6.2 Six municipalities
In this section, the teams of the six municipalities which participated in this research
are introduced. The descriptions are partially based on questionnaires,' city council
publications and the observation protocols of the runs. Characteristics such as size,
geographical location of the municipality, type of position and work experience of
the team members are presented.
1 This information was gathered by means of the questionnaires the participants answered preceding
and at the end of the first day, and again at the end of the gamelsimulation (see Appendices 2-4).
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In addition, behavioural characteristics which were observed during the gamel
simulation are described. In Table 6.1 some of the main characteristics of the six
municipalities are presented. On the basis of these data we will assess whether the
two research groups are similar.
6.2. I Region and nusnicipaliry size
The municipalities are situated in various parts of the country and differ in size. The
control group consists of larger municipalities. This uneven distribution over the two
groups is partly the result of the methodological decision to assign municipalities
either to the experimental or to the control group according to their order of
recruitment. Since it is conceivable that civil servants working for large
municipalities are better trained to deal with complex issues than those in smaller
towns, municipality size seemed a variable which needed to be controlled.'- In the
course of the process the attempt to create more balanced groups had to be
abandoned for practical reasons.'
6.2.2 Sex, age, rype offunction and work experience
Some of the characteristics of the teams presented in Table 6.1 are age, type of
position and work experience. Not included in the table is sex. Both groups consisted
predominantly of inen; only municipalities 3(control group) and 5(experimental
group) included approximately 350~o women. Women are still rare in more senior
positions, also in Dutch local government.
The participants in both groups were, on average, between 45 and 55 years old.
The team of municipality 4 was the most senior by age, and municipality 5 stood out
as a comparatively young team.
Considering the type of positions the team members had, most teams consisted of
senior civil servants. The contro] group included two teams (municipalities 1 and 2)
which represented a policy development unit, a staff unit specialized in advising
aldermen and civil servants on developments in (strategic) policy and administration.
The experimental group included more civil servants and heads of departments (e.g.,
social or environmental affairs). Both the experimental and the control groups
2 In large municipalities many policy areas will demand more specified knowledge and may im-olve a
larger variety of interests. For instance, public order issues of a relatively prosperous small town will
be of a different nature than those of large towns with deprived inner ciry areas.
3 We had planned to introduce the mapping technique in municipality 3, which was the fifth municipal-
ity we recmited. Following the random assigrunent method, it would have been assigned to the
control group. Since the room in which we played BANS in municipality 3 tumed out to be too small
to work with the technique, it was assigned to the control group.
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consisted of about the same number of local politicians (4 to 5) participating in the
game.
In addition to municipal representatives, the teams included representatives
from related profit and non-profit organizations. Our aim to simulate in this way
existing policy networks did not really come through (cf. section 4.6.5).
The participants in the experimental group had, despite the fact that it included
a team of fairly young civil servants, somewhat more work experience in their
present positions.
6.2.3 Social groups: Interests and confltcts
From the questionnaires the participants answered before the gamelsimulation
started, it became clear that participants in both groups were well acquainted with
their team members. The teams from municipalities 3(control group) and 5
(experimental group) were less well acquainted with one another. Municipality 3 is a
rapidly growing new town, so new staff (also seniors) are recruited regularly. The
team from municipality 5 also consisted of a number of fairly recently recruited civil
servants from various departments. Both groups tended to consider the interests they
represented reasonably diverse. There was a trend that the experimental group held
somewhat more diverse interests than the control group (F(1,64) - 3.18, p- 0.08).
Particularly, municipalities 4 and 6 of the experimental group pointed out that
interests within their team differed. Participants from these two municipalities had to
deal with conflicting opinions about work-related issues somewhat more frequently
than the other teams. Despite the diversity of interests, the participants in both
groups had, overall, experienced few conflicts of opinion about work-related issues.
Personality conflicts between the team members were virtually non-existent in all six
municipalities. The participants in both groups appeared to have entered the
game~simulation as fairly conflict-free teams.
6.2.4 Team clTaracteristics dernonstrated in BANS
Finally, Table 6.1 also presents some distinctive features which characterize the
various teams while playing the gamelsimulation BANS. These characteristics are
deduced from the observation transcripts and will be discussed for the various
municipalities separately. Variables included are: the degree to which participants
were linking issues;' the degree to which participants were involved in and reflecting
4 The linking of whole policy issues is distinguished here from the linking of different aspects into
ideas, and ideas into issues which refers to the criterion `aspect integration', one of the dependent
variables in this study.
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on the game; the degree to which the group was dominated by a leader; and the
degree of conflict and hierarchy in the team.
In municipality 1, participants tended to think holistically: they continuously
advocated an integral approach to the issues presented to them on the first day of the
game. Furthermore, two of the participants played an important role (without being
overtly dominant) in managing and facilitating the process they were involved in.
They stood out as attentive process managers who paid close attention to the various
interests displayed. One of them was the head of a department. Hardly any
participant put forward her or his own interests. There was a clear tendency to
choose a multi-perspective view of the issues. At the same time, the majority of the
participants were critical. Some strongly questioned the analytical distinction made
in the gamelsimulation between process and content on the first and second day.
Also, some were very self-critical in the evaluations.
The team from municipality 2 shared some of these characteristics. Here, there
was one participant who overtly dominated the game with his ideas and social skills.
He introduced a combined integral and regional approach to the issues and
convinced the others of its merits. The participants from municipality 2 were also
critical, but they were, above all, critical of the ideas of some of their fellow
participants and reluctant to accept the advice given by the facilitator they hired
(played by the game facilitator). On the second day the team opted for an alternative
process architecture to the one BANS provided.
The team from municipality 3 focussed somewhat more on action than on
reflection in comparison with the previous two municipalities. Participants
repeatedly drew parallels between what they experienced in BANS and in their own
municipality in which everybody is very busy and occupied all the time. As a result,
communication between departments is often frustrated, since people are so busy
with other tasks that they lack the time to consult with other departments and adjust
policy accordingly. Like the participants from municipality 2, the team willfully
opted for an alternative process on the second day.
The team representing municipality 4 appeared to function as an `old-boys
network'. The representatives of the municipality were used to going on excursions
together and for some the game~simulation had a similar function. There was a clear
sense of hierarchy and participants were sensitive about losing face. The participants
were more action than reflection-oriented.
The team from municipality 5 was not only mixed in as far as age and
experience are concerned, but also showed a variety in behaviour. Some were
overtly consensus seeking, others were unwilling to compromise and took a strong
position. The result was a polarization of interests which increased in the course of
the game~simulation.
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Finally, the last team was more procedure-oriented than the other teams. This was
most evident in the plans they designed and presented. Furthermore, they were
meticulous in their approach to the issues presented to them.
6.2.5 Do the groups differ?
Above, we discussed a number of characteristics of the control and experimental
groups. These data are based on questionnaires and observations. There is little
difference in general characteristics such as age and sex, nor do the groups differ in
the number of years of work experience. Although the experimental group appears to
consider itself somewhat more diverse in the interests it represents, there is no
difference between the two groups as regards the extent of personality conflicts
among team members or conflicts of opinion about work-related issues. Overall,
both groups indicate that there are few conflicts of opinion as regards content and
virtually no personal conflicts. However, the groups do differ in two respects. The
control group consists of larger municipalities, and the teams within the control
group consisted predominantly of civil servants working for a policy development
unit. This may explain why these participants were more inclined to think
holistically, link policy issues and reflect critically on the topics they discussed.
6.3 The basic design of BANS
6.3. I Main characteristicsof BANS
As explained in Chapter 4, BANS has been developed for a civil servant training
institute as the final part of a course on participatory policy-making. Its aim was to
provide the students - who were all experienced civil servants - with a safe
environment in which they could apply the knowledge they had acquired during the
course. BANS was thus developed for training purposes.
The gamelsimulation simulates the municipality of Beneveld. Beneveld
represents a large town in the Netherlands with approximately 160,000 inhabitants.
It is a rather prosperous town where, after a period of industrial decline, new
industries were attracted. The city has a university, a number of schools for higher
vocational training, and a prosperous cultural sector.
In Table 6.2, the main characteristics of BANS are presented. Policy-making in
the municipality involves three categories of players: policy advisers (civil servants),
local politicians (mayor, aldermen and councillors) and stakeholders. Transfer, one
of these stakeholders, is a major industrial estate in the western part of the city.
There are 25 firms located at the estate and together they employ 10,000 people. The
companies cooperate on matters concerning the estate. Calimus is a village of 15,000
inhabitants, which is situated to the west of Beneveld. Its problems are typical for
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smaller municipalities which border on large towns. Recently, it has only just been
able to avoid being joined together with Beneveld.
Tuble 6.2 Structure of BANS
goal orientation issues 14 roles
day 1: process light pollution 4 policy advisers
process architecture housing issue 4 mayorlaldermen~councillors
A206 2 Transfer
coffee shop issue 2 Welfare Foundation
2 Calimus
day 2: content light pollution
policy-making
The Welfare Foundation is an umbrella organization representing approximately 100
health and welfare organizations and organizations in Beneveld in the field of
culture, sports and environmental issues. They assist their members in their contacts
with local government. They prepare and take part in negotiations. Furthermore,
they stimulate cooperation among their members.
6.3.2 The first round
The game~simulation takes two days, and consists of two rounds. In the first round
(day 1), high on the city's policy agenda are four issues which predominantly
concern the western part of the city. Firstly, there is the light pollution issue, which
involves a new policy area concerned with inconvenience caused by the lighting of,
e.g., industrial estates and pitches. A second issue is the housing issue. Beneveld has
a number of welfare organizations which need new accommodation. Simultaneously,
a number of schools face budgetary problems because they have too many empty
classrooms due to the decline in pupils. Thirdly, a new motorway, the A206, is
planned west of the city. National government already decided the approximate
route, but the city council has been given some discretion in determining its exact
location; it will have to run either through an old historical park or through a modern
sports centre. Finally, there is the coffee shop issue, which involves problems caused
by soft drugs outlets in the city. The fourteen participants in the gamelsimulation had
one of the four issues as their major concern. The subgroups met several times in a
sounding-board meeting in order to discuss one of the issues. These so-called
sounding boards are relatively ne~v institutions in the municipality. They were
created to facilitate a more participatory style of policy-making the city council
aspires to. The sounding boards include representatives from the municipality's
policy network, who are involved in a particular field. Figure 6.1 presents an
104
overview of the four sounding boards with their corresponding issues and members.
The sounding boards are presided by four policy advisers (civil servants), who are
responsible for developing - together with other parties involved - a process
architecture (plan of action) for the four issues. This is a plan which specifies `who
will talk to whom about what topic at what time'. In other words, it explains how the
decision-making process concerning an issue will evolve and what steps will be
taken.
Figure 6.1 The sounding boards, their members and issues
policy adviser for t policy adviser for social
environmental affairs affairs
' alderman for environmental affair ~ aldennan for social affairs
' Transfer ~ welfare foundation
~ Calimus ~ Transfer
sounding board on environmental affairs
light pollution issue
~ policy adviser for
transport
~ alderman for transport
~ Calimus
sounding board on transport
A206




sounding board on public order
coffee shop issue
Summarizing, in the first round of BANS the focus is on process rather than content:
participants are asked to design a process architecture. Both the process architecture
and the sounding board are instruments which are introduced to the game~simulation
to persuade participants to adopt a more process-oriented and participatory style of
policy-making. Another instrument which serves this purpose and which is
introduced to the players in both rounds is the actor analysis. It assists the players in
identifying the nature of the interests of the various parties, their influence and
expected behaviour.
6.3.3 The second round
In the second round, participants change roles, except for the externals who play the
roles of Transfer and the Welfare Foundation. The players start developing a policy
for one issue, the light pollution issue. All fourteen participants become involved in
sounding board on social affairs
housing issue
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developing approximately two or three alternative policy strategies for this issue.
BANS provides a process architecture for the second day, which specifies step by
step how to design the strategies. This plan ensures that the participants have several
plenary sessions (city meetings). In between, they meet in smaller groups or in twos.
As in the first round, the participants make a stakeholder analysis and use an
additional instrument suitable for participatory policy-making, viz. a policy table.
This is a structuring device which helps categorizing issue aspects into three main
categories: goals, decision areas, and options (see example in section 6.4.2). Ideas
shared among different groups can be traced and serve as starting points for policy
implementation. With the aid of the policy table, different strategies can be drawn.
Table 5.1 and 5.2 provide an overview of the agenda of both days and indicate
when the facilitator introduced the technique. As indicated above, the experimental
group was assisted by facilitators who introduced the oval-mapping technique in the
second step-of-play on both days in order to assist the participants structuring the
policy. In all six runs of BANS, the participants were assisted by the same game-
facilitator. In the following section, a summary will be given of how municipality 6
went through these steps-of-play ofthe game~simulation.
6.4 Policy-making in a gamelsimulation in municipality 6
6.4.1 BANS, Day 1: D,-awing up a process architecte,re for the coffee s{iop issue
Introduction
The game~simulation started with the fourteen participants being welcomed to the
City of Beneveld. Three participants will have as their main responsibility the coffee
shop issue. They are the mayor, the policy adviser for public order, and a
representative of the Welfare Foundation. Their issue concerns a number of outlets
selling (soft) drugs, which are referred to as coffee shops. The local government has
made a covenant with the local coffee shops. However, the coffee shop owners do
not observe the arrangements laid down in the covenant. Neighbourhood councils
have warned the municipality that hard drugs are being sold and that the use of drugs
causes inconvenience in the vicinity of these outlets. The loca] government now
considers exploiting its own shop as a means to regulate the use of soft drugs.
Relocating the shops away from the city centre to reduce inconvenience is a measure
which is also being considered.
After the participants have been informed about their identity and task, the
game starts with an orientation phase.
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Step 1: orientation
All 5 groups of actors gather in their various offices to concentrate on their manual,
which gives further explanation about their various identities, hopes and aspirations
in their professional lives. The manual also includes a small guide which gives an
outline of the day's events. Participants are told to prepare for a sounding-board
meeting. The sounding board is a fairly new instrument introduced by the
municipality of Beneveld, which aspires to a more participatory style of policy-
making. A number of boards have been formed in order to early involve
representatives of the societal network in the policy-making process.
The participants read their manual in silence and there is little informal contact
between the organizations. The game facilitator informs the policy advisers that in
the sounding-board meetings, they will be assisted by a facilitator who will use a
technique to generate and structure ideas, which they can then use for their process
architectures. In the meanwhile, the mayor and aldermen discuss the motorway
extensively and briefly touch upon the other issues. The mayor explains that he has
to deal with the closure of coffee shops and that he is not in favour of immediate
action.
Although they are not members of the sounding board concerned with the
coffee shop issue, the representatives of the neighbouring village Calimus discuss
the issue extensively. They are not in favour of a municipal coffee shop but concede
that they have few means to influence the decision-making in Beneveld. Besides,
since Beneveld gets extra financial support from the national government for
controlling drug-related problems, they might as well take responsibility for the
coffee shop issue.
The representatives of the Welfare Foundation agree that a municipal coffee
shop is undesirable. The actual selling of soft drugs is not the task of a municipality.
Step 2: thefirst sounding-board meeting
The mayor and policy adviser who are concerned with the coffee shop issue come
together for their first sounding-board meeting. They are welcomed by a facilitator,
and while sitting down in a half circle in front of a wall covered with white paper,
they immediately engage in a discussion. The representative of the Welfare
Foundation joins them.
Their discussion is directed at sharing information on the content of the
covenant and the nature of the inconvenience caused. The sounding-board members
5 Municipality 6 is part of the experimental group and is hence informed about the facilitator who will
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thus jointly trace the best possible way to tackle the issue. They consider the
advantages and disadvantages of relocating or decentralizing the coffee shops.
The facilitator intervenes in what has so far been a very constructive discussion
among equals. She explains that she has been asked by the municipality to assist the
board in organizing the various ideas and to help structuring them. These can then
serve as input for the process architecture. She distributes oval-shaped cards and
markers and asks the participant to write down ideas which come to mind when they
read the question she has written in the corner of the papered wall: What should the
aim of coffee shop policy be and tivhat action needs to be taken to achieve this aim?
This trigger question mirrors the focus of the first day of the game~simulation which
concerns process. The technique is used to first generate ideas on the issue and then
switch to ideas for the process architecture (see section 6.3.2). In SODA-approaches
the focus is on issue-content and not process.
Initially, the participants feel somewhat inconvenient but they soon get
involved in the process of generating ideas and sticking them on the wall. With the
aid of the facilitator ideas are arranged in a certain way. (In Figure 6.2. the oval map
produced by the group is presented.) The actions they come up with are formulated
and weighed in close deliberation. The discussion concentrates on when citizens
should become involved. The Welfare representative argues that it should be from
the first phase onwards. How~ever, both the mayor and policy adviser think that it is
sensible to gain more insight into the problems before starting a discussion with
citizens. Another point of debate is who should become involved in the quick scan
and whether already certain solutions should be excluded at this stage of the policy-
making process. The meeting can be characterized as very open and the participants
are very cooperative. After the meeting is finished, the participants return to their
offices.
Step 3: designing a process arckitecture
While the various participants brief each other about their experiences with the
sounding-board meetings, the policy advisers remain seated in front of their
respective maps and work solitarily on their draft version of a process architecture.
The majority of the council of aldermen agree that the municipal coffee shop is still
a conceivable option. The mayor explains that the Welfare Foundation was more
cooperative than expected but that they are still at the very beginning of the process.
The Welfare representative briefs her colleague which actors will be involved and
explains the mayor's position concerning the municipal coffee shop. They then
switch to another issue.
The representatives of Calimus are visited by the Welfare representative, who
is interested in their view on drugs and the number of users in the village. Calimus
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replies that they are really too small for a coffee shop. The Welfare representative
agrees that Calimus is not a likely location and asks whether the municipality can
make enquiries about what the parents of youngsters using soft drugs think of the
issue. They conclude that there should be no coffee shops in residential areas.
Step 4: the second sounding-board meeting
The policy adviser presents his draft of the process architecture. First, the problems
will be listed. There will be a preparatory meeting led by the mayor with the policy
adviser and the police; they will explore facts and complaints. The mayor interrupts
the presentation and asks why only these three parties will participate in this first
meeting. The policy adviser argues that the information available to the police
should first be reported in a small circle. He then proceeds with the next phases of
his draft proposal. The Welfare foundation will participate repeatedly in the process.
The Welfare representative does not agree with this. She emphasizes that it is
important to organize and implement affairs as close as possible to where they are
happening. As an umbrella organization, they are not the right institution to discuss
drug problems with. Social workers are better interlocutors, she argues. She also
points out that youngsters should be approached as full participants in the process.
They should be formally invited, by, for instance, the alderman for welfare. The
discussion continues with the idea of the municipal coffee shop and the need for
stronger enforcement of the covenant. Sanctions should be made transparent. The
mayor advocates tit for tat. Another option which is discussed is a decentralization
approach. The policy adviser asks who should become involved in discussing
options. The mayor advocates a quick scan by the police, the Welfare Foundation
and the Alcohol and Drugs Agency. The Welfare Foundation points out once more
that it is important to involve the neighbourhood council from the start.
Subsequently, the meeting is finished and the policy adviser says he will finalise the
process architecture.
Step S: making a definite process architecture
After the sounding-board meetings have ended, the policy advisers start working
solitarily on a final proposal which they will present in the city meeting in which the
various representatives will participate. All participants fill out questionnaires - as
they have been doing repeatedly during the day - and discuss their experiences with
their colleagues, but also seek informal contact with the others.
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preparatory meeting - mayor - establishing facts
- police commissioner - checking covenant
- advíser - relimina ositions
conference with coffee shop - ( see above) - establishing facts
owners - coffee shop owners - exchange viewpoints
- Centre on Alcohol and Drugs - announce measures
(C.A.D.) - direct action
- inform commission on general - mayor - inform
affairs - police commissioner - exchange preliminary
- inform public - adviser viewpoints
- press release
- deliberating with ~`neighbours! -( see abo~~e) - information exchange
neighbourhood council - Welfare Foundation - exchange preliminary
~` visitors shops - C.A.D. viewpoints
explore various options - mayor - research feasibility
- police - consult third parties
- judiciary - preliminary measures
discuss feasible options - mayor - select options of preference
- police~ adviser - establish priorities




inform commission on general - mayor - agreement on options and
affairs on preferred optíon and - police strategy
strategy - adviser
taking direct actions - mayor - implement tightened control
- advisers
- police
- inform citizens neighbourhood - mayor - inform
about measures - adviser - explain
- neighbourhood council
- police
- ii~ti~rm eci(fee shof m~ner, - poli~~




Step 6: city meeting
The city meeting is opened by the mayor, who welcomes all participants and briefly
explains that in this session the various process architectures for each of the cases
will be presented. The game facilitator explains the procedure: first the policy
adviser for the light pollution issue will present his proposal, after which the
members of the meeting can ask for clarification. They will then be asked to evaluate
the proposals.
The policy adviser for public affairs is the last in the row to present his plan.
He briefly sketches the aim of the covenants with the coffee shop owners and
explains that they will first do some fact finding to get a better understanding of the
issue. Simultaneously, actions will be taken to demonstrate to the various parties that
Beneveld is serious about enforcing its soft drugs policy. Subsequently, he touches
upon the main steps of his process architecture, which are presented in the figure
below.
The Welfare representative expresses her satisfaction with the plan. An
alderman explains that he is relieved that the plan does not include a municipal
coffee shop, something his council had mixed feelings about. There are some
questions on the part of Transfer and Calimus, who wonder whether sanctions can be
enforced. Then the mayor calls it a day and the game leader explains that they have
reached the end of the first day of BANS, and invites the participants to engage in an
evaluation.
6.4.2 The second day: making policy strategies
Introdt~ction
The previous evening, most participants - except for the extemals playing the
representatives ofthe Welfare Foundation and Transfer - have changed roles. On this
second day, all participants will become involved in one issue, the light pollution
issue. There are 13 players: one policy adviser injured his foot in a football match
the previous night. One new institution - two members of the city council - is present
on this second day of the game (these roles replace those of the mayor and an
alderman). One is the chair of the largest party, the Christian Democrats. The other
is the chair ofthe committee for environmental affairs.
The light pollution issue is an old case. The municipality ofBeneveld has made
little progress with this issue since it first appeared on the policy agenda. It is already
a year ago that the first cautious attempts were made to design a process architecture.
Beneveld still hopes to set an example with this pilot for future policy makers in
other cities. The Ministry of Environmental planning has announced that it will
subsidize the development of policy in this field. Furthermore, the ministry has
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issued a directive regarding the maximum inconvenience light may cause by 2010.
In the meantime, the alderman for economic affairs has succeeded in attracting a
major supermarket chain to Beneveld, which has started a distribution centre in
Transfer, the town's major industrial estate. As a consequence, Transfer wants to
intensify its lighting. Neighbouring Calimus is not pleased with this plan. They have
already received many complaints from the citizens near the estate. There have also
been complaints about the sports centre, which also causes inconvenience with its
lighting.
The policy advisers are assigned to produce a number of strategies with the aid
of a policy table (see Figure 6.5).
Step 1: orientation
The participants again meet first in their various offices, where they find a manual
with more detailed information about their role and the issue. As in most of the
games, this first step on the second day is much more lively than on the first day.
There is a high level of inter-organisational interaction. Some of this is briefly
described below.
The two aldermen discuss the possibility of a technical solution to the problem.
The alderman of economic affairs seems rather undisturbed by the issue and points
to a previous experience with a firm, in which case different bulbs ended the
inconvenience caused.
The policy advisers brainstorm together on the various aspects which they
think are relevant to the issue: its environmental sides, health, safety of buildings,
and roads. The adviser for economic affairs gives an explanation about the new
distribution centre of a large supermarket chain which needs more luxb than what is
presently being provided. He suggests designing a parallel trajectory focusing on the
pilot project' on the one hand and simultaneously solving the problems ofTransfer.
The representatives of Calimus agree that their main goal is the reduction of
inconvenience caused by the light pollution, and that their sub-goal is safeguarding
employment. Subsequently they split up. One representative visits the alderman of
economics, who points out that for the sake of employment, Transfer will need more
light. Calimus agrees that employment is important, but not at all costs. He suggests
rezoning the most polluting firms.
The chair of the commission visits Transfer. He explains that research is being
conducted into the inconvenience caused by light pollution and enquires whether
6 Lux is a measure for light intensity.
7 The pilot project refers to the fact that the light pollution policy Beneveld intends to develop will
serve as a pilot for the national policy.
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Transfer is willing to participate in it. Transfer's representative declines: `already too
much money is being spent on this type of research.' His associate thinks win-win
situations can be created, since people living in the neighbourhood of Transfer are
increasingly illuminating their houses for security reasons.
The representatives of the Welfare foundation are visited by Calimus and
enquire about the kind of inconvenience the industrial estate causes. When Calimus
has left, the two councillors drop by. They are interested in the kinds of problems
residents of Beneveld have with the sport complex. In the meanwhile, Calimus visits
the Welfare Foundation in order to find some common ground and advocates a
joined approach for an integral light pollution policy. One of the Welfare
representatives wonders aloud what is troubling residents; curtains and shutters
should help, she thinks. `So, what is so temble?'
The commission's chair and the alderman of economic affairs address the
promises the latter has made to the distribution centre. Both agree that the costs
should be borne by Calimus, Transfer, and Beneveld. The alderman of
environmental affairs, however, considers Transfer solely responsible. The aldermen
are then visited by Transfer. A fierce debate with the alderman of environmental
affairs emerges. Transfer argues that they should never have built houses so near to
the estate but, he repeatedly emphasizes, he is willing to cooperate and think along
about possible solutions.
Step 2: a city meeting
All participants have been invited by the advisers of Beneveld to join a city meeting.
The alderman for environmental affairs chairs the meeting and describes the light
pollution issue as a security issue with economic aspects. He explains that there are
some conflicting characteristics. The representative of Calimus interrupts arguing
that regulations exist on lighting in public areas etc. He is thanked for his
contribution and the floor is given to an external facilitator, who has been hired by
Beneveld to assist the process. He briefly explains his approach: he will use the oval-
mapping technique to make visible the various ideas people have on the issue. First,
the participants will have 10 minutes to write down their organization's ideas on
oval slips of paper, after which all the organizations will be asked to present their
views in turn. These will be stuck on the wall and the facilitator will structure them.
With the aid of these ideas, the policy advisers will then make a policy table, which
will be presented to the participants.
After the break, Calimus is given a first turn to put forward their ovals. They
desire a reduction of inconvenience caused by light. Calimus doubts the necessity for
more lux. They want this to be investigated. They formulate additional goals and
queries, upon which the facilitator thanks them and briefly summarizes the ideas,
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inviting Transfer to share their view. One by one the various organizations explain
their views and the facilitator arranges the ovals on the wall. The result can be seen
in Figure 6.4.
A point of discussion is whether to pursue a national policy or first to solve the
local problems. Opinions also differ on what is acceptable inconvenience and what is
not.
The meeting develops in a friendly atmosphere. The participants are attentive
and interested in the various contributions. The facilitator winds up the meeting and
explains that now the policy advisers will start working with the ideas of the map.
Everyone will later be welcomed for a new round of talks.
Step 3: break city meetifzg
In Calimus, the representatives confer on the city meeting. They argue that
Transfer's strong position leaves little room for manoeuvre. Beneveld is perceived as
arrogant for they do not seem eager to talk to Calimus. Hence, Calimus concludes
they need to be careful. Transfer drops by and asks whether they realize that their
interests runs against the interests of the environment. Calimus argues that they will
not oppose the enlargement of Transfer, provided their citizens will experience less
inconvenience. `So, we all see the benefits of a technical solution', Transfer
concludes. The councillor of the Christian Democrats also drops by and draws a
parallel with noise pollution.
While everyone is going for lunch, the three policy advisers continue to work
on the policy table. They are assisted by the facilitator, who gives examples of how
to approach the matter. `It is striking, that few concrete items have been mentioned,
perhaps we can think of some' the facilitator suggests. He explains that the policy
table does not have to be complete, people can add ideas. Furthermore, he suggests
forming three groups each of which will design a strategy by choosing options which
fit one of the three goals he suggested earlier on: environrnent, employment, well-
being. The policy advisers and facilitator generate various options, which they write
down in the table. The facilitator rounds of the session with the suggestion a
distinction should be made between short and long-terrn options.
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Step 4: strategy meetings
After the lunch break, all participants join again in a short plenary session, which
one of the policy advisers illustrates the policy table (see Figure 6.5). Then the game
facilitator explains that the aim of the table is to postpone decisions as long as
possible, and develop parallel ideas on decisions. He suggests forming three groups
on the bases of the three goals: economy and employment, environment and nature,
and well-being
The subgroup that forms a strategy favouring the economy and employment is
very much dominated by the councillor who chairs the Christian Democrats. He
repeatedly objects to choices being made at this stage of the process. Several times,
the policy adviser who is chairing the session tries to redirect attention and asks
which option they should choose in the first column of the table. He eventually
succeeds, and for most decision areas, the group makes its choices. They want to
cooperate, enlarge the estate, increase the number of lux, but this should be done
cost-neutral.
In the sub-group that designs a strategy benefiting welfare, the discussion first
focuses on the route of the new motorway, since, according to the Welfare
representative, this might force them in due time to change policy again. The
commission chair suggests distinguishing between short term and long term policy.
The policy adviser advises continuing the discussion with the aid of the table but
initially the group has difficulty submitting to the pattern of the table. After choosing
short-term options they continue with the long-term policy. Technical solutions and
solutions around the house are chosen as short term options. Transfer will be
financially involved, in that it will pay for adjustments on their grounds. The
municipality and possibly citizens will also share financial responsibility. The
Welfare representative concludes towards the end that citizens are not sufficiently
heard.
In a relatively short, the third group designs time a policy for nature. It works
its way through the table methodically. There is a clear willingness to reach
consensus on the various options.
Step S: 2th ci[y meeting
In this meeting, the three strategies are presented. Various questions arise about
particular choices. After every presentation, of a strategy the participants score it on
a questionnaire. The game facilitator invites participants to change back to the real
world and evaluate their experiences.
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6.5 Reflections on the intervention
In the previous chapter the outline for the oval-mapping intervention was presented.
The way in which we intended to apply it differs in two ways from the oval-mapping
technique as it is presented by its designers (cf Eden and Akkerman, 1998a). The
intervention was going to last approximately an hour and on the first day of BANS it
was going be used to generate ideas for a process architecture and not focus solely
on the content of the issue (cf. section 6.3.2).
While applying the technique some additional differences emerged. Table 6.3
presents an overview of the differences and similarities between the intended
application of the oval-mapping technique and the way it was really applied during
the runs. A distinction is made between three phases of activities i.e., starting up,
structuring and enlarging, structuring and selection. In addition, some general
characteristics of the technique are addressed.
The table does not show that in the sounding-board meeting participants did
not start immediately working with the technique (the delays were between
approximately 3-10 minutes). The policy adviser who formally chaired the meeting
made a round robin and participants took the opportunity to exchange information
on the issue. The facilitator interrupted this discussion to explain his~her presence
once more an started with the group mapping exercise. According to the SODA-
designers the facilitator should chair the meeting and immediately start with the
oval-mapping technique. This difference in approach should not be a reason for great
concern. Firstly, given the nature of the game~simulation, it is only understandable
that participants have to find out what their roles and issues were. In practice, people
in organizations exchange views and information constantly and do not enter a
SODA-trajectory without preconceived knowledge. Moreover, sometimes, when
participants are not familiar with each other, oval mapping also starts with a round
robin in which participants can introduce themselves and their cause (cf Eden and
Ackermann, 1998a: 268).
In some instances participants did not write ovals simultaneously in the first
phase (see Table 6.3). For instance, in one session in the coffee-shop case the
participants slipped in a mode of consensus seeking, while contributing ideas for the
process architecture. They deliberated on an idea and when they reached consensus
the oval was stuck on the wall. They could not be persuaded to first write down their
ovals simultaneously. A second difference is that on the second day the participants
first wrote ovals for approximately 10 minutes and then, given turns by the
facilitator, stuck them all on the wall. This nominal group approach was chosen
because of the group size (14 participants). By offering more structure the facilitator
aimed for more efficiency.
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This approach of first writing ovals individually and then sticking them on the wall
is not alien to the way oval mapping is used (cf. Eden and Ackermann, 1998a: 320).
In the second phase of the intervention, the emphasis is on structuring ovals
into clusters and the gathering of new data (see Table 6.3). In this phase most
activities the oval-mapping technique prescribes were introduced by the facilitators
in the research with one exception. Towards the end of the intervention, only a few
new ideas emerged and not a real second round of generating new ideas and
structuring (3th phase) evolved. Eden and Ackermann (1998a) emphasize that idea
generation and structuring form a cyclical process. After a first round of idea
generation, the structuring of these ideas and discussions on the map's structure, a
new round of idea generation is started. Consequently restructuring is necessary. It is
on this point where our application of the technique diverges most strongly. In the
last phase the difference between the oval-mapping technique as described by its
designers and the way it was introduced in BANS increases. Firstly, few new ideas
emerged. In addition the clusters for the process architecture on day one did not
really require to be ]abelled. Secondly, no options were selected because option
selection was going to be addressed later on in the process.
Summarizing, there are a number of differences between the oval-mapping
technique as it was intended to be applied and the way it evolved in the runs. That
facilitators had to diverge from the guidelines if circumstances require to do so, is
not uncommon. The designers of SODA-trajectories and the oval-mapping technique
opt for alternative scenarios not unlike the ones which emerged in the game~
simulation. One important aspect which characterizes the difference between the
intended and applied technique is its cyclical nature. By and large, only one cycle of
idea-generation and structuring was carried out and in this respect we have not
exploited the technique in its full richness. Given the fact that in all instances only a
few new ideas emerged towards the latter part of the intervention, it is questionable
whether a more elaborated intervention would have produced a better result. This
can be explained partially by the fact that participants could not rely fully on their
`theories in use' because of the relative novelty of the roles and issues.
Consequently, their theories in use were less rich. A longer intervention
however, could have probably resulted in a full integration of orphan concepts, i.e.,
concept which are not linked to any of the other concepts, which emerged in some of
the maps the groups produced. Considering the above arguments we will refer to the
way we introduced the oval-mapping technique in the runs as a mapping technique
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6.6 Conclusion
The building blocks of our quasi-experiment have been presented in this chapter.
First, the six municipalities were introduced which played the game! simulation
and formed the experimental and control group. An assessment of a number of
characteristics showed that they differ in two respects. The control group consisted
of larger municipalities and included a large number of civil servants working for a
(strategic) policy development unit. The experimental group consisted of civil
servants and heads of various departments. These differences may affect the groups'
capacity for problem structuring.
Second, the main characteristics of the gamelsimulation BANS were
introduced. BANS was designed as a training in participatory policy-making for
experienced civil servants. It simulates a city in which fourteen participants engage
in different roles. On the first day, they concentrate on designing a process for four
policy issues and on the second day the content of one policy issue is addressed.
Thirdly, the account of one of the six municipalities playing BANS is given. It
offers the reader insight in how the gamelsimulation actually develops and thus
provides a stepping stone to the following chapters which will discuss the results of
the quasi-experiment.
Finally, an analysis of the case of municipality 6 shows that in some respects
the planned intervention differed from the factual application of the oval-mapping
technique which is the reason we will refer to it as group mapping based on the oval-
mapping technique.
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7. Analysing policy issues: The results of
the first day
7.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, the policy-making process was described for one of the six
municipalities which played BANS. For the first day, the development of one issue
in particular - the coffee shop issue - was sketched. Here, we will first present and
compare the results of this issue for all six municipalities. The six quality criteria
defined to assess the quality of problem-structuring constitute the outline for the first
section of this chapter. The aim is to offer the reader an insight into the way in which
the criteria were operationalized and into the wealth of the data. We hypothesize that
the mapping technique based on oval mapping assists problem-structuring in terms
of the six quality criteria defined. The second part of this chapter presents an over-
view of the results concerning the other three issues of the first day of BANS. Ap-
pendix 12 presents a summary of the operationalization of the six quality criteria.
7.2 Analysing the coffee shop issue
7.2.1 Introduction
For each criterion, the observation data and the survey data of the coffee shop issue
will be discussed in separate sections.' A distinction is made between the control
group and the experimental group. The data were analysed and scored for two time
intervals - the two sounding-board meetings - and for the process architectures
which were drawn up at the end of the first day of BANS. The results are illustrated
by observations.
1 Chapter 6 presents an introduction to the issue.
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7.2.Z Aspect differentiatiort in the coffee shop isscre
Aspect differentiation refers to the wealth of ideas a group of policy-makers has
about a particular issue. Several ideas constitute an issue, and one idea can be subdi-
vided into several aspects. The greater the diversity of aspects which are attributed to
an issue, the higher the degree of aspect differentiation. Examples of aspects which
feature in policy issues such as the coffee shop issue, are different stakeholders,
different policy instniments such as meetings, conferences or regulations, and differ-
ent goals, for instance, reduction in the use ofhard drugs.
Obsen~ation results on aspect differentiation
In Table 7.1, the observation results are presented for the criterion `aspect differen-
tiation' in the coffee shop case. The table presents the number of different aspects
for three categories (actors, process and content) for municipalities l, 2 and 3, which
constitute the control group, and municipalities 4, 5 and 6, which constitute the
experimental group. Aspect differentiation is assessed during the two sounding-
board meetings (SBM) and as regards the final product the various teams made, i.e.,
the process architecture (PA). Subtotals and totals of the categories of aspects are
presented for the munícipalities and groups respectively.
The number of different aspects emerging during the two sounding-board
meetings and in the process architecture are derived from the observation protocols.
Three categories of aspects are distinguished. These are :
1. `actors': parties that somehow have a stake in the coffee shop issue, for in-
stance, the coffee shop owners and the police;
2. `content': all aspects which refer to substantive characteristics of the coffee
shop issue such as location of the shop, type ofdrug, health risks;
3. `process': all aspects which refer to possible actions which can be part of the
policy-making process.
The way in which the observation protocols "~ere analysed - aspects were derived
from them and ordered into the three categories - is demonstrated by means of the
following passage from a protocol of municipality 2:
Welfare representative: `[ do not think that the analyses of the issue are very clear,
and the ideas about deconcentration are rather weird.'
Policy adviser: `The present coffee shops cause inconvenience. Control is question-
able.'
Welfare representative: `Agreements have been made with the coffee shop owners,
but they do not observe them.'
Only one actor is mentioned in this passage, viz. the coffee shop owners. Content
aspects are: deconcenh-ation of coffee shops, ii:convenience caused by coffee shops,
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coiztrol (of issues), agreeirtents made tivith coffee shop owners, agreements not being
observed. One aspect refers to a possible action for the process architecture: analyses
(of the issue).
For the first sounding-board meeting, the number of aspects in all three catego-
ries were added up (subtotals) for the six municipalities, and the totals for the two
groups were calculated. Table 7.1 shows, for instance, that in the first sounding-
board meeting municipality 6 scored the highest (81) number of aspects~ideas and
that the control group had a slightly higher total score than the experimental group:
182 versus 176 aspects.
The totals for the second sounding-board meeting and for the process architec-
tures were calculated somewhat differently. Only the categories `actors' and `process
aspects' were included in the total. The reason for this is that the participants' main
task for the first day was to develop a process architecture, i.e., to process ideas, and
ideas about possible interlocutors for an issue. During the second meeting, the policy
advisers discussed a first draft for the process architecture. One would thus expect
attention to shift during the day towards process ideas (after both content and pro-
cess ideas had been considered). In situations where the process architecture is rich
in terms of content aspects but poor in actors and~or process aspects, aspect differen-
tiation is, given the task the policy advisers had, rather limited. Few ideas were
offered for the process architecture itself. For this reason, content aspects are not
included in the subtotals for the second sounding-board meeting and process archi-
tecture.
In order to give an impression of the types of aspects the participants defined,
the main clusters of aspects for municipality 1 for both sounding-board meetings and
the process architecture are presented here. At the first sounding-board meeting, the
participants discussed the following ideas: general steps for a process architecture,
decentralization and relocation of coffee shops and possible consequences, the
NIMBY feature and potentially relevant actors.
During the second sounding-board meeting, the emphasis was on an integral
approach of the policy issue and various options ( e.g., decentralization, quality
circles, and protocols) were discussed. The process architecture (an example is
presented in Chapter 6) was not finished and contained general rather than specified
steps.
As Table 7.1 shows, in the first sounding-board meeting aspect differentiation
is slightly higher for the control group. Their total score was 182 while the experi-
mental group scored 176. The higher score can be attributed to the higher number of
content aspects the municipalities defined. In the second sounding-board meeting
and for the process architectures, aspect differentiation in the experimental group
was higher than in the control group: 153 v. 112. The difference between the two
127
groups is greatest as regards the process architecture (101 aspects for the experimen-
tal group and 38 for the control group). The team from municipality 3 failed to
produce a process architecture; this obviously influences the total score. However,
the municipalities from the experimental group scored on average 33 aspects and
those in the control group considerably less.
Tahle 7.1 Aspect differentiation in the coffee shop issue
Control group Experimental group
Mwticipality 1 Z 3 4 S 6
1 st SBM. actors 14 15 11 16 16 1~
process 30 17 13 18 19 36
content 25 24 33 14 12 30
subtotal 69 56 57 48 47 81
total ( ranking) 182 ( 1) 176 (2)
2nd SBM. actors 14 ] 1 1 1 1 l 10 1 f~ ~
process 26 34 16 28 31 5~
conte~it 1d 23 31 14 3 16
subtotal 40 45 27 39 41 ?~
total ( ranking) 112 (2) 153 (1)
PA actors 4 ]0 - 17 13 14
process 9 15 - 20 14 23
conte~~t 3 4 - 8 9 3
subtotal 13 25 - 37 27 37
total ( ranking) 38 (2) 101 (1)
Surl~ey results on aspect diferentiatioit
The way the participants themselves perceived the wealth of ideas (aspect differenti-
ation) during the two sounding-board meetings and in the process architecture is
shown in Table 7.2. Immediately after the meetings and the presentation of the
process architecture the self-perception of aspect differentiation, and indeed the
other 5 criteria, were measured with 1 item (the gamelsimulation offered little time
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for a more elaborate questioning of the participants). The items consisted of a 5-
point scale (1 - very unsatisfied, 5- very satisfied).
Table 7.2 Aspect differentiation of the coffee shop issue according to the survey results (means and
stanrlard deviations)
Control group Experimental group









































When comparing the results of experimental and control groups there seem to be
barely any difference between the groups. A repeated measures ANOVA for the two
sounding-board meetings indicate no main effect for time (F(1,18) - 0.00, p- 1.00)
or treatment (F(1,18) - 0.32, p- 0.58). Neither is there an interaction effect (F(1,18)
- 0.23, p- 0.6). A MANOVA for the process architectures shows that there no
difference between the groups (F (1,63) - 0.12, p- 0.73). (The fact that our groups
are small may explain in part why the survey results show no statistically significant
effect for the meetings.)
A comparison of the observation results with the survey results of the first
sounding-board meeting shows that the self-reported results do not quite account for
the slightly higher score ofthe control group. Nevertheless, both sets of data suggest
that the difference between the two groups is rather small for the first meeting. The
participants did observe the difference in richness the observations demonstrated for
the second sounding-board meeting and process architecture. Apparently, the per-
ceptions of the participants differed from those of the observers and the researcher.
In analysing the results, more weight is attributed to the observation data since these
provide a more in-depth overview of the developments during the sounding-board
meeting. Furthermore, as relative outsiders working with standardized observation
lists, the observers were able to obtain a more intersubjective perspective than the
participants were able to. The researcher assessed the observation data and process
architecture in detail. The assessment of aspect differentiation provides a clear
2 All participants taking part in the gamelsimulation judged the process architectures.
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example of the attempt to achieve intersubjectivity. Counting aspects in both the
observation transcripts and process architectures seems to provide data which are
somewhat more reliable than the diverging survey results.
Summarizing, the intervention based on the oval-mapping technique did not
enhance aspect differentiation in the first sounding-board meeting. On the contrary,
the control group had a slightly more differentiated understanding of the issue than
the experimental group. A possible explanation for this unexpected outcome may be
the fact that the sounding-board meetings for municipalities 4 and 5 had problems
settling into their new surroundings (the game~simulation) and at the same time
dealing with method. Two of the three participants from municipality 4 expressed
their feeling uncomfortable with the situation. The process in municipality 5 was
hampered by the inexperience in policy-making of the young external participant
(representing a local youth group), who represented the Welfare Foundation.
Although the control group initially scored somewhat higher, in the second
sounding-board meeting and the process architecture the experimental group showed
a more differentiated understanding ofthe issue according to the observation results.
However, these observation results do not correspond with the participants' percep-
tions. They considered aspect differentiation to be the same.
7.2.3 Aspect integration in the coffee shop issue
Aspect integration refers to the degree to which various aspects are combined and
linked into ideas and ideas into issues. The linking of aspects into strings of ideas
constitutes meaning. The way in which aspects are linked (or not linked) into more
tightly or loosely connected strings of ideas determines the level of order and trans-
parency of the policy-makers' perception of the issue. When aspects are better
integrated, there is more order and meaning in the group's perception ofthe issue.
Observation results on aspect integration
Tracing aspect integration in the observation protocols of the control group proved
to be rather difficult. The analysis for the experimental group was easy: the oval-
mapping technique requires that groups draw an explicit map on a wall chart. In the
control group connections between aspects had to be derived from the observation
protocols. Linking words like `leads to' and `is the same as', etc. were traced. Fol-
lowing this analysis, the oval maps of the protocols of the sessions of the control
group were then drawn and compared with the maps of the experimental group.
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In the first sounding-board meeting, oval maps were produced by the teams in the
experimental group.' To be able to use the maps for comparison, the content of each
map was carefully studied and the concepts that appeared in the maps were catego-
rized. Heads (the most important goals) and clusters (strings of concepts4 and aspects
grouped around a centra] theme) were distinguished in all maps and used as indica-
tors for aspect integration. The degree to which aspects are clustered in a meaningful
way is an important indicator for integration. A meaningful cluster implies that a
more unequivocal and profound understanding is produced by the linking of aspects.
The relationship between clusters was assessed and determined by comparing the
maps. In those instances where it was difficult to establish the nature of the connec-
tion between clusters, the observation protocols were also compared very closely
with each other and with their corresponding maps. An example of a group map (of
municipality 2) is given in Figure 7. L It demonstrates that the group in municipality
2 linked various aspects they brought into the discussion. However, most aspects
were linked consecutively - and thus not in strings - and there was little transparency
as to how the various options (e.g., decetttralizatiott, ntore police surveillat~ce) were
related to each other or to the various actions. Hence, many links remained implicit.
Few potential clusters and no heads can be detected. Aspect integration is thus low.
Table 7.3 Observatiar resultsfor aspect integration in the coffee shop issue
Control group Experimental group
Municipality~ 1 2 3 4 5 6
lst SBM. t - f t t t
2nd SBM. t t t tt f ff
PA - f - ft f ft
Legend: tf - very high, f- high, f- reasonablelsomewhat, -- low
The level of aspect integration in the process architectures was assessed by establish-
ing the extent to which the various steps of actions build upon previous steps. Fur-
thermore, the degree to which, for each step, actors were linked to actions and
corresponding aims is a second indicator for integration. For instance, the process
3 In instances where drawing the oval map was preceded by discussions during which aspects were intro-
duced that were later not included in the map, these were incorporated in the analysis.
4 A concept may contain more than one aspect: for instance, combining a process aspect (information
gathering) with a content aspect (on decentralization) and an actor (policy adviser).
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architecture of municipality 6 that was presented in the previous chapter (see section
6.4.1) contains nine steps that form a sequence of steps. Each subsequent step built
on the previous step. Furthermore, for all actions, actors and goals were specified.
The level of aspect integration was therefore high (-~f).
In Table 7.3, the results for all six municipalities are presented. In order to
avoid a type-I error (concluding wrongly that there is an effect of inethod), it was
decided that at least two out of three municipalities in the experimental group
needed to score higher than those of the control group. Table 7.3 shows that in the
first sounding-board meeting two municipalities from the experimental group scored
higher than two from the control group (f, -~ versus -, f). This is also the case for the
second sounding-board meeting (ff, ft versus f, f). In the case of the process
architectures, all tlTree municipalities in the experimental group scored higher.
Survey results on aspect integration
In Table 7.4 the results are presented of the way in which the participants judged the
degree of aspect integration. These results were assessed in the same way as the
survey scores on aspect differentiation.
The results are diverse across time both for the various municipalities as well
as within the two groups. For the first sounding-board meeting, there seems to be no
overall difference between the experimental (M 4, 5, 6) and control groups (M 1, 2,
3). In the second sounding-board meeting the control group is more positive about
the integration of ideas in their meetings than the experimental group. A repeated
measures ANOVA for the two sounding-board meetings shows that there are no
main effects for time or treatment (F(1,18) - 0.04, p - 0.85; F(1,18) - 0.03, p-
0.87) and no interaction effect (F(1,18) - 0.34, p - 0.85). For the process architec-
tures, the experimental groups seemed more positive about aspect integration. How-
ever, a MANOVA for the process architectures (F(1,63) - 0.02, p - 0.90) showed
that there is no statistically significant difference between the two groups.
Again, comparison of the observations and survey results indicates that the
latter do not support our observation findings. Only 1~5 of the survey scores support
the observation outcome. In 2I5 of the measurements the observation results are
more positive and in another 2~5 of the measurements the survey results are more
positive than the observation results.
In conclusion, the observation results suggest a clear positive effect of the
mapping technique on the degree of aspect integration for both sounding-board
meetings and the process architecture, albeit that the survey results do not support
the observations.
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Table 7.4 Aspect integration on the coffee shop issue according to survey results (means, standard
deviation)
Control group Experimental group









































7.2.4 Balancing interests in the coffee shop issue
The third criterion which we consider to be an important indicator for the quality of
problem structuring is `balancing interests'. The various interests which are involved
in a policy-making process deserve the consideration of the policy nerivork.s
`Balancing interests' refers to the degree to which policy-makers weigh the interests
of the various stakeholders involved in the issue.
Observation results on balancirtg interests
With the aid of the observation protocol, we analysed, for every municipality the
degree down, to which interests were balanced during the sounding-board meetings.
The observers noted for all parties taking part in the sessions, whether they paid
much, not so much or little attention to their own or to common interests, and
whether certain interests dominated the meeting. Furthermore, the protocols were
screened for statements regarding interests.
The following illustrates the assessment process using what happened in mu-
nicipality 2. During the first sounding-board meeting in municipality 2, the represen-
tative of the Welfare Foundation pointed out that they should consider what other
organizations could play a role in the process, and mentioned schools and the CAD
(Centre for Alcohol and Drugs), a loca] health service. The policy adviser replied
that he wanted to involve citizens in the discussion on the inconvenience the coffee
shop causes. These parties are thus pointed out as having an interest in the issue. The
statements indicate a willingness to consider other interests apart from their own
5 Here, the policy network was the sounding board for public affairs. Not the individual organization's way
ofbalancing interests is our concem but that of the inter-organizational network.
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interests. Analyses of the protocols and observation questionnaires of this first
sounding-board meeting of municipality 2 showed that single interests did not
dominate the discussion. The policy adviser tried to ernphasize the common inter-
ests. The mayor and representative of the Welfare Foundation both advocated com-
mon interests and personal interests to some extent. Furthermore, various actors
were defined as relevant for the policy-making process. These findings for the first
sounding-board meeting were compared with the results from the other five munici-
palities, and subsequently scored as positive. Interests were thus well balanced by
the team from munícipality 2.
In the second sounding-board meeting of municipality 2, the policy adviser
advocated a broadly based working group. Individual interests were more present
than in the first meeting, but common interests dominated. The mayor suggested to
talk to the various parties involved on a bilateral basis, to get a clear perspective of
the various perceptions of the issue. Again, these findings - when compared with the
results ofthe other five municipalities - accounted for a positive score for the way in
which interests were balanced in this second session.
7able 7.5 Observation results on the balancing of interests in the coffee shop issue
Control group Experimental group
Municipality 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 st SBM f f f f t f
2nd SBM f t f t t t
PA - f - t f t
Legend: ff - very well, f- well, f - reasonable, -- poor
Balancing interests in the process architecture was assessed by counting the number
of parties mentioned and considering the time at which they were to become in-
volved in policy-making according to the process architecture presented.b For exam-
ple, in the process architecture of municipality 2, a working group was planned,
consisting of the municipality, the Welfare Foundation, and a neighbourhood coun-
cil. They were to make proposals and confer with the coffee shop owners and citi-
6 There is an overlap behveen the way in which `balancing interests' and 'aspect differentiation' are
operationalized and assessed conceming the process architecture. Both share a subset which is part of
larger sets of items. There is, therefore, a certain level of contamination, but both concern dependent
variables instead of independent variables and hence the reliability of our criteria is not undermined.
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zens. Involving these groups implies that various interests are thus considered early
in the process. Hence, the way in which interests are balanced in the process archi-
tecture is scored positively.
The scores for municipality 2 and the other municipalities are summarized in
Table 7.5. There is little difference between the control and experimental groups for
the sounding-board meetings. The oval-mapping technique does not seem to differ-
entiate. Only for the process architecture, there is a clear difference in favour of the
experimental group (M 4, 5, 6), two municipalities of which score evidently higher
than two municipalities in the control group (M 1, 2, 3).
Survey results on balancing interests
Below, the results of the surveys concerning `balancing interests' are presented.
Participants were asked to what extent they considered the various interests to be
we11 balanced in the meetings (on a 5-point scale).
Overall, the participants in the experimental group appeared to be slightly more
positive about the outcome of the first sounding-board meeting and the process
architectures than those of the control group. The results for the second sounding-
board meeting suggest the opposite. Differences are small. A repeated measures
ANOVA for the two sounding-board meetings shows that there is no main effect for
time or for treatment (F(1,18) - 0.28, p- 0.61; F(1, 18) - 0.00, p- 1.00). Neither is
there an interaction effect (F(1,18) - 1.10, p- 0.31). For the process architectures
too, there is little difference between the experimental and control groups: a
MANOVA shows that there is no significant difference (F(1,63) - 0.35,p - 0.55).
Table 7.6 Balancing interests in the coffee shop issue according to survey results
(nieans, standard dei~iations)
Control group Experimental group









































Both the observation and survey results for the two sounding-board meetings con-
firm that for both meetings there is little difference between the control and experi-
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mental groups. The survey results do not confirm the difference the observation data
show between the groups in the way in which process architectures balanced inter-
ests.
Summarizing, the intervention based on the oval-mapping technique seems to
contribute little to the way in which interests are balanced in the meetings. One
explanation for this outcome might be that the game~simulation was designed and
presented to the municipalities as a training technique in interactive policy-making.
Participants in both conditions were, therefore, probably already inclined to pay
attention to other interests related to the issue. This may have made it more difficult
to trace a possible effect of the method. Nevertheless, for the process architecture the
observations do suggest a modestly positive effect.
7.2.5 Participation in the coffee shop issue
Participation refers to the level of active involvement of the group of policy actors in
the policy-making process. This involvement may have different forms: people can
contribute in terms of ideas, investing energy andlor offering financial support.
Methods and techniques such as the oval-mapping technique aim to increase the
active involvement of stakeholders in problem structuring. A greater degree of
participation contributes to a possibly more complete framing of the issue (more
ideas may be generated as a result of greater involvement) and a wider support for
the policy.
Observation results on participation
Participation was assessed in a similar way as balancing interests. The observers
noted how talkative and dominant the various participants were and what their
attitude (e.g., active, fighting, listening, etc.) was during the sessions. The degree to
which participants asked one another for information was another indicator for the
level of involvement in the meeting. Furthermore, all statements suggesting some
form of contribution, positive or negative, were traced in the observation protocols
of the meetings. Together with the observation questionnaire, this provided the data
for assessing the degree of participatíon. The data for all six municipalities were
compared and then they were scored.
To illustrate the way in which participation is scored for the sounding-board
meetings we again discuss the results for municipality 2.
In the first sounding-board meeting, the policy adviser proposed to make a
draft process architecture. He wanted to talk to citizens about the coffee shop and
suggested to organize a number of ineetings with varíous groups. The Welfare
Foundation offered to talk to the citizens and pointed out that the costs of a societal
problem such as drug use should be borne by all actors and not just a particular
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group. Participants asked each other for information. They adopted an active and
constructive stance during this meeting. Participation was thus high. In the second
meeting, the participants actively discussed the question which groups should be-
come involved. The mayor slightly dominated the board, but the others talked more
than during the first meeting. The policy adviser wanted a broadly composed team
and suggested that the mayor himself should lead the discussions. He promoted the
active involvement of a number of parties. Again, participation was qualified as
positive.
Tahle 7.7 Observatioii results on participation in tire coffee shop issue
Control group Experimental group
Nlunicipality 1 2 3 4 5 6
lst SBM t t t t f t
2nd SBM } t t } t t
PA t f - t t t
Legend: ff - very high, f- high, t- reasonable~somewhat, -- low
The way in which the process architecture included future participation was assessed
for the various steps of action the teams defined. Per step, the level of involvement
of organizations~actors was established. For example, inviting policy actors to
provide information was valued as a slighter degree of participation than involving
policy actors in taking decisions. In municipality 2, for instance, the process archi-
tecture arranged for various parties to take part in a task force, which was to formu-
late proposals and discuss these proposals with other actors in order to improve
control and reduce the sense of insecurity. In comparison with some of the other
municipalities, this indicates a reasonably high degree of participation (see Table
7.7).
In Table 7.7, all observation results are presented. The observations show few
differences between the experimental and control groups as regards the degree of
participation in both sounding-board meetings. Only with regard to the process
architecture, the experimental group seems to be doing better since two out of three
municipalities in the control group have lower scores (t, -) than the municipalities
in the experimental group (f, f).
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Survey results otz participation
Table 7.8 demonstrates how the participants themselves valued their own contribu-
tion to the meeting in terms of money, energy and~or time to the meeting and, in the
case of the process architecture, all participants expressed whether they were willing
to support the architecture and participate in the policy-making process.
In the first sounding-board meeting the municipalities from the experimental
group seemed - according to their own perception - more actively involved in the
process than those in the control group. The results for the second sounding-board
meeting and the process architecture do not seem to differ between the groups. A
repeated measures ANOVA for the two sounding-board meetings show no main
effects for time (F(1,18) - 2.72, p- 0.12) or for treatment (F(1,18) - 0.231, p-
0.64). There is no interaction effect either (F(1,18) - 0.30,p - 0.59). A MANOVA
for the process architecture showed no statistically significant difference between the
two groups (F (],63) - 0.65, p- 0.43).
Table 7.8 Participa[ion in the coffee shop isszre according to survey results (means, standard
deviations)
Control group Experimental group









































Both the observation and survey results for the sounding-board meetings suggest that
the intervention based on the oval-mapping technique did not increase the level of
participation in the sounding-board meetings. However, the process architecture of
the experimental group scored higher on this criterion. Again it is pointed out here,
that the context in which group mapping based on the oval-mapping technique was
assessed, was possibly biased towards a participatory style of policy-making, as
explained above. As a consequence, there was a strong focus in the game~simulation
on actively involving possibly relevant organizations in the process. It may there-
fore, have become difficult to trace an additional effect of the intervention based on
the oval-mapping technique on the level of participation.
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7.2.6 Contmunication in ti~e coffee slrop issue
Our criterion `communication' refers to the level of cognitive and mutual under-
standing in participants.
Observation results on cornniunication
Communication in the sounding-board meetings was assessed by the following
questions in the observation questionnaire: the degree to which each participant
listened (well, reasonably, not), the participant's attitude, the atmosphere character-
izing the meeting and whether participants understood one another. Furthermore,
statements in the observation protocols which referred to the atmosphere of the
meeting, cognitive and mutual understanding were used. A comparison of these
items for the six municípalities resulted in a score for communication.
Again, to illustrate our operationalization and scoring of communication we
present the findings for municipality 2.
The atmosphere of the first sounding-board meeting can be typified as open,
observant and constructive. The participants understood each other well and listened
reasonably well. The protocol contains no statements referring to misunderstandings,
confusion or (experienced) disrespect or lack of trust. On the contrary, it indicates
that participants were seriously interested in each other's positions and experiences.
Hence, the first meeting of municipality 2 can be valued as `involved' and `open':
participants listened reasonably well to each other and they had a reasonably good
cognitive and mutual understanding. Communication was qualified as `good' as
Table 7.9 illustrates.
Table 7.9 Comnn~nication in the coffee shop issue according to obsen~atiort results
Control group Experimental group I
Mur2icipality 1 2 3 4 5 6
lst SBM t t } f t t
2nd SBM } f f t f t
PA f t - t f t
Legend: tt - very high, f- high, f- reasonable~somewhat, -- low
Communication as arranged in the process architecture was assessed by checking
step by step whether explicit attention was paid to the organization of communica-
tion or to instruments such as meetings directed at providing information, realizing
mutual understanding or other activities which functioned to communicate a mes-
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sage to the groups involved. These results for the various municipalities were again
compared and a final score was given. For municipality 2, communication was
reasonable (t). In its process architecture, meetings were mentioned. One of the
goals of these meetings was to increase public support; i.e., the municipality was to
communicate an idea to various participants. However, communication was not
explicitly referred to.
Table 7.9 presents an overview of the observation results for the criterion
`communication'. Again, for the two sounding-board meetings there is little differ-
ence between the control and experimental groups. Communication was rather
poorly organized in most of the process architectures. One municipality of the
experimental group organized future communication in its process architecture
rather well. Given the fact that at least two of the three municipalities needed to
score higher, the difference between the two groups is overall too small to suggest an
effect of the intervention based on the oval-mapping technique.
Survey results oiz communication
Table 7.10 presents the survey results for the criterion communication. It shows the
way in which the participants perceived attention paid to one another and whether
there was mutual understanding in the group. The item concerning the process
architecture enquired whether the architecture would enhance mutual understanding
in the policy network.
The results show that there is almost unanimity among the experimental and
control groups about the level of communication in the first and second sounding-
board meetings.
Table 7.10 Communication in the coffee shop issue according to survey results (means and stan
dard deviationsJ
Control group Experimental group










































A repeated measures ANOVA for the two sounding-board meetings shows that there
is a trend towards a main effect of time (F(1,18) - 7.03, p- 0.017) but no effect for
treatment (F(1,18) - 0.31, p- 0.59). Nor is there an interaction effect (F(1,18) -
0.03, p- 0.86). A MANOVA for the way in which future communication was
arranged in the process architectures shows no statistically significant difference
between the two groups (F(1,63) - 2.29, p - 0.14).
The participants' perceptions of communication in the two sounding-board
meetings are in accordance with our observations. This is not the case for our find-
ings on the process architecture. The participants of municipalities 2 and 4 were
much more positive and the participants of municipality 5 were more negative about
future communication arrangements than one would expect them to be, considering
our observation results.
In conclusion group mapping based on the oval-mapping technique seems to
have had limited effects. For the sounding-board meetings, the experimental and
control groups did not differ. Only as regards the process architecture did the experi-
mental group pay somewhat more attention to communication in future policies. The
bias of the game~simulation pointed out in previous sections may be an explanation
for the fact that there is little difference between the groups. The constructive atti-
tude of participants which characterized most meetings might well have been the
product of the game~simulation and its function as a training.
7.2.7 Process nianagernent iii the coffee shop issue
Process management is our sixth and last criterion. It refers to the way in which the
debate is organized and structured by one (or possibly more) of the participants in a
policy-making process. A well-managed process involves offering participants
opportunities to contribute, challenging them to define andlor pursue goals, and
check whether there is support from the rank and file of the various organizations
invoh~ed.
Observation results on process management
Process management was assessed in the two sounding-board meetings on the basis
of items in the observation questionnaire and an analysis of the observation protocol.
The observants noted for each participant whether he or she steered a lot, somewhat
or a little, who was the formal and who the informal leader and whether the meeting
was well structured, reasonably structured or unstructured. In addition, the observa-
tion protocols were analysed and checked for statements directed at influencing
group processes. Indicators for good process management are, for example, giving
turns to the participants; summarizing what has been said; asking participants to
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inform their organizations, and make sure they are supported by those whom they
represent.'
Once more, the experiences of municipality 2 will illustrate our operationaliza-
tion. In the first sounding-board meeting, the policy adviser repeatedly emphasized
that no solutions should be excluded, and he tried to encourage the participants to
avoid the premature rejection of viable options. He urged the various parties to
clarify their positions and suggested it would be beneficial if the mayor were to
attend the meeting with the inhabitants, suggesting that his presence would commu-
nicate to citizens that they were being taken seriously. Also, he gave comments on
suggestions the others made. He concluded with the suggestion that he would make
a draft-proposal for the process architecture. Comparing these main elements with
those of the other municipalities resulted in an end score which is presented in de
table below.
Process management as organized in the process architectures was also mea-
sured. Step-by-step these were analysed to find out whether attention was paid to
informing relevant actors, taking care of boundary management, mentioning who
would be responsible for what action, and whether the coordination of these actions
was taken care of. For example, the process architecture of municipality 2 scored
well as regards process management because it provided for attaining activities in
the management team. This team was also responsible for attuning long and short-
terrn problems and developments. Furthermore, a task force would be created to play
a central role in process management and the formulation of proposals. Finally, the
promotion of support was an important point of attention.
A repeated measures ANOVA for the two sounding-board meetings shows that
there is a trend towards a main effect of time (F(1,18) - 7.03, p- 0.017) but no
effect for treatment (F(1,18) - 0.31, p- 0.59). Nor is there an interaction effect.
Once more, the observations suggest little effect of the intervention based on
the oval-mapping technique on the way in which the process was managed during
the sounding-board meetings. There is a small difference between the control and
experimental groups. However, there is a positive score for the process architecture
of the experimental group.
7 Gray (1991) emphasizes the importance of boundary management. Organizations involved in multi-party
negotiations need to keep in mind their organization's goal. Simultaneously, they need to inform their
own organization about the negotiation process and avoid losing the support and commitment of those
whom they represent.
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Taóle 7.11 Observation results on process management in the coffee s{:op case
Control group Experimental group
Municípality 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 st SBM } t t f t f
~nd SBM f f f f f f
PA - t - t } t
Legend: ff - very high, f- high, f- reasonable~somewhat, -- low
Survey results on process ntanagement irt the coffee shop lssue
The survey results on process management are presented in Table 7.12, below and
express the participants' perception of the way in which the process was managed in
the sounding-board meeting or in the process architecture. In the first sounding-
board meeting, the control group seemed more satisfied with the way in which the
process was managed than the experimental group. This was, to some extent, also
true for the second sounding-board meeting. The scores for the process architectures
are similar. However, a repeated measures ANOVA for the two sounding-board
meetings shows that there are no main effects for time or treatment (F(1,18) - 0.07,
p- 0.80; F(1,18) - 0.50, p- 0.49). There is no interaction effect either (F(1,18) -
0.07, p - 0.80).
Table 7.1 ' Pr-ocess rnanagement in tlae coffee shop issue according to survey restrlts (rneans and
stnndnr-d deviationsJ
Control group Experimental group









































A MANOVA for the results on how the process architectures arranged future pro-
cess management shows no difference between the two groups (F (1,63) - 1.16, p-
0.29).
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Comparison of the observation and survey results suggests that the latter support the
findings for the two sounding-board meetings though not for the process architec-
tures.
7.2.8 Sumtrtarizing the results for the coffee shop issue
Above, the results for one of the four issues of the first day of the gamelsimulation
have been presented. Table 7.13 presents a general summary of the observation
results for all six criteria.
Our observations show an unexpected higher score for aspect differentiation by
the control group in the first sounding-board meeting. However, the experimental
group succeeded in sustaining a more differentiated view of the issue in process
terms during the second meeting and in the process architecture. For aspect integra-
tion, the experimental group performed better in all three instances.
Table 7.13 Swnmary observation results Coffee shop issue
crit.l crit.2 crit.3 crit.4 crit.5 crit.6
lst SBM c 2~3 0 -1 -ll3 1~3
2nd SBM e 2l3 0 0 0 ll3
PA e 3l3 2l3 2~3 1~3 2l3
Legend: crit. 1- aspect differentiation; crit. 2- aspect integration; crit. 3- balancing interests;
crit. 4- participation; crit. 5- communication; crit. 6- process management; c- the control group
scores higher; e- experimental group scores higherg; 0- there is no difference between the two
groups; 112, 212, 3~3 - one, two or three of the in total three municipalities of the experimental
group score higher than those of the control group; -113, -213 and -313 - one, two or three munici-
palities of the in total three municipalities in the control group score higher than those of the
experimental group.
The two groups did not differ in the way they balanced interests, participated, com-
municated and managed their processes in both sounding-board meetings. However,
the process architectures of the experimental group scored somewhat higher on
balancing interests, participation and process management. This outcome suggests a
possible delayed effect ofthe intervention based on the oval-mapping technique. The
technique does not have an effect in the short term (lst SBM) nor in the second
8 The scores (c~e) in this table are only given for aspect differentiation which was assessed at the leve] of
the two groups but not specified further for the municipalities within those groups.
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meeting, but there appears to be an effect on the policy product (PA), which results
from the policy-making process.
In Table 7.14 a summary of the survey results ofthe six criteria is presented.
Table 7.14 Surnman~ survey results of the coffee shop issue
crit.l crit.2 crit.3 crit.4 crit.5 crit.6
1 st 8t 2nd
SBM
0 0 0 0 0 0
PA 0 0 0 0 0 0
LeQend: 0 - no statistical difference between the two groups for criteria x on measuring point,
SBM 1, SBM 2 or for the PA; c- control group scores higher; e- experimental group scores
higher; (c) there is a trend for the control group; (e) there is a trend for the experimenta] group.
Following the participants' perception, the experimental group does value in some
instances some of the criteria somewhat higher. However, as Table 7.14 demon-
strates, none of the differences are statistically significant. Thus only in some in-
stances do the participants' perceptions correspond with the observation findíngs.
7.3 Summarizing the results of the other three issues
The coffee shop issue is one of the four issues which the participants have to deal
with on the first day of BANS. In this section, a summary of the results of the other
three issues (the housing issue, light pollution issue, and the new motorway the
A206 will be presented. A more elaborate account of the results of the discussions
on these issues is provided in Appendix 1.
7.3.1 The housing issue
Table 7.15 presents the observation outcomes of our quasi-experiment with group
mapping based on the oval-mapping technique for the housing issue. The observa-
tion outcomes suggest - for the first sounding-board meeting (this is the short-term
result9) - that, surprisingly, the control group initially scores higher on aspect differ-
entiation than the experimental group. Only for aspect integration does the experi-
mental group score higher than the control group in the short tetm.
9 A short-term result refers to a difference between the two groups in the first meeting in which the inter-
vention was introduced. A long-term effect indicates that the groups differ later on in the process, either in
a second meeting or in the outcome of [he process, i.e. the policy product.
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Table 7.15 Summa~y observatior: resul[s for the housing issue
crit.l crit.2 crit.3 crit.4 crit.5 crit.6
lst SBM c 2~3 0 0 1~3 -1~3
2nd SBM e 3~3 1~3 Il3 1~3 2l3
PA e 3l3 2~3 2l3 2~3 ll3
Legend: see Table 7.13
For the second sounding-board meeting, the experimental group scores higher on
aspect differentiation, aspect integration and process management. For the other
three criteria the observations indicate a trend. Finally, the experimental group
scores higher as regards the process architectures on all criteria except process
management. Here, only one municipality of the experimental group scored higher.
Table 7.16 Survey resultsfor the housing issue
crit.l crit.2 crit.3 crit.4 crit.5 crit.6
1 st 8r 2nd
SBM
0 0 0 0 (e) 0
PA e e (e) 0 0 (e)
Legend: see Table 7.14.
In Table 7.16, the participants' own assessment of the six criteria are presented.
These results only partly support the observation outcomes. One should take into
account that with a repeated measures MANOVA the effect is calculated for the
results of the two sounding boards combined. No separate outcomes for the meetings
are given. The survey results suggest that there is a trend for communication - but no
significant difference - favouring the experimental group.
Furthermore, the experimental group's process architectures scored higher on
aspect differentiation and integration. There are trends that the experimental group
scored higher on balancing interests and process management. Summarizing, both
outcomes indicate a long-term effect for all four criteria. Given the survey results,
this effect is less strong for participation and communication.
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7.3.2 Tlze light pollution issue
The outcomes for the light pollution issue show a somewhat different picture. Tables
7.17 and 7.18 present an overview of the observation and survey results of this
issue, respectively.
In the first sounding-board meeting, the contro] group scored higher on partici-
pation and communication than the experimental group. For the other criteria, the
two groups did not differ. For balancing interests, only one municipality of the
experimental group scored higher.
In the second sounding-board meeting, the two groups differed significantly only for
the criterion aspect differentiation: the experimental group scored (slightly) higher
than the control group.
For the process architecture, it is the contro] group which scored higher on
aspect differentiation and process management. Although the control group scored
somewhat higher on participation and communication, it is not a significant differ-
ence as only one of municipalities scored higher.
Table 7.17 Sununarj~ observation results for the Iig1:1 pollutiort issue
crit. ] crit. 2 crit. 3 crit. 4 crit. 5 crit. 6
lst SBM 0 0 lí3 -2í3 -313 0
2nd SBM e -]í3 0 0 -ll3 -lí3
PA c 0 0 -ll3 -ll3 -213
Legend: see Table 7.13
Table 7.18 shows the survey results for the light pollution issue
Table 7.18 Sununary survey resultsfor the light pollution issue
crit.l crit.2 crit.3 crit.4 crit.5 crit.ó
1 st Bt: 2nd
SBM
0 0 0 0 0 0
PA c c c 0 (c) (c)
Legend: see Table 7.14
The survey results indicate that the groups did not differ for all six criteria during the
sounding-board meetings. The process architectures of the control group scored
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higher on aspect differentiation, aspect integration and balancing interests, and there
are trends that the control group scored higher on communication and process man-
agement.
Summarizing, the observation and survey results are only partly in accordance.
The observation data suggest that it is the control group which scored higher on
participation and communication in the short term. With regard to the process archi-
tectures, the control group scored higher on aspect differentiation and process man-
agement. The survey outcomes support the latter but indicate in addition a positive
outcome for the control group for aspect integration and balancing interests and a
trend for communication.
7.3.3 The A206 issue
The fourth issue is the A206, a new motorway which is to be constructed west of
Beneveld. The observation and survey results for this issue are presented in Tables
7.19 and 7.20, respectively.
Table 7.19 shows that it is again the control group which scored higher on
aspect differentiation in the first sounding-board meeting. The data also suggest that
the control group scored somewhat - but not significantly - higher on participation,
communication and process management.
Table 7.19 Surr:mary observation resultsfor the A206
crit.l crit.2 crit.3 crit.4 crit.5 crit.6
lst SBM c 0 0 -ll3 -1~3 -1~3
2nd SBM e 2l3 1~3 0 ll3 1~3
PA e 2~3 1 l3 2l3 -ll3 2~3
Legend: see Table 7.14
In the second sounding-board meeting, it is the experimental group which scored
higher on aspect differentiation and aspect integration and somewhat (but not signifi-
cantly) higher on balancing interests, communication and process management.
Again, the groups differ most strongly as regards the process architectures. The
process architectures of the experimental group scored higher on aspect differentia-
tion, aspect integration, participation, and process management.
In Table 7.20 the participants' perception of the six criteria are presented. It
shows that following the participants' perception, the intervention appeared to have
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had no effect. The two groups do not differ in their appreciation of the six criteria for
the two sounding-board meetings and the process architectures.
Table 7.20 Survey resultsfor the AZ06 issue
crit.l crit.2 crit.3 crit.4 crit.5 crit.6
1 st 8t 2nd
SBM
0 0 0 0 0 0
PA 0 0 0 0 0 0
Legend: 0- no difference between the groups
The survey results - see Table 7.20 - for the A206 issue only partly support the
observation outcomes. Overall, group mapping based on the oval-mapping technique
appears to have had limited effect. Following the observation results, it is the control
group that scores higher on aspect differentiation in the short-term time. But in the
long term the experimental group appeared to have a more differentiated understand-
ing of the issue. They were better at integrating aspects, and ensured a somewhat
better participation and process management.
7.4 Conclusion and discussion
In this chapter, the outcomes for the coffee shop issue were analysed and discussed
extensively. Subsequently, a summary was given of the results for the other three
issues which featured on the first day of the gamelsimulation. When comparing the
results for the four issues, the followíng pattern emerges. First, contrary to our
expectations, group mapping based on the oval-mapping technique appears to have
had a rather modest overall effect. Second, there is little immediate effect. The
experimental group does not score higher on the six criteria for problem structuring
during the first sounding-board meeting. In fact, in three of the four issues the tech-
nique seems to be counterproductive to increasing aspect differentiation in the first
sounding-board meeting. It is the control group which initially scored higher on this
criterion. However, there is some evidence that there is a positive immediate effect
on aspect integration. Third, there appears to be a positive long-term effect on the
process architecture for the criteria aspect differentiation and aspect integration, and
a tentative and modest effect for balancing interests, participation and process man-
agement.
There are some differences between the issues. The effect of the oval-mapping
technique is somewhat greater in the coffee shop - and housing issue in comparison
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with the A206 issue. The most striking difference concerns the light pollution issue:
here, it is the control group which scores unexpectedly higher in a number of in-
stances.
This difference in outcomes between the four issues cannot be explained by a
difference in experience of the facilitator. The facilitator engaged in the A206 issue
was very skilled in comparison with the others, but the results for this case were less
convincing than for the coffee shop and housing issue. To what extent can issue
characteristics play a role? Following the participants' perception, the four issues
were to be - cognitively and socio-politically - qualified as neither simple nor very
complex. The issues were considered to be normatively rather simple. The partici-
pants viewed the housing and coffee shop issues cognitively and socio-politically as
somewhat less complex than the other two issues. It is important to note that the
experimental group did not experience less complexity as a result of the intervention.
The fact that the housing issue is viewed as less complex can be explained by
its focus on choosing between alternative options. The coffee shop issue, on the
other hand, has all the characteristics of a NIMBY issue, and one would expect it to
be socio-politically and normatively complex. However, the sounding-board meet-
ings on the issue were marked by a cooperative style. This can be explained by the
fact that a limited number of stakeholders was represented. The issue's NIMBY
characteristics did thus not really emerge. This consensus- seeking style of policy-
making marked by and large all four issues. However, in the light pollution and
A206 issues interests collided more. The light pollution issue is a new issue which
requires technical expertise. It is cognitively more complex than the other three
issues. Both the light pollution issue and the A206 issue are socio-politically com-
plex in the way the issues were offered to the players in the game~simulation.~"
In conclusion, the effects the intervention based on the oval-mapping technique
had on problem structuring in the four cases are rather limited. There is some differ-
ence between the results for the issues which may be contributed in part to their
complexity: the latter is a tentative conclusion. In Chapter 9, the results for both days
will be further analysed.
Finally, the participants were also asked about their experiences with the
intervention.' ~ The experimental group agreed with the proposition that group map-
ping serves the policy-making process (x - 3.7'Z) and increases insight into the issue
(x - 3.5). The participants are indecisive about the technique's contribution to
10 A distinction can be made between the complexity of the issue as it was designed for the gamelsimula[ion
and the complexity the players with their characteristics added to BANS.
1 I In appendix 10 an overview is presented of [he participants' appreciation of the various policy instru-
ments.
12 The item is measured on a five-point scale: 1- fully disagree, 5- fully agree
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increasing mutual understanding and reducing conflict between the various interests
(x - 3). These outcomes seem to support some of the results presented in this chapter
which point to a modest positive effect of group mapping based on the oval-mapping
technique. They suggest that there is some effect on the insight policy actors have
into the issue, but no effect on the social interaction between them or the way in
which they understand each other. It thus contributes more to the reduction of cogni-
tive complexity (aspect differentiation and aspect integration) than of socio-political
(balancing interests, participation) or normative complexity (communication, pro-
cess management).
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8. Policy-making in Beneveld: Round Z
8.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the results for the second round of the game~simulation BANS are
presented. As explained in Chapter 6,~ on the second day the players actually
develop policy. They no longer concentrate on how to design a process, but on the
policy itself. They are challenged to design various policy strategies for the light
pollution issue. The municipality of Beneveld has made little progress with this issue
since it first appeared on the policy agenda a year ago. Beneveld still wants this pilot
to serve as an example for national policy-makers. The Ministry of Housing, Spatial
Planning and the Environment announced that it will subsidize the development of
light pollution policies. Furthermore, it issued standards regarding the maximum
inconvenience lighting will be allowed to cause by 2010. In the meantime,
Beneveld's alderman for economic affairs succeeded in attracting a distribution
centre for a major supermarket chain to be located in the town's major industrial
estate Transfer. Transfer therefore wants to increase the light supply. There have
already been complaints about the inconvenience Transfer's lighting and that of the
sports centre causes neighbours.
Below, for each of the six quality criteria for problem structuring the
observation and survey results are presented for the first city meeting and for the
strategy meetings and strategies. Furthermore, the policy tables are also analysed.
There are no observation or survey results for process management for the strategies
because the nature of these strategies did not allow operationalization of the concept
of process management. A more detailed account ofthe operationalized indicators is
presented in appendix 12.
1 Chapter 6 gives a more in-debt account of the second day ofBANS.
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8.2 Aspect differentiation
Oóservation results on aspect differentiation in policy-making
Aspect differentiation (descriptions of this and the other quality criteria for problem
structuring have been presented in the previous chapter) in the first city meeting was
measured in the same way as on the first day; however, this time the distinction
between different content and process aspects became irrelevant since the
participants no longer concentrated on process. Aspects were counted in the
observation transcripts of the first city meeting and in the policy table. The results
for the separate municipalities are presented in Table 8.1. It should be noted that the
participants of municipalities in the control group had a certain degree of freedom to
organize themselves in one or more sessions parallel to the city meeting of the
experimental group at which the ova-mapping technique was introduced.
Furthermore, in the policy table a distinction is made between goals, decision areas,
and options. (In Chapter 6 an example of such a table is given and its use explained.)
The results for the first city and parallel meetings show that the control group
(municipalities 1, 2, 3) did unexpectedly better than the experimental group
(municipalities 4, 5, 6). Municipality 3 scored distinctly higher than the other
municipalities: we will briefly illustrate the main clusters of aspects this team
discussed. Not only light pollution was a topic of discussion, but also the A206
motorway featured prominently, as indeed did the coffee shop and housing issues.
This very broad framing of the `light pollution' issue resulted in a large number of
aspects. Connecting so explicitly the light pollution issue with the three other issues
of the previous day did not occur in the other five municipalities.
For the policy tables, the experimental group showed it had a more
differentiated understanding of the issue. Furthermore, it should be noted that in
municipalities 1 and 2, two different policy tables were produced. In municipality 1,
the policy tables were made during the strategy meetings when the other
municipalities where designing their strategies. Municipalities 3, 4, 5 and 6 had
produced one policy table earlier in the process. In municipality 2, the facilitator
suggested to produce two tables, which could then be used in subsequent meetings.
He intervened when the process seemed to end in deadlock or indecision. The fact
that two municipalities each produced two tables implies that the number of aspects
they produced should be interpreted with some care. For instance, the most extensive
table of municipality 2 does not meet the level of aspect differentiation of the tables
of the three municipalities of the experimental group. The total difference in richness
between the two groups is therefore higher than the total in Table 8.1.
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Table 8.1 Aspec! differentiation in policy-making uccording to observation re.rults
Control group Experimental group
Municipaliry 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 st city or parallel
meeting(s)
49 71 102 65 56 56
total 222 177
~` goals policy table 2 2 3 3 3 4 4
~` decision areas
policy table
3 1 4 11 10 8 7
' options policy
table
7 4 26 13 31 36 29 28
subtotal 16 49 45 49 41 41
total 110 131
Legend: number of aspects are specified for the 1 st city~parallel meeting(s) and the policy table.
Summarizing, in the early hours of the process the control group had a more
differentiated perception of the issue, whereas, this was the case for the experimental
group later on.
The next section describes how participants themselves viewed the degree of
aspect differentiation in their meetings and for the strategies they designed.
Survey results on aspect differentiation in policy-making
In Table 8.2 the results of the survey on aspect differentiation are presented.
Unfortunately, there are no scores for the group from municipality 2 on their policy
tables. As a consequence, the scores for the strategies should be interpreted with
care.
When comparing the results for the first city meeting between the experímental
and control groups, the former valued the level of aspect differentiation they
achieved higher. The difference between the groups is significant (T(55)z - -4.17, p
- 0.00~). The chance that there is a significant difference on the second day is larger
2 The degrees of freedom differ for the criteria due to the fact that in some instances the variances differ.
3 For the second day there is only one issue which involves all participants. Consequently there are fewer
quantitative data, and we can confine ourselves to t-tests as a the primary statistical test. The possibility of
a type I error is larger because of the capitalization ofchance, which is why we choose for a probability of
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because the teams involved in a game~simulation larger (n-14 whereas on the first
day the teams existed out of three or four participants).
The groups did not differ in their appreciation of the differentiation of the
strategies which were presented. First, the means of the strategies were added up and
divided by n strategies. For this total, a t-test was performed and the outcome
(T(64)- 0.15, p- 0.88) indicates that the groups do not differ in their views of the
level of aspect differentiation of the strategies~tables.4
Table 8.2 Aspect differentiution in polrcy-making.~ Sun~ey results (means and standard
deviations)
Control group Experimental group
Municipalitl~ 1 2 3 4 5 6
ist city or 1.9 4.1 3.2 4.2 4.1 3.9
parallel 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.4 O.h 0.8
meeting(s)
strategies 3.3 3.3 - - 3.7 3.9 3.4 3.9 3.8 3.6 3.6 .3 3.2 2.4 4.1 3.5
0.8 0.6 0.9 0.3 0.9 0.9 0.9 L0 0.8 1.1 0.7 1.3 0.7 LZ
total for the 3.45 - 3.7 3.7 3.4 3.3
strategies 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5
These survey results are not in accordance with the observation results. The more
positive view the participants of the experimental group have of aspect
differentiation in the first city meeting is not justified on the basis of the observation
data. The latter show that it was the control group which had a more differentiated
understanding of the light pollution issue (see Table 8.1). For the policy tables, the
observations show a higher level of aspect differentiation for the experimental
group. Although these results cannot be compared with the survey results for the
strategies,b we can conclude that the difference in the tables pointed out by the
observations, is not sustained in the strategies according to the participants.
~ - o.ol
4 We add `tables' here since the participants of municipality 1 did not design strategies in the strict sense,
but two tables.
5 The scores for strategies have been added up and the mean was calculated per municipality. The outcome
may differ from the sum of ineans per strategyin strategies since not all respondents answered to all items.
All scores were weighed equally.
6 The participants scored the strategies which were based on the policy tables. The observations concern the
policy tables themselves.
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Summarizing, the intervention based on the oval-mapping technique did not have a
beneficial effect on the richness of ideas which emerged in the meeting in which it
was introduced. However, the analyses of the strategies and observations suggest
that group mapping did have a positive effect on aspect differentiation later on in the
process.
8.3 Aspect integration
Observation results on aspect integration in policy-making
The previous chapter described the way in which aspect integration was assesed. For
the second day of the game~simulation, the observation transcripts of the control
group were again converted into cognitive maps, which were drawn by the
researcher. But this time also the maps the facilitator had produced with the
experimental groups were converted into the more causal-style cognitive maps
which were discussed in Chapter 5.' Again, heads, clusters and themes were
distinguished and used as indicators for aspect integration. The degree to which
aspects are clustered in a meaningful way is an important indicator for integration. A
meaningful cluster implies that a more unequivocal and profound understanding is
produced by linking aspects. The relationship between clusters was also considered.
A variety of clusters which are not linked in any respect score less high on aspect
integration than clusters which are linked.
As an example, we briefly discuss how municipality 2 linked the aspects it
came up with: aspect integration was marked by a proposal for a complete renewal
plan of Transfer. Figure 8.1 shows that there is a large cluster of concepts on this
theme. Two medium sized clusters (5-10 concepts) could be pointed out which
concerned `policy-making', and `safety and crime'. There is one small cluster
connecting one of the central concepts -`reduction of complaints' to the head
`prosperous flora and fauna'. Finally, there was a small cluster oftechnical solutions.
Various concepts were linked in twos to more central concepts (concepts which
bring together a number of other single concepts), but were not part of a larger
cluster (i.e., strings of concepts). From the observation transcripts it is clear that the
participants did not actively link a considerable number of their concepts - these
links remain implicit which is shown by the dotted line. Integration was thus limited.
7 The maps the facilitator made were structured somewhat differently. He organized the concepts into main
categories rather than goal-means chains of concepts. As a result, the map of the facilitator could not be




Table 8.3 Aspect integration in policyanaking according to observation results
Control group Experimental group
Municipality 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 st city meeting or parallel
meeting(s)
t f - t f t
strategies - - f t t 6
Legend: -i--~ - very well, t- well, t - reasonable, -- poor
As an indication of the degree of aspect integration constituted by the policy
product, the design of one policy table rather than two policy tables is chosen. The
policy table can be viewed as an indicator for integration. It is used to structure and
categorize ideas, thus providing an opportunity to link ideas in a particular way. Two
municipalities did not manage to produce one table. Due to the diversity of the issue
perceptions they held, they were less successful in integrating ideas. Intervention by
the facilitator helped them overcome the deadlock they had arrived at. Table 8.3
gives an overview of the way in which the six municipalities integrated the various
aspects. For the first city meeting, there were few differences between the
experimental and control groups. The degree of aspect integration the policy table of
the experimental group delivered was higher than that of the control group. The
three municipalities from the experimental group managed to produce one table, in
contrast to the control group.
As indicated above, municipalities 1 and 2 did not succeed in producing one
table. Municipality 1 used the strategy meeting for drawing up two separate tables.
In municipality 2, again two tables were made (after intervention of the game-
director).
Summarizing, the introduction of the mapping technique did not - according to
our data- increase the degree of aspect integration. The control and experimental
groups did not differ as regards the degree of aspect integration they attained in the
first city meeting or parallel meetings. However, the latter did manage to integrate
aspects in one policy table in the period after the meeting, while two municipalities
in the control group were unable to generate sufficient community of thought. Since
the teams risked ending up in deadlock, the option was proposed to deliver two
tables. It seems therefore justified to conclude that the control group had difficulties
in integrating all aspects in one table. In the next section, the participants' view of
the way in which ideas were integrated, are discussed briefly.
1~9
Survey results on integration in policy-ntaking
Participants expressed their views of the way in which ideas were ordered in the
meeting and by way of the strategies. The results are presented in Table 8.4. For the
city meeting, the experimental group scored higher than the control group. The
difference is statistically significant as a t-test (of unequal variance) indicates (T(69)
-- 5.92, p- 0.00 (two-tailed)). For the strategies, there seems to be little difference
between the two groups. This is confirmed by a t-test (T (64) - -.074, p- 0.46 (two-
tailed)).
Table 8.4 Aspect integration in polict~-making: Survey results (means m:d standard deviations)
Control group Experimental group
Mwticipali 1 2 3 4 5 6
ty
lst city or Z.0 2.9 2.9 4.1 3.9 3.5
parallel 0.8 1.1 0.7 0.3 0.6 1.1
meeting(s)
strategies 3.2 3.3 - - 3.9 3.9 3.3 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.9 .3 3.4 3.4 4.1 3.6
0.8 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.9 !.? 0.8 0.9 0.9 L1 0.6 1.4 0.7 IJ
Total of 3.4 - - 3.7 3.8 3.5 3.7
strategíes 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.8
These survey results - except for the scores of municipality 3- do not confirm the
observation results. While the observations indicate that there is no difference in
aspect integration during the city meeting but only a higher score for aspect
integration of the experimental group's policy tables, the survey results suggest
something different. The participants of the experimental group clearly valued the
integration of the ideas in the city meeting more positively, but their appreciation of
the strategies did not differ.
Summarizing, according to our observations aspects were initially not better
integrated by the experimental group than the control group; this is contrary to our
expectations. Nevertheless, the fact that the experimental group scored higher on
aspect integration with regard to their policy tables suggests that the method did
have a delayed effect.
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8.4 Balancing interests
Observation results on balancing interests in policy-making
The way - according to the observations - in which the municipalities balanced the
various interests is presented in Table 8.5. These results refer to the first city
meeting, the strategy meetings,g and to the policy strategies. Operationalization of
`balancing of interests' in the meetings of the second day of the gamelsimulation
was identical to those of the first day. The degree to which interests were balanced in
the policy table was assessed by counting actors which were mentioned as taking
part in the process. We briefly discuss the results for municipality 1.
Interests were initially rather well balanced in municipality 1, but this changed
in the course of time. There were two brief parallel sessions which preceded the city
meeting and which brought together interest groups and local politicians. At these
meetings, the alderman for economic affairs emphasized that sustaining employment
and the well-being of citizens were the primary goals of his council. Furthermore, a
policy adviser emphasized that he wanted to bring about a solution in close
cooperation with other organizations. He thus expressed his intention to involve
various interests in the issue. At the city meeting, which brought together all
participants, the emphasis changed to own interests rather than the common good.
Transfer initially advocated a broad perspective, but in the end it wanted the Welfare
Foundation to be removed from the discussion because the pitches were not in their
interest. The Welfare Foundation had, earlier, already stated that it did not
understand why Transfer was present, thus suggesting that Transfer did not really
have an interest in the issue. At the city meeting, the broad, common orientation on
the issue prevailed. However, most participants advocated their own interests and
some defended public interests. In conclusion, interests were not balanced very well
at the meetings.
Since the policy advisers failed to produce a policy table, the participants split
up in two groups and produced their own policy tables. In the group discussing the
supply of light in relation to the industrial estate, interests were somewhat less
balanced. The meeting was partially led by a facilitator who concentrated on
Transfer's experience regarding new production concepts, safety and security and
working conditions. As a result, the representative of Calimus felt rather neglected.
He suggested that, apparently, only Transfer was considered a relevant interested
party. Overall, the participants were eager to cooperate and hence pay attention to
the various interests involved: personal interests did not dominate.
8 These are the meetings in which the snategies were designed with the aid of the policy table.
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The group which concentrated on the theme `sports and light' produced its table in a
relatively short time and in relative consensus. Personal and common interests
seemed to coincide. In the policy tables few particular interests were specified.
Table 8.5 Balancing interests conneeted with light pollution policy-making according to
obseivation results
Control group Experimental group
mtcnicipalities 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 st city meeting or
parallel meeting(s)
t f f f t t t
strategy meetings f t t t t f -t- t t f f f t t
policy table t f t f f t f f
Legend: tt - very well, t- well, f- reasonable, -- poor
As Table 8.5 shows, at the first city meeting interests were better balanced by all
three municipalities from the experimental group. For the strategy meeting however,
the two groups did not differ in the way in which interests were balanced,9 nor did
the policy tables the groups produced vary substantially in the way they paid
attention to interests.
Sutvey results on balancing interests in policy-ntaking
In this section, the participants' views are presented on how they felt that partial
interests were being taken care of The results of the survey questions are presented
in Table 8.6. When comparing the results for the first city meeting between the
experimental and control groups, interests seem to be better balanced in all three
experimental groups. The strategies indicate that there is no clear difference between
the two sets of municipalities. A t-test (equal variance) confirms that there is a
significant difference between the experimental and control groups (T (70) --2.68,
p - 0.009) at the city meeting but no significant result for the strategies (T (64) -
- O.OO, p - 0.16).
9 1'he scores for the municipalitíes 2 and 3 are the same as those for municipalities 4 and 6, respectively.
Municipality 1 scores somewhat higher than municipality 5. Since only one of the three municipalities of
the control group scores higher, the difference is regarded as too small to decide that the groups differ in
the way in which interests were balanced at the second sounding board meeting.
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A comparison with the observation results shows that the observations are confirmed
by the participants' experience. The initial advantage the experimental group seemed
to have at the first city meeting disappeared during the day. Although the results for
the policy table and strategies cannot be compared straightforwardly, both data sets
suggest a similar trend towards a less difference between the two groups.
Table 8.6 Balancing interests in policy-neaking: Survey results (means and standarddeviations)
Control group Experimental group
rnunicipality 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 st city or 2.5 3.4 3.2 4.0 3.7 3.5
parallel 0.8 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.8 l.l
meeting(s)
strategies 3.1 3.3 - - 3.2 3.5 3.0 3.8 3.7 3.4 2.8 .0 3.4 2.3 3.6 3.4
0.9 0.7 1.0 0.5 0.8 1.1 0.8 1.3 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.4 0.8 0.9
total 3.2 - 3.2 3.6 3.1 3.1
strategies 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.6
Summarizing, both the observation and survey results suggest that, initially, the
oval-mapping technique contributed to balancing the interests, but during the day
this difference disappeared. Hence, the method did not have a sustainable effect.
8.5 Participation
Observation results on participation in policy-making
In this section, the observation results on the actual contribution of the various
municipalities to the policy-making process are discussed. The operationalization of
the criterion `participation' was given in the previous chapter and was assessed in
the meetings of the second day in the same way as on the first day. As for the
process architecture, we tried to establish for the policy table what actor might
become involved in the policy-making process and what the nature of that
involvement would be. Again, the results presented in Table 8.7 are illustrated here
by the outcomes for one municipality, municipality 2.
Municipality 2(part of the control group) held two successive rounds of talks
(parallel to the city meeting of the experimental group). In the preparatory meeting,
participation was high. All stakeholders participated actively in this round. Policy-
advisers and aldermen from Beneveld visited the stakeholders, who explained their
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various positions. Calimus was cooperative and Transfer designed and discussed a
proposal for restructuring the industrial estate. The policy-adviser offered Calimus
the support of a communication specialist they had hired. During the subsequent
meeting of the policy-advisers and aldermen, the stakeholders were waiting wearily
for the city meeting to begin. Participation in the city meeting was somewhat
limited. The interest groups were only asked to confirm whether the policy-advisers
had correctly presented their position. The representative from Transfer - who
strongly dominated the meeting - threatened at some point to leave.
After the city meeting, two groups were formed to discuss the two policy tables
which were designed. One group discussed the restructuring of Transfer.
Participation here, was reasonably high. The group started discussing the map
Transfer had drawn, not the policy table. Transfer insisted on a joint declaration of
intentions. Calimus agreed, but argued that - if necessary - it would not refrain from
legal action. Transfer clearly dominated the session again. Participation in the other
group which discussed a table for a general light policy, was likewise reasonably
high. On the whole, the participants had an equal share in the discussion and asked
critical questions, making suggestions and statements.
The first policy table on the restructuring of Transfer gave some indication
about the financial involvement and, hence, participants of organizations in the
renewal policy. The table~strategy designed by the other group gave limited
indication about who would participate in the policy- making process.
Table 8.7 participatio~t in policy-n:aki~ig accordir:gto observatio~: results
Control group Experimental group
Municipalities 1 2 3 4 5 6
Ist city meeting or } f f f t t f t
parallel meeting(s)
f t
strategy meetings t f f f f f f t t f f f f t
policy table - f - t t - f - f
Legend: tf - very well, t- well, t- reasonable, -- poor
A comparison of the results of the city meeting and the parallel meetings for all six
municipalities shows that participation of the three municipalities in the
experimental group was somewhat higher than in the control group. All three
municipalities in the control group participated somewhat less active. For the
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strategy meetings, the two groups did not differ in the way they participated. The
policy tables of the experimental group gave some more room for future
participation of stakeholders than the tables of the control group. Two municipalities
of the experimenta] group (4 and 6) scored higher than two of the control group (2
and 3).
Survey results on participation in policy-making
The participants' appreciation of their own contribution to the meetings and possible
future contribution to policy-making is shown in Table 8.8. The results for the first
city meeting indicate that there is no significant difference between the experimental
and control group. However, there is a trend for the former to score higher (T(70) -
-2.07, p - 0.042). The means for the totals of strategies indicate that there is little
difference between the two groups (T(64) -- 0.22, p - 0.16).
Table 8.8 Participation in policy-making: Survey results (means and standarddeviations)
Control group Experimental group
Municipality 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 st city or 2.8 3.2 3.6 3.9 3.6 3.5
parallel 1.0 1.2 0.8 0.6 1.0 1.0
meeting(s)
strategies 3.1 2.8 - - 3.3 4.0 3.0 3.4 3.5 3.2 2.9 .2 3.1 3.3 3.8 3.6
1.0 1.3 1.0 0.8 1.1 1.3 L1 1.4 1.6 1.3 1.2 L0 11 1.3
total forthe 2.9 - - 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.5
strategies 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6
A comparison of the observation and survey results for the city meeting shows that
the difference in participation the observations indicate is supported by the survey
results, albeit, that the difference in the survey results is not statistically significant.
Furthermore, the outcomes for the policy table which are presented in Table 8.7
indicate a similar trend in the relative scoring of municipalities as the survey results
for the strategies. However, the difference noted in participation as it is captured by
the policy tables does not reappear in the survey results for the strategies which are
based on those policy tables.
In conclusion, in the first hours of the gamelsimulation participation was
somewhat higher for the experimental group and their policy tables ensured a higher
degree of participation, but this was not the case for the strategy meetings.
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8.6 Communication
Observation results on communication in policy-making
Communication refers to the degree of cognitive and mutual understanding in the
teams. A more elaborate description of this criterion and its operationalization was
presented in 7.2.6. We confine ourselves here to a description of the way in which
communication took place in the city meeting and strategy meetings of municipality
1. Table 8.9 presents the observation results for all six municipalities.
Communication in both preparatory meetings municipality 1 organized was
somewhat limited. In the preparatory meeting of the local politicians,
communication was hampered by an atmosphere of distrust. There was tension and
imtation between an alderman and a councillor. However, there was reasonable
mutual understanding and participants comprehended the various positions. The
meeting of the stakeholders was occasionally marked by confusion as a result of a
difference in knowledge. Thus, cognitive understanding was limited. Although there
was initially some irritation between the Welfare Foundation and Transfer, the
participants seemed to listen to and understand each other. Communication in the
subsequent city meeting was rather bad. The mood during this meeting - which
brought together all participants - was tense and quarrelsome. Participants listened
but mutual understanding was limited. Some participants argued that the
representatives of the municipality Beneveld communicated insufficiently with the
other parties.
Table 8.9 Communication in policy-making according to observation restdts
Control group Experimental group
Municipatities 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 st city meeting or t f f - t t f t
parallel meeting(s)
strategy meetings f f f f - f f f - f f t
Legend: ~- very well, }- well, f- reasonable, -- poor
Communication in the two strategy meetings went well. Participants discussing the
policy table for the industrial park listened well and there was considerable mutual
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understanding among them. In the other group, communication was well too. The
atmosphere was very friendly and open and participants showed mutual and
cognitive understanding.
There are no results for the policy table. The policy instrument provided little
information on arrangements for future communication between the policy actors.
Hence, we were unable to assess communication for this intermediary policy
product.
The observation results for the first city meeting and parallel meetings suggest
that communication in the three municipalities of the experimental group was, on the
whole, better than in the control group. For the strategy meetings, however, the
opposite was true; here communication in the control group was better. Hence, a
possible positive initial effect of the oval mapping technique did not have an
influence beyond the city meeting in which it was introduced.
Survey results on communication in policy-making
The participants' view on mutual understanding in the city meeting is presented in
the table below. Table 8.10 gives the survey results for communication in both the
city and parallel meetings and for the degree in which the policy strategies expressed
mutual understanding.
Table 8.10 Communication inpolicy-making: Survey results (means and standard deviations)
Control group Experimental group
Municipality 1 2 3 4 5 6
] st city and 2.1 2.9 2.9 3.2 3.6 3.2
parallel 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.9
meeting(s)
strategies 3.5 3.6 - - 3.3 3.7 3.4 3.5 3.8 3.5 3.0 .8 2.9 2.3 3.7 3.5
0.7 0.8 1.0 0.5 0.8 1.1 0.9 1.2 L1 1.3 1.3 1.4 0.5 0.9
Total of 3.6 - 3.5 3.7 2.9 3.2
strategies 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.9 0.4
Communication in the city meeting of all three experimental municipalities was
perceived more positively than of the corresponding meetings of the control group.
For two out of three meetings, the difference is significant (T(72) -- 3.74, p- 0.00).
However, the scores for the policy strategy totals indicate a more positive score
for the control groups. For the strategies, a t-test suggests a trend (T(64) - 1.85, p-
0.06).
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A comparison of the observation and survey results for the city meeting shows that
the trend the observations indicate is supported by the survey results: communication
in the experimental groups was better. Although the strategy meetings and their
outcomes cannot be compared, the data sets do suggest that a change during the day
occurred in favour ofthe control group. The municipalities' ranking according to the
survey scores for the strategies, matches by and large that of the observation scores
for the meetings in which the strategies were designed.
Summarizing, both the observation and the survey data suggest that, initially,
communication was better in the experimental group. However, during the day this
changed. The control group scored higher on communication in the strategy meeting
and the strategies it designed.
8.7 Process management
Observation results on process management in policy-making
For the operationalization of our sixth quality criterion `process management' we
refer back to the previous chapter. Process management concerns the way in which
communication in policy-making processes is steered and organized by the formal
andlor informal `leader'. The observation results for process management in the
various meetings are presented in Table 8.11. To illustrate these findings the results
for municipality 5 will be briefly discussed here.
The process of the city meeting in municipality 5 was managed reasonably
well. The policy adviser opened the meeting and explained the policy issue to be
discussed. More insight into the issue was his aim. He then gave the floor to the
Welfare foundation but a colleague intervened and said it was the facilitator who
should continue. The facilitator explained that language is a slow medium and that
the oval mapping technique could enhance communication. Participants were asked
to confer among themselves and write ovals. They were then asked to present their
ovals in turns. The facilitator briefly summarized the essence of what the participants
contributed and organized the ovals on the wall. Towards the end of the session, the
facilitator addressed the various clusters he made. He praised the participants for
what they had achieved.
Three strategies were developed in municipality 5. One concerned the future of
Transfer. In the meeting where this strategy was designed, process management was
limited. The policy adviser was overshadowed by the representative of Transfer,
who took all decisions in a very short time. There was also little process
management in the meeting discussing `the interests of citizens'. The meeting was
rather chaotic and people were speaking simultaneously. The policy adviser who
chaired the session was clearly aware of the need of a group product. He mentioned
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it several times. Yet, limited effort was put into bringing this about. Process
management in the third group - with the goal `restrict damage to the environment' -
was initially chaired by Transfer and, later, by the policy adviser for environmental
affairs. The meeting was somewhat sttuctured but partly chaotic.
Table 8.11 gives an overview of the observation results for all six
municipalities.
Table 8.11 Process managen:ent in poticy-making according to observation results
Control group Experimental group
Municipatities 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 st city meeting or - t - t f t t f
parallel meeting(s) t f
strategy meetings f f f f - t f f - f t f }
Legend: i--F - very well, t- well, f - reasonable, -- poor
During the city and parallel meetings the process was better managed in all three
municipalities of the experimental group where the facilitator was in charge. Due to
his position as a relative outsider, he was able to convince people. However, this
result was not repeated during the second part of the day: in the strategy meeting, the
two groups did not differ in the way the process was managed.
Survey results on process managentent in policy-making
Do the participants themselves subscribe to the observation outcome? In Table 8.12
the participants' view of the way in which the meetings were led is presented. When
comparing the results for the first city and parallel meeting(s) between the
experimental and control group, process management in two of the three meetings
was evaluated more positively. A t-test (equal variance) confirms a significantly
positive difference between the experimental and control group (T(70) --3.59, p-
0.00) as regards the city meeting. It was not feasible to relate `process management
in any way to the content of the policy table or strategies, so there are no survey
results for the products.
A comparison of the observation and survey results for the first city and parallel
meeting show that the observation findings are supported by survey results.
169
Initially, process management was better in the experimental group. The participants
themselves confirm this observed difference between the groups. However, later on
in the process this difference disappeared.
Table 8.I1 Process management in policy-making on light pollution according to survey results
(means and standard deviations)
Control group Experimental group
Municipality 1 2 3 4 5 6















In this chapter, the results for the second day of our gamelsimulation BANS were
presented. The introduction of the intervention based on the oval-mapping technique
seems to have had some effect on problem structuring if we consider the outcomes
for our six quality criteria. The relationship is, however, rather ambiguous. As Table
8.13 demonstrates, initially there was a positive effect on the level of balancing
interests, participation, communicatíon and process management. The experimental
group had a more positive view of aspect integration but our observations suggest
that the control group actually had a more differentiated view of the issue. The
results for the policy table suggest that in the course of the policy-making process,
the intervention based on the oval-mapping technique seemed to have a long-term
positive effect only as regards aspect differentiation, aspect integration and
participation. The effects found for the other criteria in the first city meeting were
not sustained. In fact, the control group scored higher on communication in the
strategy meetings than the experimental group.
Summarizing, there is a short-term positive effect of the intervention based on
the oval-mapping technique but its long-term effect is more limited.
The participants were asked about their experiences with group mapping (see also
appendix 10). The participants view the intervention merit predominantly in terms of
a reduction of cognitive complexity rather than of socio-political or normative
complexity. They neither agree nor disagree with the proposition that the technique
increases mutual understanding and reduces conflict between interests. The
participants' appreciation of the technique is largely in accordance with the
empirical results presented in this chapter, which suggest that there is a long-term
effect on aspect differentiation, aspect integration and participation.
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Table 8.13 Sun:mary results of round 2
Observation results Survey results~o
Criteria 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
citylparallel
meeting(s)
c 0 3~3 3~3 3l3 3l3 e e e (e) e e
policy table e 2l3 0 3~3 I I I I I I I I
strategy meeting I I 0 0 -2 0 I I I I I I
strategies I I I I I ~ 0 0 0 0 (c) I
LeQend: 1 - aspect differentiation; 2- aspect integration; 3- balancing interests; 4- participation;
5- communication and 6 - ~rocess management; c- control group scores higher; e-
experimental group scores higher ~; (e) there is a trend for the experimental group, (c) - there is a
trend for the control group; 1~3, 213, 3l3 - one, two or three municipalities of the in total 3
municipalities in the experimenta] group score(s) higher; -113,-2~3,-3~3 - one, two or three
municipalities from the in total 3 municipalities in the control group scores higher; 0- no
difference between groups was found; I- no data are available
10 For the survey, it is indicated whether the t-test showed a significant difference in the way the experimen-
tal and control group scored.
11 These scores (cle) apply in this summary only to aspect differentiation which was assessed at the level of




The focus of this study is problem structuring in participatory policy-making
processes. Problem structuring refers to activities of representatives of various
organizations which are directed at influencing the definition of an issue. Policy
making is an iterative process in which policy-structuring actions i.e., activities
directed at sensing and searching, selecting and building aspects of the policy issue
with the aim to create order and transparency, may evolve concurrently with
activities directed at policy development and policy implementation.
Increasingly, problem structuring has become the subject of interventions by
facilitators. In our research, we have tried to establish whether such an intervention
contributes to the quality of problem structuring in participatory policy-making
processes. The method studied is based on the oval-mapping technique, one of the
techniques that are used in Strategic Option Development and Analysis (SODA). It
was designed by Eden et al. (1979, 1983, 1992, 1998a), and was chosen from a
number of inethods to facilitate problem structuring. SODA has the advantage that it
makes use of the idiosyncratic notions and language in which people express
themselves. Thus, it is in accordance with the social constructivist thought on which
this research is founded. Furthermore, the other methods tend to focus more on
policy development and implementation, whereas SODA seems better-equipped for
problem structuring.
An additional research question was how gaminglsimulation can be used as a
method for policy-science research. A gamelsimulation was chosen to serve as a
research environment to test a problem-structuring method. BANS, the
game~simulation for training civil servants in participatory policy-making was used
as the experimental setting. The oval-mapping technique on which we based our
intervention, was chosen from the SODA tools because it was best suited for
facilitating problem structuring in a game~simulation. In its application it differed in
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some respects from the guidelines specified by its designers (Eden and
Ackermann,1998a). Its cyclical nature of idea generation and structuring was not
upheld.
Section 9.2 gives an outline of the research. In section 9.3, our findings
regarding the problem-structuring method are presented. Some explanations of the
results are discussed in 9.4. Section 9.5 addresses the relevance of gamingl
simulation for conducting policy-science research. Finally, some suggestions for
further research are given in 9.6.
9.2 Testing problem structuring in a quasi-experiment
In this study, we have explored whether a method of problem structuring contributes
to a better structured policy issue. These policy issues tend to be complex issues.
Their complexity is characterized by three dimensions. Cognitive complexity refers
to the extent to which an issue involves substantial ancVor very specialized
information which is partly difficult to obtain or to judge. Issues that are highly
cognitively complex involve a lot of variables that are frequently interrelated, and
hence it is difficult to assess the consequences of certain developments and
interventions. Socio-politically complex issues involve many actors who form
complex social networks and have many different institutional interests to defend.
Finally, normative complexity can be defined as the level of contention among the
policy actors about the underlying norms and values they hold regarding the issue.
To assess the quality of problem structuring, we defined six quality criteria.
These criteria correspond to the three dimensions of complexity. Aspect
differentiation and aspect integration focus on the cognitive complexity of the issue.
Aspect differentiation refers to the richness of ideas the policy makers hold about the
issue. Aspect integration concerns the extent to which the various issue aspects are
ordered and linked to each other to form clusters of ideas which add meaning and
transparency to the policy actors' understanding ofthe issue. Balancing interests and
participation correspond with the socio-political complexity of an issue. Balancing
interests concerns the way in which the various interests involved in the policy-
making process are being considered and addressed. The criterion of participation
concerns the extent to which the stakeholders actually contribute to the process in
terms of money, time, and energy. Communication and process management
correspond with the normative complexity of an issue. Communication refers to the
level of cognitive and mutual understanding amongst the policy actors. Our sixth
criterion, process management, concerns the way the debate among the actors is
organized and structured. These six quality criteria provided the framework for
empirically assessing the quality of problem structuring.
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The gamelsimulation BANS simulates a policy-making process of a local
government and takes two days. It was designed as a training tool. On the first day,
the 14 players play 5 parties (aldermen, policy advisers, a welfare foundation, an
industrial estate and a neighbouring village), which have to design a process
architecture for four policy issues. These four issues are (1) light pollution, (2) the
housing of cultural, educational, and health and social work organizations, (3) the
routing of the A206, a new motorway in the west of the town, and (4) the coffee
shop issue which concerns the sale of soft drugs. The second day of the game, all 14
players deal with the light pollution issue. They are asked to design some alternative
policy strategies for this issue.
Our measuring instruments were questionnaires, which registered the
participants' assessment of the six criteria, and observations. In the observation
protocols independent observers (on day 1 there were four observers and on day 2
there were three observers) wrote down conversations of players and filled in
questionnaires. The observation questionnaires contained questions on indicators
corresponding with the six quality criteria. An elaborate account of the data
collection and data analysis can be found in Appendix 12.
The experiment was a post-test only design. Six municipalities in the
Netherlands participated in the game. Each of the six teams consisted of civil
servants and representatives of their municipal network. In some instances a few
local politicians participated. These were equally divided across the two groups. We
thus aimed to simulate their policy networks. Three municipalities made up the
experimental group. They were supported by three facilitators and the game director,
who applied group mapping based on the oval-mapping technique. The other three
municipalities were left to pursue their own policy process, but the municipalities in
both groups were assisted in the gamelsimulation by other policy instruments such
as an actor analysis and the policy table.
Oval mapping involves a group of policy makers who write their own ideas
about a policy issue on oval-shaped papers which are, subsequently, stuck on a wall.
The flow of ideas is triggered by a question which captures the issue that needs to be
tackled. The ovals that are stuck on the wall are rearranged by a facilitator jointly
with the group. It is the facilitator's task to stimulate idea generation, to structure
ideas and to manage the process.
9.3 Does method matter?
9.3.1 The results of the six criteria forproblem structuring
In this section, the main conclusions of our quasi-experiment with the group
mapping intervention based on the oval-mapping technique will be discussed. The
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results will be presented for the six criteria separately. In the analysis of the data the
observation results were given more weight than the survey data. The data enable us
to draw conclusions about the possible effect of the method. A distinction will be
made between a short-time effect and a long-time effect. The short-time effect
indicates that a difference between the control and experimental group has become
manifest in the first meeting in which the method was introduced. A long-time effect
refers to a difference between the groups further on in the process in a second
meeting and in the outcome ofthe process, i.e., the policy product.
Aspect differentiation
The method does not have a beneficial effect on aspect differentiation in the short
term. A recurrent pattern for 4 out of 5 issues' was that, initially, the experimental
group had a less rich idea of the issue than the control group. In the longer term, the
experimental group had a more differentiated understanding of the issue. The
method seems to contribute to retaining the richness of ideas. The oval map
supported divergent thinking because it seemed to work as an external memory.
Aspect integration
How did the intervention affect our second criterion, aspect integration? The data
indicate that various aspects of the issue were not altogether well integrated by the
policy actors from some municipalities from the control group, neither in the policy
process nor in the product of that process. The experimental group, in comparison,
already had a number of steps defined and ordered early on in the process. This was
most evident for the coffee shop and housing issue. Aspect integration is the only
criterion on which the groups in these two issues differed for both the short (the first
meeting) and long term (the second meeting), and for the process architecture. Thus,
the experimental group held a more integrated view of the issue which in part arose
early in the process. On the second day of the game, this trend became more
apparent. Problem structuring in terms of aspect integration tended to be more
efficient in the experimental group. The external memory function of the oval map
also assisted the integration process.
Summarizing, group mapping based on the oval-mapping technique appears to
affect the way aspects are integrated by the policy actors positively. During both
days of the game~simulation, the linking of aspects resulted in an acceleration of the
process. Players from the experimental group tended to have a more integrated draft
proposal earlier in the process. Again, the external memory function of the map
seems to contribute to this outcome (cf. Eden and Ackermann, 1998a: 71).
1 The five issues refer to the four issues of the first round and the issue of the second round.
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Balancing interests
The results for the third criterion, balancing interests, are ambiguous. There appears
to be a positive effect in the longer term for the coffee shop and housing issues in
terms of the outcome, i.e., the process architecture. For the second day of the
gamelsimulation, the data suggest a short-time effect. All three municipalities
assisted by the facilitator did balance the various interests better than those of the
control group. It is difficult, therefore, to draw general conclusions for this criterion.
Concluding, the intervention which is based on the oval-mapping technique
had only a limited effect on the way the two groups balanced the various interests
involved in the issues. The results for the second day indicate that the technique only
has an effect when many different parties are involved and, as a consequence, socio-
political complexity increases. On the second day, all 14 players dealt with the same
issue, whereas on the first day, they were divided over four issues.
Participation
The fourth criterion concerns the level of participation. For the first day of the
gamelsimulation there is no short-term effect, but there is a short-term effect for the
second day of BANS. Furthermore, the results suggest that there is a long-term
effect of the method in all instances except for the light pollution issue. Our results
show that in the short term, policy actors in the experimental group were not
working harder or spending or pledging more energy, time, or money than their
counterparts from the control group. This changed further on in the policy-making
process. Both the process architecture - the policy outcome produced on the first day
of the game - and the findings of the second day of the game suggest a higher level
of participation on behalf of the experimental group. These rather modest results
seem to contradict to some extent what designers of problem-structuring methods
indicate as a powerful characteristic; their ability to bind different actors ínto a group
and raise their commitment to the process they are involved in.
Communication
Communication is our fifth criterion. Generally, the effect the intervention based on
the oval-mapping technique had on communication is limited. In the housing case,
the experimental group did score higher and only for the process architecture. In the
light pollution issue, the control group scored higher on communication during the
first sounding-board meeting, both in terms of observation and survey results. For
the other issues there was no effect.
For the second day, there is only a short-term effect of the group-mapping
technique. In the meetings in which the participants constructed strategies with the
aid of the table, communication was better in the control group.
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Summarizing, the pattern which emerges from the data on communication suggest
that the technique had a limited effect on this criterion.
Process management
Process management is our last criterion. Our data, suggest that, on the first day, the
contribution of the facilitator who introduced the method did not lead to a better
organized process during the subsequent (unfacilitated) meetings of the sounding
boards. Nevertheless, in the process architectures for the housing and coffee shop
issues the experimental group did differ significantly in the way they organized the
future process. Overall, the results for the first day suggest a rather modest effect of
the intervention. The results for the second day of the game~simulation indicate that
when the facilitator was leading the discussion in the experimental group, the
process was indeed managed better than that in the control group. During the
strategy meetings later on in the process, both groups did not manage the debate very
differently.
Summary of results
The problem-structuring method matters only to a limited extent. Its influence is less
pronounced than we expected. Aspect integration is the criterion which appears to be
most strongly affected by the method, followed by aspect differentiation. For the
latter, there is only a positive effect in the longer term (second SBM and process
architecture). There is some indication that for participation and process
management, and to a lesser extent for balancing interests, group mapping has some
effect on the outcome of the process on the first day. The results of the second day
show a short-term effect for all criteria except aspect differentiation and an effect on
the strategies for the criteria ofaspect integration and participation.
9.3.Z The results in terms of the tx~o rounds ofpolicy-making
We have discussed whether the experiment with the intervention based on the oval-
mapping technique resulted in different performances of the experimental and
control group in terms of the six criteria for problem structuring. Overall, the effect
of the method appeared to be limited. Furthermore, group mapping affected not only
the six quality criteria differently, but it also produced different results for the two
days of the gamelsimulation.
On the first day of the game, the effect in terms of the six quality criteria
seemed the largest at the end of the day. For some criteria it was only the end
product of that day which indicated a difference between the control and
experimental group. This pattern suggests that the immediate effect of the method is
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limited on the first day, but later on in the process the effect becomes more visible.
Thus there seems to be a delayed effect of the method.
The results for the second day show a different pattern. Here, the observation
outcomes indicate that the experimental group scored higher for balancing interests,
participation, communication, and process management in the first phases of the
policy-making process in which the intervention based on the oval-mapping
technique was introduced. The survey results show a positive effect for all six
criteria. The short-time results for the second day, therefore differ substantially from
the corresponding results of the first day.
For the second day, the observation results for the policy table and strategy
meetings show that the experimental group scored higher on aspect differentiation
(policy table), aspect integration and participation (strategies). (For communication
and process management no data were available.)
Summarizing, the way problem structuring faired in terms of the six quality
criteria differs for both days. For the first day there seems to be a limited effect in
the meetings in which the intervention based on the oval-mapping technique was
introduced. It is for the end product of the first day that both groups differ most in
the way they structured their respective issues. The results for the second day present
a somewhat different picture. Here, the effect seems to be the largest in the first part
of the policy-making process. Although the data for the longer term effects are not
quite complete, they appear to suggest that the difference between the groups is
somewhat decreasing in the course of the second day.
In conclusion, on the first day the effect of the group mapping intervention was
not on process but on the outcome of that process, whereas on the second day the
effect was strongest early on in the process.
9.4 Explaining the results
The outcomes of our quasi-experiment presented above will be assessed here, and
general conclusions will be drawn.
Influencing cognitions
The intervention based on the oval-mapping technique seems to have affected the
criteria of aspect integration and aspect differentiation strongest. Hence, its effect is
of a predominantly cognitive nature, for it seems to:
- make the ideas in the heads of policy makers explicit;
- bring order to the ideas;
- prioritize these ideas;
- assist in retaining these ideas.
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This latter trait suggest that the map functions as an external memory board which
makes it easier for the participants to hold on to their ideas of the issue. The presence
of the group map apparently helps policy actors to overcome some of the cognitive
limitations memory besets (cf. Hogarth, 1980). The policy advisers used them as
their single most important source of information for constructing the process
architectures and policy tables.
The effect the intervention had on socio-political and normative complexity is
less pronounced. Participants:
- share information;
- focus interaction by means of the group map (cf Massey and Wallace, 1996);
- do not seem to become genuine co-owners of a group map.
Summarizing, group mapping based on the oval-mapping technique has a positive
but rather narrow effect on the quality of problem structuring in policy-making
processes. Its effect is of a predominantly cognitive nature, and there is only a
limited visible effect on the socio-political and normative complexity of policy
issues.
Aspect differe~itiation and productio~i blockiirg
A second finding we wish to address here concerns aspect differentiation, one of the
two criteria which are most strongly affected by the intervention with the mapping
technique. The results demonstrate a striking pattern. In virtually all issues of the
first day and the issue of the second day, the control group initially had a richer
understanding of the issues whereas, in the long term, the experimental group
performed better on this criterion. Psychological research on group performance has
shown that brainstorming techniques do not really increase the level of aspect
differentiation (Wilke and Knippenberg, 1996). The oval-mapping technique has
some of the characteristics of a brainstorming exercise since participants can take
notice of the various concepts which are contributed to the group map and are
encouraged to respond to each other's ideas. Unlike some brainstorming groups,
participants working with the oval-mapping technique are encouraged to `talk'
simultaneously. Diehl and Stroebe ( 1987) conducted a comparative study of group
performance in brainstorming and nominal group sessions and concluded that
production blocking is a major factor in explaining the lower scores ofbrainstorming
groups in comparison with nominal groups. Production blocking refers to the fact
that in brainstorming sessions participants speak in turn and this discourages them to
participate; they might forget ideas or are prevented from thinking of new ones. The
oval-mapping technique enables people to talk simultaneously but also to respond to
each other's ideas. During a number of sessions in our experiment in which group
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mapping based on the technique was introduced, the participants were reluctant to
talk simultaneously but started taking turns.z Nevertheless, production blocking
seems not to be the right explanation for the pattern we found in the results. After
all, the participants in the meetings of the control group were also subject to the risk
ofproduction blocking since they were discussing issues freely, taking turns as is the
custom. Furthermore, on the second day group mapping was introduced like a
nominal-group technique. The representatives of the various organizations first
wrote down the ideas of their organization on the ovals before meeting again in a
session with the other participants and presenting their ideas in turn. The results of
the second day did not differ from those of the first day. Again, these outcomes are
contradictory to research findings on difference in group effectiveness between
brainstorming - and nominal-group techniques. On both days, the applied problem-
structuring method did inhibit aspect differentiation in the short term. Apparently,
the method initially enforces a specific and rather unfamiliar structure on a group,
which inhibits the production of ideas. As pointed out above, the method does,
however, help to retain a more differentiated view of the issue in the long term in
comparison with the control group.
Concluding, the group mapping intervention initially hampers the flow of ideas
by introducing structure. However, the map assists policy makers in retaining their
ideas and hence contributes to the relative rise in different aspects in comparison
with the control group, both in terms of the longer term process as well as the policy
product of that process.
Group mapping as accelerator
In Chapters 7 and 8, it was pointed out that (1) on the first day, one municipality of
the control group failed to deliver most of the process architectures on time, and (2)
on the second day two municipalities from the control group were still struggling
with the policy table while the other municipalities in the experiment were already
designing strategies. These results suggest that the policy-making process was
accelerated by the mapping technique. The control group needed more time to walk
through the process. There are a number of explanations for this acceleration.
Firstly, it may be the result of the intervention based on the oval-mapping technique.
Eden and Ackermann (1998a: 303-304) have pointed out that the technique is used
2 Our participants tended to be rather cautious with producing ovals and sticking them on the wall. The
number of ovals produced was on the whole rather small in comparison with the numbers Eden and
Ackermann (1998a) obtained. There was a strong tendency to confer on ideas, and in various instances the
participants handed their ovals to the facilitator who, subsequently, stuck them on the wall.
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in situations where there is little time for a SODA-trajectory, which may take
months. Oval mapping is used when a quick result is preferred.
Another explanation for the outcome is that group mapping based on the oval-
mapping technique provides the participants with a procedure which assists
participants' thinking. They are guided through the process. The facilitator and
method provide a step-by-step approach on how to tackle the issue. Other ways of
offering such a procedure might have obtained similar results.
Thirdly, as indicated in Chapter 6, the two groups were not identical. Two
municipalities in the control group consisted of a number of civil servants working
for a policy development unit. These participants were more analytical, more critical
(of themselves), and more inclined to think holistically. They were independent in
their thinking and expressed their doubts about each other's suggestions or
characteristics of the game~simulation. The experimental group, on the other hand,
consisted rather of doers. This difference in outlook between the groups might
explain why the experimental group proceeded more quickly. The self-critical
approach of the policy developers in the control group implied they were taking
more time to reflect.
A fourth possible explanation which needs to be addressed is a possible
difference in the support of the game facilitator who assisted the two groups
throughout the gamelsimulation. On the first day, this support was less evident than
on the second day when the participants worked with the policy table which proved
to be a difficult instrument to use. On this day, the facilitator played a more active
role in assisting the various municipalities. The level of assistance the facilitator
provided was difficult to assess. It is possible that he gave the experimental group
somewhat more assistance in developing the policy table.
In conclusion, a problem-structuring method such as group mapping based on
the oval-mapping technique can contribute to an acceleration of the policy-making
process. However, there are alternative means which may have a similar result, such
as an alternative procedure, action-oriented policy makers, or a process facilitator.
Different resultsfor the two days of BANS
In the previous section, another important result was pointed out: the difference in
outcomes for the two days of the game~simulation. How can we explain the absence
of a substantial effect in the two meetings, and presence of a long-term effect for the
process architectures on the first day as opposed to a firm short-term effect on the
second day?
A first possible explanation is the fact that on the first day the issue's
complexity was smaller since on the second day the group concerned itself with one
issue and was therefore larger in size: ] 4 participants compared with 3 or 4 on the
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first day. Not only were there more participants and therefore probably more ideas -
which raised cognitive complexity - but also more parties and hence more interests.
Consequently, the issue on the second day was more social-politically and
cognitively complex. Perhaps the method is only effective if issues have a certain
minimum level of (cognitive) complexity. The effect decreased in the course of the
day. This may be caused by the fact that participants started to work in separate
groups. They designed different strategies for the policy goal of their choice: nature,
economic prosperity, and welfare. This curtailed the contention among the
participants.
A second explanation for the difference in effect for the two days may be the
different focus of the two days itself. On the first day, the participants concentrated
on process, and on the second day they focused on issue content. Policy actors are
used to thinking in terms of issue content and finding solutions for the issue rather
than considering process ideas. Hence, the assignment of the first day was more
difficult for them. Furthermore, the oval-mapping technique was designed for
structuring ideas on issue content rather than developing a process architecture for
that issue.
Thirdly, there is possibly a learning effect. On the second day of the
gamelsimulation, participants of the experimental group had had time to get
accustomed to working with the ovals. Learning on their part may explain the
difference in outcome for the two days. An additional argument, which is also
relevant in this context, is the fact that, on the second day of BANS, the participants
had had time to familiarize themselves with their new surroundings in the
game~simulation. The challenges they met the first day were considerable and
caused uncertainty and caution. All participants needed to familiarize themselves
with their role, new surroundings, and the issues, but the experimental group
additionally had to get accustomed to working with the ovals.
A fourth explanation for the pattern of an increasing effect on the first day with
a peak on the start of the second day and a subsequent decrease in effect, is provided
by our iterative model of the policy-making process. In Chapter 2, Figure 2.2, the
policy-making process was presented as a composition of three streams of actions:
problem structuring, policy development, and implementation. Problem structuring
was seen as an activity which increases in importance in the first phases of the
process and will subsequently partially give way to policy development and policy
implementation. Problem structuring will thus become less important in later phases
of the policy-making process when policy implementation becomes increasingly
more prominent. Consequently, when the participants progressed further in policy
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development (this was during the second part of second day of BANS), it became
more difficult to retrieve an effect of our method.3
In conclusion, group mapping based on the oval-mapping technique had
varying effects on the two days of the game~simulation. Four reasons were given
which may explain this difference. From these, the following propositions can be
deducted:
- Problem-structuring methods are more effective when used for tackling policy
issues which involve more than 3 or 4 parties~interests.
- Group mapping based on the oval-mapping technique is predominantly
effective in the period where problem-structuring activities coincide with an
increasing level of policy development activities and a modest level of
implementation activities. The effect of the intervention is most visible in the
process architectures and at the start of the second round. When the selection of
policy options increasingly dominates the policy-making process i.e., in the
course of the second day, problem structuríng becomes less prominent and,
consequently, group mapping appears to becomes less effective.
- Group mapping based on the oval-mapping technique has little direct effect in
trajectories which are aimed at designing a process architecture.
A difference between observation and survey results
Another striking result which emerged from the data presented in the previous
chapters is the difference between the two data sets. The observation and survey
results were quite often not in accordance with each other. How should one interpret
this difference? The results for aspect differentiation are illustrative here. Even
though this criterion was measured more quantitatively than the other criteria, the
participants at times contradicted the findings from the observation transcripts.
Apparently, people seem to be inclined to respond on impulse in such situations and
express their feelings. Their subjective account of how they experienced a certain
instrument for policy-making may differ from that of a relative outsider such as a
researcher. The participants' assessment of the richness of ideas which came up in
their meetings or in the policy plans did not always match sum-scores of the ideas
counted on the basis of the observation transcripts. Since the observation protocol
contained a checklist to standardize the data, a more intersubjective appreciation of
the actions and events was realized. In addition, the researcher had more time to
analyse, reflect, and check argumentations than the participants when they filled in
the questionnaires. Hence, more value should probably be attributed to the
3 The effect of the intervention is initially limited, then it increases, and decreases again further on in the
process.
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observations and less to our survey outcomes. Surveys in which policy makers are
asked to express their experience and satisfaction with a particular process or
instrument are a commonly used measuring technique in policy-science research (cf.
Bongers, 2000; Heyne, 2000). Our findings prompt a closer monitoring of the
reliability of this measuring instrument. A satisfied customer who has expressed his
appreciation for an intervention with a problem-structuring method may not
necessarily have experienced any other change than that of his or her own feelings
regarding a particular issue or instruments.
In conclusion, the difference between the observation and survey results makes
apparent the value observations can have for evaluation research of policy
instruments.
External versus internalfacilitation
In the light pollution issue on the first day, the control group scored higher in some
instances than the experimental group. This unexpected result can be attributed to
the fact that the municipality teams 1 and 2 of this particular control group were
dominated by three exceptionally skilled persons who had authority. They were
effective process managers, and they were persuasive and skilled negotiators. They
combined these traits with creativity: they had rich ideas concerning the issue. They
also were people with a broad overview of the issue: they were holistic in their
thinking.4 Consensus seeking was another of their traits, for they focused con-
sciously on involving other interests.
These observations indicate that a highly skilled person who steers both the
cognitive and socio-political dimension of the issue can be at least as effective as an
external facilitator who introduces a method. From this conclusion the following
proposition is deducted:
- It may be equally effective for organizations to select amongst its staff a
facilitator who is a good process manager, creative in this thinking, who
balances interests, seeks consensus and thinks holistically.
Alternatively, an external facilitator can form a team with an internal facilitator
so that the experience of both positions can be combined (cf. Eden and
Ackermann, 1998a).
4 Holistic thinking combined with good process management skills appears to benefit the quality of
problem structuring.
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9.5 Gaminglsimulation as a research instrument
Gaminglsimulation is a popular training instrument and a useful tool for
organizational change (cf. De Caluwé, 1997), but it has a limited tradition as a tool
for policy-science research.s Our research has been an explorative study of the use of
gaminglsimulation for research purposes. We used the gamelsimulation BANS in a
quasi-experiment in which we tested a problem-structuring method. Generally,
problem-structuring methods are evaluated through case descriptions (cf. Akkermans
et al., 1993; Lane, 1993; Eden and Ackermann, 1998a). The intervention in a
particular organization or issue is described, and the participants are asked for their
opinion on the facilitated process either by means of yuestionnaires or interviews
(Vennix, 1990; Bongers, 2000). In this type of research, the client's perception and
hence satisfaction with the intervention plays an important role in measuring its
effectiveness. However, in the previous section it was pointed out that observations
can have an additional value to surveys regarding the policy makers' experience and
satisfaction with a process or instrument.
Using a gamelsimulation has both methodological advantages and
disadvantages. Firstly, BANS facilitated making observations. Real-life policy-
making processes are much more difficult to record. Inter-organizational policy-
making involves various parties and many formal and informal meetings over a long
period. Besides, in many instances where methods like SODA are introduced,
organizations may be reluctant to share (all) their thoughts with researchers. Our
experience with BANS has shown that it is indeed possible to follow policy makers
around and write down their actions and conversations in both formal and informal
settings. It has thus been possible to follow, to a certain extent, the dynamics in the
way various participants approached an issue, took position and tried to convince
others oftheir perception.
Secondly, the gamelsimulation enabled us to present reasonably identical
environments to groups of professionals, some of whom we assisted with group
mapping based on the oval-mapping technique. The results of the experimental and
control groups could thus be compared.
Thirdly, BANS offered the participants a clear structure: due to the steps of
play, the assignments given to the participants to make a policy table and process
architecture, and the preconceived documentation forms for these two policy
5 Vissers (1994) and Van der Meer ( 1983a) are among the few who used gaming~simularion for research
purposes.
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products, the data for the various municipalities could be compared more easily.
They played an important role in measuring the six criteria.
There are also methodological disadvantages in using a gamelsimulation as a
research environment.
First, the structure BANS provided can possibly account for the limited effect
the method had on problem structuring. It has characteristics of a problem-
structuring method. The various policy instruments which were built into the game~
simulation like the actor analyses, the sounding-board meetings, and the policy table,
assisted the participants in structuring the issues. The steps-of-play, organizing the
course of the day, also assisted the participants in bringing structure to their process.
The fact that BANS entails a considerable level of structure implies that the structure
the group mapping intervention can introduce might be less visible than it would
have been in a less structured environment. A problem-structuring intervention is
probably less effective in an environment where other structuring elements prevail.
BANS was also presented to the municipalities as a course in interactive policy-
making. Consequently, participants were probably inclined to pay positive attention
to various interests, involving various actors, and to try to be sensitive to the needs
of fellow policy makers. Hence, participants were already inclined to show some of
the behaviours problem-structuring methods aim to evoke oftheir own accord.
Secondly, the external validity of BANS is not without problems. Although
participants experienced the issues and roles as realistic, they did not behave
realistically in all instances. Sometimes stereotypical images of policy situations
were enlarged. On other occasions, participants found it difficult to remain involved
in the game for various reasons, one of which was a sense of uncertainty.
Furthermore, the level of structure in BANS left limited room for improvisation. As
was pointed out in Chapter 4, this may have influenced the external validity of
BANS negatively. Essential for cognitive mapping as Eden et al. (1983, 1998a)
designed it is the notion of the idiosyncrasy of ideas about issues. A simulated issue
is by definition less idiosyncratic for the participants than a policy issue they face in
daily life. However, we have tried to transfer characteristics of real-life processes to
the experiment with BANS, by simulating policy networks. In all municipalities, at
least two pon-governmental organizations did participate, and they did offer a
different perspective from those of the municipality's representatives. Nevertheless,
our policy network was not constructed around a particular issue, as a policy
network normally is. Furthermore, the majority of the participants were civil
servants working for the municipality. This distribution of representatives in the
network probably differs from most real-life policy networks.
The issues and roles were considered realistic by the participants, but they were
less deeply involved in the issues presented to them in BANS than they would have
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been in real-life processes. `It remains a game' one of them remarked. The fact that
we camed out our quasi-experiment with groups of experienced professionals who,
by and large, were used to working with each other implied that they did bring with
them their own idiosyncratic perceptions of policy-making, of municipal
organizations and relationships between civil servants, politicians, client
organizations and citizens, and their set ways of interacting. This contributed to the
external validity of the gamelsimulation. Furthermore, since the participants in both
groups were experienced, they did bring into the game~simulation structuring skills:
e.g., some used overheads or flip-overs (cf Dórner, 1996: 192).
Summarizing, in this section the advantages and disadvantages of the role
BANS played in our quasi-experiment were discussed. The structure it offered was a
mixed blessing. It facilitated measurement of problem structuring but
simultaneously made it more difficult to trace the effectiveness of a problem-
structuring method, for BANS offered the players already considerable assistance
with structuring. The results show that the added value of planned and facilitated
structuring does exist. However, it is not easy to establish the effects empirically,
and this study could only find a rather distributed picture of these effects.
9.6 Future research
Our quasi-experiment of problem structuring in inter-organizational policy networks
has been an explorative study. Building a mature theory of problem structuring was
not our intention. By exploring the workings of a problem-structuring method in a
game~simulation we have tried to reconstruct with hindsight how problem
structuring evolves and how the workings of a method can be assessed. Despite the
methodological shortcomings, which in part emanated from the practical limitations
brought upon us by time and financial means, the design did enable us to explore the
use of gaming~simulation for policy research. It gave us some insights into the
working of a problem-structuring method and the use of a game~simulation for
policy and organization science research. The outcomes of our research raise new
questions. Considerably more assessment of problem structuring and problem-
structuring methods is needed. Longitudinal field research into problem-structuring
interventions in participatory policy trajectories will increase our understanding of
the meaning of problem-structuring methods. Field research could overcome some
of the problems we faced with the use of a gamelsimulation as an experimental
context. A comparative analysis could be made of one or more types of problem-
structuring methods.
In combining experimental research with field studies, an effort can be made to
integrate social psychological research findings on group performance with the field
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insights in problem structuring within policy-making processes. A renewed
assessment of the criteria should precede the development of the instrument. The
assessment can be founded on a more interdisciplinary focus than the present
studies. Our problem structuring criteria can serve as a starting-point for developing
a joint measuring instrument. In Chapter 3, the six criteria were formulated on the
basis of a review of the literature on problem structuring. Policy scientists and
practitioners who work with problem-structuring methods point out a number of
characteristics on which our six variables were based. Although the literature
supports these criteria, the outcomes of our experiment are ground for reconsidering
the relevance ofthe criteria.
189
References
Abualsamh, R.A., Carlin, B., 8z McDaniel, R.R. (1990). Problem structuring heuristics in
strategic decision making. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 45, 159-174.
Ackermann, F., 8t Eden, C. (1994). Issues in computer and non-computer supported
GDSS's. Decision Support Systems, 14, 381-390.
Ackermann, F., Eden, C., 8c Williams, T. (1997). Modelling for litigation: mixing
qualitative and quantitative approaches. Interfaces, 27, 48-65.
Ackermann, F., óc Eden, C. (1998). Contrasting GDSS's and GSS's in the context of
strategic change: implications for facilitation. Journal of Decision Systems, 6, 221-
250.
Akkermans, H., Vennix, J., 8c Rouwette, E. (1993). Participative modelling to facilitate
organizational change: a case study. Paper presented at the International System
Dynamics Conference, Cancun, Mexico.
Bekkers, V.J.J.M., Heyne, G.A.W.M., Frissen, P.H.A., á Ester, P. (1996).
Sturingsconcepties en instrumenten in het milieubeleid, op zoek naar vorrnen var:
co-productie. Tilburg, the Netherlands.
Belton, V., Ackermann, F., 8z Shepherd, I. (1995). Integrated support from problem
structuring through to alternative evaluation using COPE and VISA. Journal of
Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis, 6, 115-130.
Bertels, K. (1995). De weg van de traditionele maatschappij naar de risico-samenleving. In
H. Achterhuis, R. Smits, J. Geurts, A. Rip 8c E. Roelofs (Eds.), Technologie en
Samenleving (pp. 101-119). Leuven, Belgium: Garant.
Bongers, F. (2000). Participatorypolicy analysis and group support systems. Tilburg, the
Netherlands.
Bovens, M., 8z 't Hart, P. (1996). Understanding policy fiascos. New Brunswick:
Transaction Publishers.
Brehmer, B. (1986). Problem solving, decision making and complexity. Paper presented at
the WACRA Europe conference on Case Method Research and Case Method
Application. Munich, Germany.
Bougon, M.G. (1992). Congregate cognitive maps: a unified dynamic theory of
organization and strategy. JournalofManagement Studies, 29, 367-389.
Bryson, J.M., Ackermann, F., Eden, C., 8r. Finn, C.B. (1995). Critical incidents and
emergent issues in managing large-scale change. In J. Bryson (Ed.), The state of
public management (pp. 257-275). Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press.
Caluwé, de L., Geurts, J., Buis, D., 8c Stoppelenburg, A. (1996). Gaming; organisatie-
verandering met spelsimulaties. Den Haag, the Netherlands: Delwel.
Caluwé, de L. (1997). Veranderen moet je leren: een evaluatiestudie naar de opzet en
effecten van een grootschalige cultuurirrterventie met behulp van een spelsimulatie.
Den Haag, the Netherlands: Delwel.
Checkland, P. (1989). Soft Systems Methodology. In J. Rosenhead (Ed.), Rational analysis
for a problematic world, problem structuring methods for complexity, uncertainty
190
and conflict (pp. 71-100). Chichester, England: Wiley.
Checkland, P., ác Scholes, J. (1990). Soft Systems Methodology in action. Chichester,
England: Wiley.
Checkland, P. (1999). Systems thinking, systems practice. Chichester, England: Wiley.
Christensen, L.B. (1994). E.rperimental methodology. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
Cobb, R.W., 8L Elder C.D. (1972). Participation in American politics: The dynamics of
agenda-building. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press.
Cook, D.T., 8c Campbell, A. (1979). Quasi-e.rperimentation: design and analysis issues for
field Studies. Boston, Houghton Mifflin.
Cropper, S. (1990). The complexity of decision support in practice. In C. Eden and J.
Radford (Eds.), Tackling strategic problems, the role ofgroup decision support (pp.
29-39). London: Sage.
Dery, D. (1984). Problem definition in policy analysis. Lawrence, KS: University Press of
Kansas.
DeTombe, D.J. (1994). Defining complex interdisciplinary societal problems, a theoretical
study for constructing a co-operative problem analyzing method.~ the method
COMPRAM. Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers.
DeTombe, D.J. (1996). Facilitating complex societal problems. Paper presented at the
WACRA Europe conference on Case Method Research and Case Method
Application. Munich, Germany.
Diehl, M., óc Stroebe, W. (1987). Productivity loss in idea generating groups: Tracking
down the blocking effect. Journalof Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 392-
403.
Dórner, D. (1996). The logic of failure, recognizing and avoiding error in complex
situations. New York: Metropolitan Books.
Douglas, M., ác Wildavsky, A. (1982). Risk and Culture: An essay on the selection of
technical and environmental dangers. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Duckworth, W.E., Gear, A.E., 8c Lockett, A.G. (1977). A guide to Operational Research.
Londen: Chapman and Hall.
Duke, R. (1974). Gaming, the future's language. London: Sage.
Dukes, R.L., 8L Waller, S.J. (1976). Toward a general evaluation model for simulation
games. Simulation and Games, 6, 75-88.
Dunn, W.N. (1988). Methods of the second type: coping with the wilderness of
conventional policy analysis. Policy Studies Review, 7, 720-737.
Dunn, W.N. (1994). Public policy analysis: an introduction. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall.
Eden, C., Jones, S., 8c Sims, D. (1979). Thinking in organizations. London: Prentice Hall.
Eden, C., Jones, S., 8c Sims, D. (1983). Messing about in problems, an informal structured
approach to their identification and management. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
Eden, C. (1988). Cognitive mapping. European Journal of OperationalResearch, 36, 1-13.
Eden, C. (1989). Using cognitive mapping for strategic options development and analysis
(SODA). In J. Rosenhead (Ed.), Rational analysisfor a problematic world, problem
structuring methods for complexitv, uncertainry and conflict (pp. 21- 42).
191
Chichester, England: Wiley.
Eden, C., 8i Radford, J. (Eds.) (1990). Tackling strategic problems, the role of group
decison support. London: Sage.
Eden, C. (1990). The unfolding nature of group decision support: two dimensions of skill.
In C. Eden 8c J. Radford (Eds.), Tackling strategic problems, the role of group
decision support (pp. 154-161). London: Sage.
Eden, C. (1992a). On the nature of cognitive maps. Journal of Management Studies, 29,
261-265.
Eden, C. (1992b). Strategy development as a social process. Journal of Management
Studies, 28, 799-811.
Eden, C., 8c Ackermann, F. (1992). The analysis of cause maps. JournalojManagement
Studies, 29, 3 I 1-324.
Eden, C. (1994). Cognitive mapping and problem structuring for system dynamics model
building. Svstem Dvnamics Review, 10, 257-276.
Eden, C. (1995). Ón evaluating the performance of wide-band GDSS's. European Journal
of OperationalResearch, 81, 302-311.
Eden, C., 8c Ackermann, F. (1998a). Making strategy: the journev ofstrategic management.
London: Sage.
Eden, C., 8i Ackermann, F. (1996). `Horses for Courses': A stakeholder approach to the
evaluation of GDSSs. Group Decision and Negotiation, 5, 501-519.
Eden, C., 8t Ackermann, F. (1998b). Analysing and comparing idiographic causal maps. In
C. Eden 8z J.C. Spender (Eds.), Manageriul and organizational cognition: theory,
methods and research, London: Sage.
Eden, C., 8c Ackermann, F. (2000). Mapping distinctive competencies: a systemic
approach. Journalof the OperationalResearch Society, 51, 12-20.
Graaf, H. van de, 8c Hoppe, R. (1992). Beleid en politiek, een inleiding tot de beleids-
wetenschap en de beleidskunde. Muiderberg, the Netherlands: Coutinho.
Geurts, J., 8c Vennix, J. (Eds.) (1989). Verkenningen in beleidsanalyse: theorie en praktijk
van modelbouw en simulatie. Zeist, the Netherlands: Kerckebosch.
Geurts, J.L.A. (1993). Omkijken naar de toekomst, lange termijn verkenningen in beleids-
exercities. Alphen aan den Rijn, the Netherlands: Samsom.
Geurts, J.L., 8c Mayer, I. (1996). Methods for participatory policy analysis: towards a
conceptual model for research and developmer:t. Working Paper, Tilburg
University, Department ofPolicy and Organization Studies.
Geus, A.P. de (1988). Planning as learning. Harvard Business Review, 88, 70-74.
Gilles, J.R., Rogers, R., 8L Bagby, R.M. (1991). Validity of the M test: simulation-design
and natural group approaches. JournalofPersonalit}~ Assessment, 57, 130-140.
Glaser, B.G., 8c Strauss, A.L. (1976). The discoven' ofgrounded theory: strategies
for qualitative research. Chicago, IL: Aldine Publishing.
Gray, B., 8z Wood, D.J. (1991). Collaborative alliances: movirig from practice to theon~.
London: Sage.
Hart, S.L. (1985). Toward quality criteria for collective judgements. Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 36, 209-228.
192
Heyne, G. (2000). Participeren n:et beleid.~ Een evaluatie van participatieve beleidsanalyse.
Tilburg, the Netherlands: IVA.
Hickling, A. (1990). 'Decision Spaces': A Scenario about designing appropriate rooms for
group decision management. In C. Eden 8c J. Radford (Eds.), Tackling strategic
problems, the role ofgroup decision support (pp. 169-177). London: Sage.
Hickson, D.J., Butler, R.J., Cray, D., Mallory, G.R., 8c Wilson, D.C. (1986). Top
decisions: strategic decision-making in organizations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd.
Hitch, C.J. (1955). An appreciation of system analysis. In S.L. Optner (Ed.), Svsten:
Analvsis (pp. 19-36). Harmondsworth, England: Penguin.
Hogarth, R.M. (1980). Judgement and choice, the psychology of decision. Chichester,
England: Wiley.
Hofman, M.E. (1995). Cognitive mapping methods: an explorative study. Centre for
Organisational Leaming and Change, Working Paper Series 3, Nijenrode
University, the Netherlands.
Hoogerwerf, A. (1987). De levensloop van problemen: definiëring, precisering en
oplossing. Beleidswetenschap, 2, 159-181.
Hoogerwerf, A. (1992). Het ontwerpen van beleid: een handleiding voor de praktijk en
resultaten van onderzoek. Alphen aan den Rijn, the Netherlands: Samsom H.D.
Tjeenk Willink.
Hoppe, R. (1989). Het beleidsprobleem geproblematiseerd: over beleid ontwerpen en
probleemvorming. Muiderberg, the Netherlands: Coutinho.
Huisman, F. (1985). Inleiding tot de Operational Research. Groningen, the Netherlands:
Wolters Noordhoff.
Huxham, C. (1990). On trivialities in process. In C. Eden 8t R. Radford (Eds.), Tackling
strategic problems, the role oj group decision support (pp. 162-168). London:
Sage.
Jackson, M.C. (1982). The nature of `soft' systems thinking: The work of Churchman,
Ackoff and Checkland. Journal ofApplied Systems Analysis, 9, 17-29.
Joldersma, F. (1992). De analyse van het beleidsprobleem. In. A. Hoogerwerf (Ed.), Het
ontwerpen van beleid: een handleiding voor de praktijk en resultaten van onderzoek
(pp. 50-64). Alphen aan den Rijn, the Netherlands: Samsom H.D. Tjeenk Willink.
Joldersma, F. (1993). De levensloop van problemen en beleid rond alcohol en drugs.
Enschede, The Netherlands: Faculteit Bestuurskunde, Universiteit Twente.
Joldersma, F. (1995). Beleidsvorn:ing rond drugs: het doorbreken van blokkades in een vol
samenspel. Paper presented at the symposium, Werkvisie De Hoop, Dordrecht, 17-
24.
Joldersma, F., 8z Pegman, C.J. (1998). Gaming~simulation as a problem-structuring
method. Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the International Simulation
and Gaming Association, St. Petersburg, Russia.
Joldersma, F., 8z Geurts, J. (2000). Simulation~gaming for participatory policy-making. In
D. Herz ác A. Blatte (Eds.), Simulationen in den Sozial Wissenschaften (pp. 259-
275). Munster, Germany: Lit Verlag.
Keys, B., Burns, O.M., Case, T., á Wells, R.A. (1988). Decision support package in a
193
business game: performance and attitudinal effects. Simtdation and Games, 19, 440-
452.
Klijn, E.H., 8t Teisman G.R. (1992). Besluitvorming in beleidsnetwerken: een theoretische
beschouwing over het analyseren en verbeteren van beleidsprocessen in complexe
beleidsstelsels. Beleidswetenschap, 1, 32-52.
Koppenjan, J.F.M. (1991). Definiëring van complexe problemen door de overheid:
balanceren tussen ruim en precies. Beleidswetenschap 4, 21-46.
Koppenjan, J.F.M. (1993). Managemenl van de beleidsvormirag: Een studie naar de
totstandkomiiig van beleid op {aet terrein van het binnenlands bestuur. Amsterdam:
VUGA.
Lane, D.C. (1993). The road not taken: observing a process of issue selection and model
conceptualization. System Dynamics Review, 9, 239-264.
Lane, D.C., 8z Oliva, R. (1994). The greater Whole: Towards a synthesis of SD ai:dSSM,
proceedings of the International Systems Dynamics Conference, Problem Solving
Methodologies, 134-136.
Lane, D.C. (1995). On a Resurgence of Management Simulations and Games. Journal of
the OperationalResearch Society, 46, 604-625.
Lindblom, Ch.E. (1965). The intelligence of Democracy. Decisionanaking through mutual
adjustment. New York: Free Press.
Lyles, M.A., 8z Thomas, H. (1988). Strategic problem fomlulation: biases and assumptions
embedded in alternative decision-making Models. Jo:rrnal ofManagement Studies,
25, 131-145.
Man, H. de (1996). Organiseren: proces interactie en evolutie: The social psychology of
organizing' van Karl E. Weick. Bestuurskunde, S, 296-304.
March J.G., Olsen, J.P., á Christensen, S. (1979). Ambiguity and choice in organizations.
Bergen, Norway: Universtetsflaget.
Martin, D.S. (1979). Five simulation games in the social sciences. Simulation ác Games, ]0,
331-349.
Massey, A.P., á Wallace, W.A. (1996). Understanding and facilitating group problem
structuring and formulation: mental representations, interaction and representation
aids. Decision Support Systems, 17, 253-274.
Massey, A.P., 8c O'Keefe, R.M. (1993). Insights from attempts to validate a multi-attribute
model for problem definition quality. Decision Sciences, 24, 106-125.
Mason, R.O., 8c Mitroff, I.I. (1981). Challenging strategic planning assumptions, theory,
cases and techniques. New York: Wiley.
Mayon-White, B. (1990). Problem-solving in small groups: team members as agents of
change. In C. Eden 8t R. Radford (Eds.), Tackling strategic problems, the role of
group decision support (pp. 78-89). London: Sage.
Mayer, I. (1997). Debating Technologies: A methodological contribution to the design and
evaluation of participatory policy analysis. Tilburg, the Netherlands: Tilburg
University Press.
Meer, F.B. van der (1983a). Organisatie als spel: Sociale sin:ulatie als methode in
onderzoek naar organiseren. Enschede, the Netherlands: Boerderijcahier 8302.
194
Meer, F.B. van der (1983b). De sociale spelsimulatie: Bruikbaarheid voor beleidsonderzoek
naar organiseren. Systemica, 3, 155-166.
Meer, F.B. van der, 8z Geurts, J.L.A. (1995). Simulatie voor beleids- en organisatie-
ontwikkeling. Bestuurskunde, 4, 166-177.
Mitroff, I.I., 8c Sagasati, F. (1973). Epistemology as general systems theory: An approach
to the design of complex decision-making experiments. Philosophy of Social
Sciences, 3, 117-134.
Nees, D.B. (1983). Simulation: A complementary method for research on strategic
decision-making processes. Strategic Management Journal, 4, 175-185.
Nelissen, N., Geurts, J., 8c Wit, H. de (1986). Het verkennen van beleidsproblemen. Zeist,
the Netherlands: Kerckebosch.
Norris, D.R. (1986). External validity of business games. Simulation óc Games, 17, 447-
459.
Newell, A., 8i Simon, H.A. (1972). Human problem solving. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall.
Ng-A-Tham, J. (1999). Verandering van arbeidstijden: besluitvormingsproces en
uitkomsten bezien vanuit een contingentieperspectief. Assen, the Netherlands: Van
Gorcum.
Office for Public Management (1990). The rubber windmill, learning from the future.
Report of a workshop of an internal market in the health service in East Anglia.
Peters, V., Vissers, G., 8c Heijne, G. (1995). The validiry of games. Paper presented at the
ISAGA-conference. Valencia, Spain.
Phillips, L.D. (1990). Decision analysis for group decision support. In C. Eden 8c J.
Radford (Eds.), Tackling strategic problems: the role ofgroup decision support (pp.
142-153). London: Sage.
Pounds, W.F. (1969). The process of problem finding. International Management Review,
Fall, 11, 1-18.
Prápper, LM.A.M., 8c Steenbeek. D.A. (1998). Interactieve beleidsvoering: typering,
ervaringen en dilemma's. Bestuurskunde, S, 292-301.
Raser, J.R. (1969). Simulation and Society an exploration of scientific gaming. Boston:
Allyn and Bacon.
Rein, M., 8c Schán, D.A. (1977). Problem setting in policy research. In C.H. Weis (Ed.),
Using social research in public policy making (pp. 235-251). Toronto, Canada:
Lexington books.
Rohrbaugh, J., 8t Eden, C. (1990). Using the competing values approach to explore 'ways
of working'. In C. Eden 8c J. Radford (Eds.), Tackling strategic problems: the role
ofgroup decision support (pp. 40-47). London: Sage.
Roelofs, E. (1998). The use of a game for quasi-experimentation. In J. Geurts, C.
Joldersma, 8c E. Roelofs, Gaming~Simulation for Policy Development and
Organizational Change (pp. 361-367). Tilburg, the Netherlands: Tilburg University
Press .
Rooze, E.J. (1999). Effectief Strategisch probleem formuleren. Delft, the Netherlands:
Eburon.
195
Rosenhead, J. (Ed.) (1989). Ratioiial analysisfor a problematic world, problem structuring
methods for complexitti~, uncertainty and coiíflict. Chichester, England: Wiley.
Schán D.A., 8z Rein, M. (1994). Frame Reflection: towards the resolution of intractable
policv controversies. New York: Basie Books.
Selz, O. (1924). Die Gesetze der produktiven und reproduktiven Geistestcitigkeit:
kurzgefasste Darstellung. Bonn: Cohen.
Stoll, C., 8t Inbar, M. (1970). Games and socialization: an exploratory study of race
differences. The Sociological Quarterly, 374-381.
Teach, R.D. (1993). Forecasting accuracy as performance measure in business simulations.
Simulation 8c Gaming, l4, 476-490.
Terhune, K.W., á Firestone, J.M. (1970). Global war, limited war and peace: hypotheses
from three experimental worlds. International Studies Quaterley, 14, 195-218.
Teisman, G.R (1995). The reconstruction of complex decision making: on phases, streams
and rounds. In P. 't Hart, M. Metselaar, 8c B. Verbeek (Eds.), Publieke
besluitvorming (pp. 33-55). Den Haag, the Netherlands: VUGA.
Termeer, C.J.A.M. (1993). Dynamiek en inertie rondom mestbeleid: Een studie naar
veranderingsprocesse~: in het varkenshouderijnetwerk. Rotterdam, the Netherlands.
Termeer, C.J.A.M. (1993). Een methode voor het managen van veranderingprocessen in
netwerken. In F.F.M. Koppenjan, J.A. de Bruijn, 8c W.J.M. Kickert (Eds.),
Netwerkmanagement in het openbaar bestuur: over de mogelijkheden van
overheidssturing in beleidsnetwerken (pp. 101-121). Den Haag, the Netherlands:
VUGA.
Tigchelaar, M. (1992). System D}viamics als instrument van strategisclle besluitvorming:
een cognitief-psychologische benadering. Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam,
Faculteit der Economische Wetenschappen en Econometrie.
Tomlinson, R. (1990). Of tools, methods and methodology. In C. Eden, 8c J. Radford
(Eds.), Tackling strategic problems, the role of group decision support (pp. 178-
188). London: Sage.
Tomikura, M. (1998). Problems of Designing Global Games. In J. Geurts, C. Joldersma, 8c
E. Roelofs (Eds.), Gaming~simulation for policy development and organizational
change (pp. 383-387). Tilburg, the Netherlands: Tilburg University Press.
Tops, P.W. 8z Moorman, M. (1996). Co-produktie: een plaatsbepaling. In P. Tops, P.F.G.
Depla, á P.J.C. Manders (Eds.), Verhalen over coproductie. De praktijk van
politieke en bestuurlijke vernieuwing in Noordbrabantse gemeenten (pp. 67-74).
Tilburg, the Netherlands: KPMGNNG ~ICUB.
Vennix, J.A.M. (1990). Mental models and computer models: design and evaluation of a
computerbased learning environment for policy-making. Nijmegen, the
Netherlands.
Vennix, J.A.M. (1995). Building consensus in strategic decision making: system dynamics
as a group support system. Group Decision and Negotiation, 4, 335-355.
Vennix, J.A.M. (1996). Group Model Building facilitating team learning using system
dynamics. Chichester, England: Wiley.
Vissers, G.A.N. (1994). The production of strategy. Delft, the Netherlands: Eburon.
196
Vissers, G.A.N., Heyne, G.A.W.N., 8c Peters, V.A.M. (1995b). Spelsimulatie in
bestuurskundig onderzoek. Bestuurskunde, 4, 178-187.
Vissers, G., Peters,V., Heyne, G., 8z Geurts, J. (1998). Validity of games~ simulations: A
Constructive View. In J. Geurts, C. Joldersma, 8z E. Roelofs (Eds.),
Gaming~Simulation for policy development and organizational change. Tilburg, the
Netherlands: Tilburg University Press.
Volkema, R.J. (1983). Problem formulation in planning and design. Management Science,
Z9, 639-652.
Wilke, H., óc Knippenberg, A. van (1996). Group performance. In M. Hewstone, W.
Stroebe, 8L G.M. Stephenson (Eds.), Introduction in Social Psychology (pp. 440-
485). Oxford: Blackwell.
Whyte, G. (1991). Decision failures: why they occur and how to prevent them. Academy of
Management Executive, 5, 23-31.
Woerkum, C. van (1997). Communicatie en interactieve beleidsvorming. Houten, the
Netherlands: Bohn Stafleu van Loghum.
Wolfe, J. 8i Roberts, C.R. (1993). A further study of the external validity of business
games: five year peer group indicators. Simulation c~ Gaming, 24, 21-33.
197
Appeudix 1. Problem structuriug iu three issues
In Chapter 7, the results for the coffee shop issue were presented. This is one of four issues
which the participants were confronted with on the first day of the game simulation. In this
appendix, we will give an overview of the results for the other three issues: the housing
issue, light pollution, and the new motorway, the A206. Finally, we will summarize and
compare the results of the four issues ofthe first round of BANS.
1. The housiug issue
1.1. Introducing the issue
The policy makers involved in the housing issue were presented with a twofold problem.
On the one hand, there is an oversupply ofclassrooms as a result of a decline in the number
of pupils. On the other hand, there are four organizations which need new accommodation:
an institution for the mentally handicapped, a general social work organization, a youth
centre, and an art society. As a possible alternative accommodation, the old glass factory is
mentioned, which is situated on Transfer. This factory, which has been empty for a number
of years, has been nominated to become an industrial monument. The sounding board was
given the assignment to take an integral approach to the issue.
1.2 The results
The results for the housing issue are presented in Table 1. The observations on aspect
differentiation show that, for the first sounding-board meeting, the control group produced
the highest number of aspects. In the second sounding-board meeting, aspect differentiation
was evidently higher for the experimental group. This is also the case for the process
architecture.
The survey results suggest, for both sounding-board meetings and the process architec-
ture, a slightly higher score for the experimental group. However, a repeated measures
ANOVA for the two sounding boards indicate no main effects for time or treatment (the
oval-mapping technique): time, F(1,18) - 0.0, p- 0.93; treatment, F(1,18) -2.0, p- 0.17.
Moreover, there is no significant interaction effect: F(1,18) - 0.65, p- 0.43. Thus, in the
first sounding board, there is little difference between the groups and, although the experi-
mental group appeared to have a richer understanding of the housing issue according to the
survey results, this difference with the control group is not significant. A MANOVA for the
process architectures which the groups made for this issue indicate a trend: F(1,63) - 5.14,
p- 0.03 in favour of the experimental group.
Integration of aspects was clearly better in the experimental group than the control group
for both sounding-board meetings and the process architecture. In the first sounding-board
meeting two municipalities of the experimental group scored higher than those of the
control group. For the second sounding-board meeting and process architectures, all three
municipalities in the experimental group scored higher.
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Table 1: The results tor the housinQ issue
observation results survey results: means and standard
deviations
control group experim. group control group experim. group
municipaliry 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
aspect sbm] 60' 80 61 45 66 68 2.8' 3.3 2.8 2.5 3.3 3.7
differ. 20l !79 t.o" ~.2 o.s t.3 o.s o.6
sbm2 33 18 24 40 27 45 3.0 2.0 3.5 3.8 3.3 3.0
75 !12 0.8 0.0 0.7 o.s i.o t.o
pa 25 17 24 26 27 34 3.0 2.6 I 3.3 3.1 3.6
56 87 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.9
3.0 4.0 2.8 2.9 4.0 3.3as ectp sbml f t - t tt t 0.0 0.0 I.0 1.4 0.0 0.6
integ. 3.8 2.7 4.0 4.0 3.0 3.0
sbm2 - - t tt t t o.s i.2 0.0 0.0 0.7 t.o
3.3 2.4 ~ 3.4 3.3 4.0
pa t - t t t t 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.8
balan. sbml t t t t t t 2.8 33 2.8 3.0 3.0 2.7
interests t.0 l.s L0 0.0 0.8 !.i
sbm2 f - t t t t 3.3 2.3 4.0 3.3 3.5 2.3
1.0 l.s 0.0 O.s l.3 l.s
3.0 2.6 ~ 3.2 3.2 3.5
pa t f f t t t 0.9 0.8 0.8 1.2 i.0
partici. sbml t t t t t t 4.0 3.0 2.5 2.8 3.0 3.3
0.0 1.0 1.0 1.3 0.8 l.s
sbm2 f - t t t t 3.8 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.8 3.3
O.s !.0 0.7 0.6 O.s l.s
pa t t t t t f 2.9 2.4 I 2.8 3.1 3.1
0.9 0.9 l.3 1.3 t.2
com. sbml - t t t tt t 2.8 3.0 3.3 3.0 3.8 4.3
1.7 1.0 1.3 0.8 L0 0.3
3.0 2.0 4.0 3.8 3.8 3.0sbm2 f - t t f t 0.8 0.0 0.0 O.s !.0 l.7
2.9 2.9 ~ 3.4 2.8 3.6
pa f - - f f f 0.8 0.9 0.9 L0 L0
process sbml t t t t t t 3.0 3.0 2.0 2.4 3.0 3.0
manag. t.z 1.0 0.0 o.s o.8 0.0
sbm2 t - f t t t 3.5 1.7 3.5 3.0 3.0 3.0
0.6 1.2 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.0
pa ~ -
3.3 2.7 z.6 3.0 3.6
~~ i 0 r 0 9 l.! 0.8
Legend: 1- number of aspects, 2- total number of aspects for the group, 3- mean, 4- standard
deviation
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The survey results, except for the results for the process archítecture, do not indicate a
relevant difference between the groups. A repeated measures ANOVA for the two meetings
indicates no significant main effect for time F(1,18) - 0.18, p- 0.67; or for treatment F(1,
18) - 0.30, p - 0.59. The interaction effect is also not significant: F(1,18) - 0.32, p - 0.58.
A MANOVA for the survey results on how the process architectures integrated aspects
shows a significant difference between the groups: F(1,63) - 10.5, p- 0.002. From Table 1
we can deduct that the experimental group scored higher.
The observation results indicate that interests were balanced equally well by the two
groups during the first sounding-board meeting. For the second sounding-board meeting,
the experimental group scored somewhat, but not significantly, higher. However, two of the
process architectures of the experimental group did balance interests better than those of the
control group.
Again, the survey results do not confirm this pattern. A repeated measures ANOVA
for the participants' scores for how they perceive the balancing of interests in the sounding-
board meetings shows that there is no significant effect for time F(1,18) - 0.75, p- 0.39 or
for treatment F(1,18) - 0.03, p- 0.88. In addition, a interaction effect is also absent:
F(1,18) - 0.65, p- 0.80. A MANOVA for the way interests are balanced by process
architectures according to the participants shows a trend: F(1,63) - 4.72, p- 0.03 in favour
of the experimental group (see means in Table 1).
For the participation, the observation scores again indicate that there is no difference
between the two groups in the first meeting. For the second sounding-board meeting, one
municipality from the experimental group does score higher. Furthermore, two of the
process architectures from the experimental group scored higher than those of the control
group.
There was no difference between the two groups' perception of the way they contrib-
uted to the meetings. Only for the process architecture did the experimental group score
somewhat higher. A repeated measures ANOVA for the two meetings suggest no signifi-
cant main effect of time F(1,18) - 0.86, p - 0.37 or of treatment F(1,18) - 0.29, p- 0. 55.
There is no significant treatment effect F(1,18) - 0.86, p- 0.37. A MANOVA for the
survey results on the process architectures for this issue show no difference between the
groups: F(1,63) - 1.76, p - 0.19.
Communication in the sounding board of the experimental group faíred better in both
meetings in only one of the municipalities: a difference too sma11 to be significant. For the
process architecture, the observation scores were low overall. However, two of the three
municipalities from the experimental group did pay somewhat more attention to communi-
cation than the control group did.
A repeated measures ANOVA for the survey results on communication in the two
sounding-board meetings showed no significant main effect for time F(1,18) - 0.00, p-
0.78, but a trend for treatment F(1,18) - 6.5, p- 0.02. There was no significant interaction
effect: F(1,18) - 0.08, p- 0.77. In both meetings, the experimental group did not score
significantly higher on communication than the control group (] th sbm: T(1,20) --1.35, p
- 0.19; and 2th sbm, T(1,18) --1,48, p- 0.16. A MANOVA for the results on the process
architectures also indicate for the product they made, an absence of a significant difference
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between the two groups: F(1,63) - 1.5, p- 0.23.
Finally, the observation outcomes suggest no significant difference between the two
groups in the way the process was managed in the first meeting. In the second sounding-
board meeting however, the experimental group did score higher on process management
(in two of the three municipalities). Furthermore, the experimental group also provided
better preconditions for future process management in their process architecture (again, in
two of the three municipalities).
The repeated measures ANOVA for the two meetings for process management
confirm what Table 1 suggests: there is no significant main effect for time between the two
groups: F(1,18) - 0.30,p - 0.59; nor is there a main effect for treatment: F(1,18) - 2.88, p
- 0. 84. An interaction effect is also absent F(1,18) - 0.041. p- 0.85. The way the groups'
process architectures managed the future process - although suggesting a trend - did not
differ significantly, according to the survey results: F(1,63)- 3.49, p - 0.07. As the obser-
vation data suggest, the experimental group also scored higher in the participants' own
perceptions.
2 Problem structuring of the light pollutiou issue
2.1 Introducing the issue
The Society of Transfer, the industrial park situated on the westside of Beneveld, has
designed a plan to increase the light intensity on their estate. There have been a number of
burglaries. In addition to the need for more security, the safety of people working the night
shift is also a reason why Transfer wants more lighting. However, the inhabitants of the
neighbouring municipality, Calimus, have complained about sleeping disorders and other
related health problems. Coincidently, Beneveld has been selected to engage in a pilot
project to develop a new policy to reduce light pollution.
2.2 Results of the experimentfor the light pollution issue
Table 2 gives an overview of both the observation and survey results for the light pollution
issue. These outcomes will be discussed here briefly.
The observation results on aspect differentiation for the first sounding-board meeting show
little difference between the two groups. In the second sounding-board meeting, the experi-
mental group seems to have a somewhat richer understanding of the policy issue. For the
process architectures, it is, however, the control group which demonstrates a richer under-
standing of the future process than the control group.
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Table 1 Problen: structurin~ accordinQ to 6 criteria in the lieht Dollution issue
observation results survey results
control group experim. group control group experim. group
municipality 1 2 3 4 S 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
aspect sbml 39 56 69 57 53 56 3.0 2.5 2.0 3.8 3.3 3.8
diffec 164 166 1.7 1.3 0.8 o.s o.s l.o
sbm2 21 33 24 23 35 27 4.3 3.3 4.0 3.5 2.0 3.8
78 gs o.s 1.3 0.0 0.6 0.0 l.o
pa 43 37 21 22 32 29 4.1 3.6 ! 3.1 3.1 2.9
107 85 0.3 l.o
l.z l.o 0.9
aspect sbml t t t t t t 4.0 3.0 2.8 4.0 3.5 3.8
integr.
0.0 f.4 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.5
sbm2 t t t - t f 4.3 4.3 4.5 4.0 2.8 3.5
0.5 I.0 0.7 0.8 1.1 0.6
4.1 4.0 I 2.5 3.2 3.2
Pa ~ f t t f f 0.5 l.0 I.3 1.0 0.7
balanc. sbml t t f t t f 3.3 3.3 3.8 3.8 2.8 4.3
interests 1.1 1.5 I.0 0.5 l.s 0.5
sbm2 t t t f } t 4.0 3.5 2.5 4.0 2.8 3.5
0.0 0.6 2.1 0.0 l.s 0.6
pa t t f t t t 4.1 3.5 I 3.0 2.9 2.8
0.5 l.2 !.1 !.0 0.9
partici. sbml t t } } f f 4.0 3.8 2.8 3.5 3.0 3.3
1.0 l.s 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9
sbtn2 t t t } f
~ 3.5 4.0 3.0 3.5 3.3 3.5
l.3 0.8 0.0 0.6 I.0 0.6
pa t ~-t t t t t 3,6 3.6 I 3.3 3.1 3.2
I.0 0.9 !.1 I.0 l.l
com. sbml t t t - t t 4.0 2.8 3.5 3.8 2.5 4.0
L0 L0 0.6 LO 0.6 0.8
sbm2 t t t t - t 4.3 4.8 4.5 4.3 2.8 4.3o.s o.s o.7 o.s o.s r.o
3 5 3.4 I 2.9 2.6 2.9pa t t t - f t .!.l 0.9 1.3 0.9 1.3
process sbml tt f t t t t 4.0 3.0 2.8 3.3 2.5 3.8
~a8. o.0 0.8 l.0 1.0 0.6 0.5sbm2 t t t t t t 4.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.3 3.8
0.8 o.s o.o l o l.s o.s
pa f~ } ~ - ~ f 3.4 3.6 ! 3.0 3.1 2.8
0.9 0.9 l.3 l.l LI
Legend: 1- number of aspects, 2- total number of aspects for the group, 3- mean, 4- standard
deviation
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The survey results are only partly in accordance with these findings. A repeated measures
ANOVA for aspect differentiation in the two sounding boards shows that there is no main
effect for time: F(1,19) - 2.95, p- 0.10. Neither is there a main effect for treatment:
F(1,19)- 0.37, p- 0.55. There is however, a significant interaction effect: F(1,19) - 14.3,
p- 0.001. This can be largely explained by the substantially higher score of the control
group in the second meeting when compared with the first meeting. In the first sounding-
board meeting the experimental group scores almost significantly higher. T(1,15) --2.7, p
- 0.015 (unequal variances). In the second sounding-board meeting, the control group
scores higher, but not significantly: T(1,19) - 0.023,p - 0.1.
A MANOVA for the process azchitectures indicate a significant difference between
the two groups: F(1,63) - 14.2, p - 0.002. It is the control group (see Table 2) which scores
higher than the experimental group.
The observation results for the criterion `aspect integration' suggest that there is no
significant difference between the two groups for either sounding-board meetings or their
process azchitectures.
A repeated measures ANOVA for the level of aspect integration - as perceived by the
participants - in both sounding-board meetings indicate no significant main effect of time or
treatment (F(1,19) - 2.51, p- 0.13, F(1,19) - 0.44, p- 0.52). However, there is a signifi-
cant interaction effect: F(1,19) - 8.7, p- 0.008. This effect can be lazge ascribed to the
increase in appreciation of the control group of the level of aspect integration between the
first and second meeting. For the first meeting, there is no significant difference between
the groups: T(1,21) --1.7, p- 0.11, For the second meeting, there is trend for the control
group: T(1,20) - 2.38, p- 0.03.
A MANOVA for the process architectures shows a significant difference between the
groups: F(1,63) - 23.9, p- 0.000. The control group again scores higher than the experi-
mental group.
Interests were, according to the observation outcome, almost equally well balanced by
both groups in the two sound boards and as well as by the groups' process architectures.
A repeated measure ANOVA for the survey results on balancing interests in both sounding-
board meetings shows no effect for time (F(1,19) - 0.06, p- 0.8), nor for treatment
(F(1,19) - 0.03, p- 0.8, and there is also no significant interaction effect: F(1,19) - 0.06,
p - 0.81.
A MANOVA for the process architectures does, however, suggest a significant difference
in favour (see Table 7.14) of the control group: F(1,63) - 15.4,p - 0.001.
The observation results indicate that, contrary to our expectations, in the first
sounding-board meeting, the control group participated more actively than the experimental
group. In the second sounding-board meeting, the two teams were equally active. One of
the three process architectures of the control group suggested a more active participation of
various interests in comparison to those of the experimental group.
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A repeated measures ANOVA for the criterion `participation' in the two sounding-board
meetings shows that there is no significant time effect (F(1,19) - 0.14, p- 0.71 and no
effect for treatment (F(1,19) - 1.12,p - 0. 30) Neither is there an interaction effect: F(1,19)
- 0.14, p- 0.71. In both instances, the control group scores higher than the experimental
group. A MANOVA for the process architectures suggests no significant difference be-
tween the two groups: F(1,63) - 3.0, p- 0.09.
Communication in the first sounding-board meeting was, according to the observation
results, evidently better with the control group. This was the case for all three municipali-
ties. For the second sounding-board meeting, only one of the three municipalities in the
experimental group communicated better: a difference too small to be significant. The same
result applies to the process architectures of the two groups.
A repeated measures ANOVA for the two sounding-board meetings shows a signifi-
cant effect for time: F(1,19) - 14.5, p- 0.001, no effect for treatment: F(1,19) - 0.84, p-
0.37; and a trend for the interaction effect: F- 5.2, p - 0.034. This can be largely attrib-
uted to the higher score of the control group for communication in the second sounding-
board meeting. In the first meeting, there is little difference between the two groups (T
(1,19) --0.1, p- 0.87). But there is trend that the control scored higher in the second
meeting: T(1,19) - 2.3, p- 0.03.
A MANOVA for the process architectures indicates a trend in favour of the control
group: F(1,63) - 5.9, p- 0.06. Summarizing, the survey results partly support the obser-
vation outcome.
Finally, the observation results for the sixth criterion `process management'. For the
two sounding boards, there seems to be no significant difference between the two groups.
Two of the three process architectures of the control group do manage future processes
better than those of the experimental group.
The survey results partly confiml the observation outcome. A repeated measures
ANOVA for the two sounding-board meetings show a trend for time (F(1,20) - 4.4, p-
0.05, but there is no significant treatment effect (F(1,20) - 2.50, p- 0.12 and no significant
interaction effect: F(1,20) - 0.5, p- 0.47. In both instances, the control group scored
higher, albeit not significantly.
A MANOVA for the survey results on how the process architectures arranged future
process management according to the participants indicates a trend in favour of the process
architectures of the control group: F(1,63) - 3.3, p- 0.08. The survey results in the case of
process management largely seem to underwrite the observation outcome.
3 Problem structuring ofthe A206 issue
3.1 Introducing the issue
The central government of the Netherlands has decided that a new motorway - the A206 -
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will be constructed. It will run through the western part of the municipality of Beneveld.
The municipality has been asked by the Ministry of Transport to decide upon the exact
location of the road. The road can be built either 200 metres left or right of the mapped-out
road the govemment has chosen. If the plan is unaltered, the construction of the road will
cause serious damage to a park of natural and historical value. Placing the road 200 metres
to the right will mean the loss of a fairly new sports complex, and it may cause noise
pollution for the neighbourhood the Braak. In Beneveld, the sounding board on public
works has been asked to look into the matter and assist in designing a process architecture
for the issue.
3.2 The results of the experiment for the A206 issue
Table 3 presents the observation and survey results for the A206 issue. These results will
again be briefly discussed for the six criteria.
According to the calculations which were based on the observation transcripts, the
control group had a slightly richer understanding of the issue in the first sounding-board
meeting than the experimental group. However, in the second meeting, and with their
process architectures, the experimental group had an increasingly richer understanding of
the issue in comparison to the control group.
A repeated measures ANOVA for the two sounding-board meetings show that there
are no main effects for time or for treatment: F(1,14) - 0.03, p- 0.86; F(1,14) - 0.21, p-
0.65. Neither is there an interaction effect: F(1,14) - 0.3, p- 0.61. A MANOVA for the
process architectures indicates that there is no significant difference between the two
groups: F (1,63) - 0.1, p- 0.78.
The observation results for aspect integration show that, in the first sounding-board
meeting, the two groups do not differ. In the second sound board meeting and the process
architectures two of the three municipalities in the experimental group scored higher on
aspect integration.
A repeated measures ANOVA for the survey results on aspect integration during the
two meetings demonstrates that there are no main effects for time and for treatment and no
interaction effect: F(1,14) - 0.16, p - 0.70, F(1,14) - 0.22, p - 0.65, F(1,14) - 0.16, p-
0.70 (respectively).
A MANOVA for the way the process architectures were perceived to integrate aspects
shows that there is no difference of significance between the two groups: F(1,63) - 1.1, p-
0.30.
The observation results on the way interests were balanced in the two sounding
boards and by the process architectures the groups designed indicate that there is a limited
difference between the two groups.
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Table 3. Results for the A206-issue (survey results are means and standarddeviations)
observation results survey results
control group experim. group control group experim. group
municipality 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
aspect sbml 54 49 72 37 60 71 3.7 3.0 3.7 2.3 4.0 3.0
differ. 175 168 0.6 1.0 0.6 l.1 l.0 l.6
sbm2 18 27 39 20 36 52 4.3 3.5 2.0 4.0 3.3 3.7
84 108 0.6 0.7 1.0 0.0 1.2 1.2
21 23 13 39 27 38 3.2 4.0 I 3.9 3.6 3.6pa
s7 103 1.0 0.6 L0 0.8 0.8
aspect sbml t t f t t t 3.3 3.3 4.0 2.0 4.0 3.0
integ.
0.6 0.6 l.0 l.0 1.7 1.4
sbm2 t t - t t t 4.0 4.0 2.7 4.0 2.3 4.30.0 0.0 I.S 0.0 l.s 0.6
3.2 3.8 I 3.6 3.8 3.8
pa - t t t f ~ 0.8 0.8 l.l 0.7 0.8
balanc. sbml t t t t } t 3.0 3.0 3.7 3.0 3.3 3.5
interests l.0 1.7 0.6 1.7 l.z t.3
sbm2 t } t t } } 3.7 4.0 2.3 4.0 2.0 4.0
0.6 0.0 l.s 0.0 I.0 1.0
pa t t t tt f t 3.2 4.0 I 3.9 3.3 3.1
0.9 0.9 I.0 0.9 0.9
partici. sbml t } t f t t 3.7 4.0 4.0 3.7 4.0 3.50.6 l.o o.o l.z r.o 1.3
4.0 4.5 3.0 4.5 3.7 4.0sbm2 f } t t t t o.o 0.7 l.o a.7 l.z l.o
3.2 4.0 I 3.8 3.8 3.2
pa t - f t t t 1.2 0.9 1.1 0.7 l.2
4.0 2.7 4.3 2.0 4.3 3.0
com. sbml t } f - f t 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.6 L3
3.7 5.0 3.3 4.5 3.0 4.3
sbm2 } t - } t t o.6 0.o t.s o.7 t.o oe2.9 3.9 I 3.5 3.6 3.4
pa ~ f f t f f I.0 0.8 l.i 0.8 0.9
3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 4.3 3.0rocessp sbml } } } } } } 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.2
manag. 3.0 4.5 1.7 4.5 2.3 3.7
sbm2 t } t t t t 0.0 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.6 1.2
2.9 3.8 I 3.9 3.6 3.4
Pa ~ - } } } } 0.8 09 1.0 0.9 0.9
Legenrl. I- number of aspects, 2- total number of aspectsfor the group, 3- mean, 4 - standard
devration
206
These results are confirmed by the survey results. A repeated measures ANOVA for the
way interests were balanced during the two sounding-board meetings shows that there is no
significant main effect for time (F(1,14) - 0.08, p- 0.79) and no main effect for treatment
(F(1,14) - 0.00, p- 1.0). The interaction effect is not significant either: F(1,14) - 0.0, p-
1.00. There is no difference between the two groups and their scores for both meetings. A
MANOVA for the process architectures shows no significant difference between the
groups: F(1,63) - 0.81,p - 0.37.
According to the observatíon outcomes, the participation of the two groups did not
differ significantly in the two sounding boards. However, two process architectures of the
experimental group ensured better future participation of the interest groups in comparison
with those of the control group.
A repeated measures MANOVA for the survey results from the two sounding boards
indicates that there are no significant main effects for time and treatment (F(1,14) - 0.00, p
- 1.00; F(1,14) - 0.11,p - 0.75). Neither is there a significant interaction effect: F(1,14) -
0.3, p- 0.62. A MANOVA for the process architectures shows that, contrary to what the
observations suggest, the participants ofboth groups do not value participatíon differently:
F(1,63)-O.O,p-0.98.
Communication during the two sounding-board meetings was, according to the
observation results, of similar quality. Furthermore, the process architectures of the two
groups also did not differ in the way they arranged future communication.
A repeated measures ANOVA for the survey results on communication in both
sounding-board meetings indicates that there are no main effects for time or for treatment:
F(1,14) - 0.07, p - 0.78. F(1,14) - 0.00, p- 1.0, respectively. Neither is there an interac-
tion effect: F(1,14) - 0.0. p- 1.0. A MANOVA for the way communication was supported
by the process architecture shows that there is little difference between the groups: F(1,63)
- 0.01,p - 0.91. Here, the survey results support the observation outcome.
Finally, the observation results indicate that process management did not differ
significantly between the two groups in the sounding-board meetings. Two process archi-
tectures of the experimental group did however, take better care of the way the future
process would be managed than those of the control group.
A repeated measures ANOVA for process management in the two sounding-board
meeting shows that there is no main effect for time and for treatment (F(1,13) - 0.6, p-
0.44; F(1,13) - 2.4,p - 0.11. In addition, there is no interaction effect either: F(1,13) - 0.1,
p- 0.92. A MANOVA for process management within the process architectures shows no
significant difference between the two groups: F(1,63) - 0.95, p- 0.34. This conclusion is
not in accordance with the observation findings.
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Appendix 2. General questionnaire (preceding the game~simulation)
1. What is your name?
2. What is your age? ~ 20-35 ~ 36-45 O 46-55 O 56-65
3. You are ~ female ~ male
4. For which type of organization do you work? .................................
5. What is your position? ..........................................................
6. How long have you been employed in your present position?
~ 0-3 jaar ~ 4-8 jaar ~ 9-12 jaar ~ meer dan 12 jaar
The following questions concern the policy issues which you come across in your position.
An example of the answer categories for question 7:
1 - very small
2 - small
3 - reasonably large
4 - large
5 - very large
7. In these issues the number of parties tends to be:
very small 1 2 3 4 5 very large
8. The number of interests involved tends to be:
very small 1 2 3 4 5 very diverse
9. The knowledge these issues require, tends to be:
not specialized 1 2 3 4 5 very specialized
10. The issues touch upon very fundamental questions and hence are very sweeping.
fully disagree 1 2 3 4 5 fully agree
11. The issues are:
not dynamic and familiar 1 2 3 4 5 dynamic and new
12. The way the issues are approached tends to be:
not interactive 1 2 3 4 5 very interactive
13. Do you think, that the problems for which your municipality develops policy are being made
sufficiently clear?
no 1 2 3 4 5 yes
]4. How well do you know the people who participate in the gamelsimulation`?
very poorly 1 2 3 4 5 very well
15. How do you judge the interests, the participants represent?
very homogenous 1 2 3 4 5 very diverse
16. Did you ever have a personality conflict with one or several of the participants?
never 1 2 3 4 5 often
17. Did you have differences of opinion conceming work content with one or several of the
participants?
never 1 2 3 4 5 often
Appendix 3. Evaluation tirst day of BANS
1. Which role did you play in the first round?
2. What was the issue you were involved in?
3. The content of the issue was:
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very simple 1 2 3 4 5 very complex
Please, explain your answer :.................
4. The number of interests involved in the issue was:
very small 1 2 3 4 5 very diverse
Please, explain your answer :.................
5. The interests involved in the issue collided:
hardly 1 2 3 4 5 very strongly
Please, explain your answer :.................
6. To what extent where the parties in the discussion led by their own interests?
very little 1 2 3 4 5 very much
7. The role norms and values play in the issue was:
very small 1 2 3 4 5 very large
Please, explain your answer :.................
8. The stakeholder analysis helped me structuring the issue.
fully disagree 1 2 3 4 5 fully agree
9. The sounding board is a useful instrument for policy development
fully disagree 1 2 3 4 5 fully agree
10. The process architecture is a useful instrument for policy development
fully disagree 1 2 3 4 5 fully agree
11. Has the oval-mapping technique offered you better insight in the issue?
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 yes, a lot
12. The oval-mapping technique is a useful instrument for policy development.
fully disagree 1 2 3 4 5 fully agree
13. Thanks to the ova]-mapping technique, mutual understanding was raised
fully disagree 1 2 3 4 5 fully agree
14. The oval-mapping technique reduced the contrast in interests.
fully disagree I 2 3 4 5 fully agree
Appendix 4. Evaluation BANS second day
l. Which role in BANS did you play in round 1? ...............................
2. In which issue were you involved in, in this round? ...............................
3. The content of the issue was:
very simple 1 2 3 4 5 very complex
Please, explain your answer :.................
4. The number of interests involved in the issue was:
very small 1 2 3 4 5 very diverse
Please, explain your answer :.................
5. The interests involved in the issue conflicted:
very little 1 2 3 4 5 very strongly
Please, explain your answer :.................
6. To what extent where the parties in the discussion led by their own interests?
very little 1 2 3 4 5 very much
7. The role norms and values play in the issue were:
very small 1 2 3 4 5 very large
Please, explain your answer :.................
8. In the gamelsimulation six criteria were presented to you which are relevant for policy
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development: indicate their relevance for policy development in your practice.
Aspect differentiation: the differentiation in ideas which are offered
unimportant 1 2 3 4 5 very important
Aspect integration: the logical clustering of ideas
unimportant 1 2 3 4 5 very important
balancing interests: the level in which different partial interests are taken into account
participation: the level in which parties actively take part
unimportant 1 2 3 4 5 very important
communication: the level in which parties listen and mutually understand to each other
unimportant 1 2 3 4 5 very important
process management: the level in which interaction leads to a positive results
unimportant 1 2 3 4 5 very important
9. The stakeholder analysis is a useful instrument for policy development.
fully disagree 1 2 3 4 5 fully agree
10. The policy table is a useful instrument for policy development
fully disagree 1 2 3 4 5 fully agree
11. Has the oval-mapping technique offered you better insight in the issue?
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 yes, a lot
12. The oval-mapping technique is a useful instrument for policy development.
fully disagree 1 2 3 4 5 fully agree
13. Thanks to the oval-mapping technique, mutual understanding was raised
fully disagree 1 2 3 4 5 fully agree
14. The oval-mapping technique reduced the contrast in interests.
fully disagree 1 2 3 4 5 fully agree
15. What do you think of the game~simulation?
not enjoyable 1 2 3 4 5 enjoyable
16. I found the first day of the game~simulation:
not instructive 1 2 3 4 5 very instructive
17. I found the second day of the game~simulation:
not instructive 1 2 3 4 5 very instructive
18. What was the most important you learned in the past two days?
19. Did the game~simulation offer you sufficient possibilities to experiment with a more
interactive style ofpolicy making
Totally unsufficíent 1 2 3 4 5 very sufficient
20. The facilitation of the game~simulation was:
very bad 1 2 3 4 5 very good
21. The evaluations in-between were:
not useful 1 2 3 4 5 very useful
22. The gaming materiai was:
very unaccessible 1 2 3 4 5 very accessible
23. What was unrealistic about BANS?
24. What was for you most valuable about BANS?
25. What is your most important point of criticism on the gamelsimulation?
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Appendix S16. Evaluation criteria firstlsecond sounding board meeting
1. In which issue were you involved? Housing coffee shops light pollution
A206
2. What is your position'?
3. Aspect differentiation: Are you satisfied with the differentiation in ideas which were
mentioned about the process architecture in the sounding board meeting?
very unsatisfied 1 2 3 4 5 very satisfied
4. Aspect integration: Are you satisfied with the way the various ideas were ordered?
very unsatisfied 1 2 3 4 5 very satisfied
5. Balancing interests: Are you satisfied with the way the various partial interests got a chance
in the meeting?
very unsatisfied 1 2 3 4 5 very satisfied
6. Participation: How was your own contribution - in terms of energy, money or time - to the
development of the process architecture during the sounding board meeting?
not active 1 2 3 4 5 very active
7. Communication: To what extent did participants listen to and show understanding for each
other?
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 a lot
8. Process management: To what extent are you satisfied about the way in which the meeting
was led?
very unsatisfied 1 2 3 4 5 very satisfied
Appendix 7 Evaluation process architecture
(This questionnaire consisted of four identical list for the process architectures for all four issues.)
1. Aspect differentiaton: Are you satisfied about the differentiation in actions and aims the
process architecture lists?
very unsatisfied 1 2 3 4 5 very satisfied
2. Aspect integration: The sequence of steps the process architecture presents are coherent.
totally disagree 1 2 3 4 5 totally agree
3. Balancing interest: Are you satisfied about the way in which the process architecture takes
account of the various interests involved?
very unsatisfied 1 2 3 4 5 very satisfied
4. Participation: To what extent will you support the process architecture in terms of for
instance money, time or energy?
not active 1 2 3 4 5 very active
5. Communication: Do you expect that as a result of the process architecture, the understanding
between the parties will improve?
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 tremendously
6. Process management: Is the way in which the process architecture arranges the interaction
between the parties effective?
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 highly
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Appendix S. Evaluation cit,y meeting
1. What is your position?
2. Aspect differentiation: Are you satisfied about the differentiation in ideas regarding the light
pollution policy which were put forward in the meeting?
very unsatisfied 1 2 3 4 5 very satisfied
3. Aspect integration: Are you satisfied about the way in which the various ideas were ordered
in the meeting?
very unsatisfied 1 2 3 4 5 very satisfied
4. Balancing interests: Are you satisfied about the way your interests were considered in the
meeting?
5. Participation: How was your own contributíon - in terms of for example energy, money or
time - to the meeting?
not active 1 2 3 4 5 very active
6. Communication: To what extent did participants listen to and show understanding for each
other?
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 a lot
7. Process management: Are you satisfied about the way in which the meeting was led?
very unsatisfied 1 2 3 4 5 very satisfied
Appendix 9. Evaluation questionnaire strategies
(This questionnaire consisted of three identical list for the strategies (maximum three) the
participants designed.)
1. Aspect differentiaton: Are you satisfied about the differentiation in actions and aims the
strategy lists?
very unsatisfied 1 2 3 4 5 very satisfied
2. Aspect integration: The chosen options and aims form a coherent unity.
totally disagree 1 2 3 4 5 totally agree
3. Balancing interest: Are you satisfied about the way in which the strategy takes account of
the various interests involved?
very unsatisfied 1 2 3 4 5 very satisfied
4. Participation: To what extent will you support the implemention of the strategy in terms of
for instance money, time or energy?
5. Communication: Do you expect that as a result of the strategy, the understanding bet,veen
the parties will improve?
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 tremendously
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Appendix 10. Participants' perceptions on policy instruments
The participants taking part in our quasi-experiment were asked for their opinion of a number of
policy instruments they worked with in the gamelsimulation. These results are briefly presented
here. On a 1-5 scale they express there view of how the various instruments assisted problem
structuring (stakeholder analyses) and policy making in general (sounding board, process
architecture and policy table) (1 - fully disagree, 5- fully agree). Furthermore, the participants
were also asked whether the ova] mapping technique contributed to a: more insight in the issue; b:
the policy making process; c: a greater mutual understanding, c: reduced conflict of interests. All
participants of both groups were reasonably positive about the contribution the process architecture
and the sounding board made to the policy making process. The experimental and control group
did not differ significantly in their appreciation of the these two instruments.
On the second day, the participants considered the other two instruments - the actor analysis and
policy table - as more useful for policy making than the oval mapping technique. A paired T-test
shows that experimental group values the actor analyses almost significantly higher than the oval
mapping technique in terms of its contribution to policy making (T(1,35) - 2.4, p- 0.02). The
policy table scores significantly higher (T(1,35), p- 0.005).
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9. Who chairs the meeting formally?
10 Who chairs the meeting informally?
11. Was the meeting well structured? Yes I somewhat I no
12. Did participants ask for information? Yes I somewhat I no
13. Did participants understand each other? Yes I somewhat I no
14. Did interests dominate the meeting? Yes I somewhat I no
15. Describe the atmosphere in which the
meeting took place: friendly~openl
enthusiastic~tame, passive, quarrelsome
16. Did someone adopt ideas of another
person?
17. Were compromises decided upon?
Describe these compromises
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Appendix 12. Data gathering and operationalization
12.1 Introduction
First, the way the data was collected is described. Apart from survey questionnaires,
observations played an important role in the data collection. The way the rich material
which the observation and survey data provided was analysed and condensed, is illustrated.
Section 12.2 provides an overview of the operationalization of the six quality criteria in
indicators and items. Finally, we will conclude with an brief evaluation of our approach.
I2.1.1 Data collection
Two sets of data were collected with the game~simulation. Players filled in questionnaires
during and after the gamelsimulation (see appendix 2-9). Observers filled in a questionnaire
(see appendix 11) after the meetings they observed. Furthermore, they wrote down the
conversations of the players during those meetings.
The observers were trained with the aid of a video which was developed for training
communication techniques. It contained several scenes of ineetings in which different
topics were discussed and social-emotional relationships were depicted. The meetings on
the video were analysed and scored by the observers with the aid of appendix 11.
Subsequently, differences in the observation protocol were discussed in order to reach
consensus. Some of the items in the observation questionnaire referred to behaviours such
as `mutual understanding' which are difficult to operationalize straightforwardly. The
training was important in establishing a common understanding about the concepts the
items introduced.
During the game runs, there were four observers, two of which had to be replaced for the
last two runs. Those observers which took part in the first four runs were the first team and
those taking part in the last two runs formed the second team. The experienced observers
also took part in the training of the new observants. During the training the observers
obtained similar scores for most items. However, in both teams, one observer scored
somewhat differently on two of the items. In the first team training, the items on
emphasizing personal interest and common interest were discussed extensively. In the
training of the second team the level in which `interests dominated the meeting' and the
atmosphere of the meeting were addressed. Because each observer worked with different
teams, no post-hoc interobserver reliability could be assessed.
12. l.l Data analysis
The observation protocols which were written during the experiment (consisting of the
observation questionnaire and the observation text) were first worked out by the observers
and then discussed with the researcher and the observers in order to obtain a first diagnosis
of the important events and characteristics of the runs. Subsequently, six extensive reports
(report 1) (approximately 45 pages per run) were written containing the results of the
observation questionnaire and an elaborate chronological summary of the protocol texts of
the issues of the first day and the second day. On the basis of this report, a summary was
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made of the similarities and differences in how the issues evolved in the six runs. This
second report ( report 2) - containing approximately 5-7 pages- summarized for the gamed
policy issues: the most important themes which surfaced in the discussion on the issue; the
interaction which evolved between the participants, and social-emotional characteristics
which dominated the process (e.g., dispute or tension, or a very constructive approach).
This report offered the researcher an informed understanding of the 6 ( municipalities) x 4
(issues on the first day) f 6(municipalities on the second day) - 30 cases which did both
justice to the richness of the data and yet satisfied the need for conciseness required for
providing the various cases with a basic identity. The researcher could thus develop a better
understanding of the material. Our whole approach of data collection and analyses can be
placed within the tradition which Glaser and Strauss (1967) have coined as `grounded
theory'. A priori assumptions only in part guided the analyses for they also are developed
from the data through the identification of themes and concepts.
Finally, a third report ( report 3) was written containing for every step of play, the
observation text and the observation questionnaires in terms of the six criteria for problem
structuring. Items were categorized according to the corresponding quality criteria. In
addition, by means of cross-check, the observation text was also analysed for statements
which corresponded with the quality criteria. The following section gives an overview of
the different indicators and corresponding type of statements which were taken from the
text.
In order to reduce the amount of data further, three measuring points were chosen over
the day which corresponded with the most important steps-of-play in the game. For the first
day these were the two sounding board meetings and the process architecture. The latter
was a process plan the policy makers designed which specified a set of sequential actions,
corresponding responsible actors and aims. It was the product the different groups of policy
makers had worked on during the day. For the second day, the city and strategy meeting
and the two policy products, policy table and strategies were chosen as measuring points.
The policy table is an instrument which assists participants in structuring aspects in aims,
options and decision areas. Participants are encouraged to choose the main aim of the
policy and consider the most important options in each decision area. A decision area is a
category identifying various alternative options. For instance in the light-pollution case, if
safeguarding the environment is the main aim, within the decision area light intensity the
option lower level of lux will be chosen as opposed to a higher level of lux. The policy
table and strategies are policy outputs which were developed during the day. Our
assumption is that improved problem structuring should result in a higher quality policy
outcome.
For the specified measuring points the six criteria were assessed. Aspect differentiation
and aspect integration were analysed with the aid of report 1 which provided a full account
of the conversations ( see 12.2 for the scoring categories). This report provided the most
detailed information about the different ideas which surfaced and the way they were
connected. In order to assess `aspect differentiation' the number of different aspects were
counted in both the observation text for the meetings, and in the policy products, i.e.,
process architecture and policy table.
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The group maps developed in the experimental group served as a starting point for
assessing `aspect integration'. Aspect integration refers to the level in which the different
aspects were linked in a logical and meaningful way. The observation text of each
municipality in the control group was analysed and constructs were drawn and linked by the
researcher on the basis of report 1. In this way the researcher constructed group maps for
the control group which were then compared with those made by the experimental group.
For the scoring of `balancing interests', `participation', `communication' and `process
management' report 3 was used. This report gives an overview per municipality of these
four criteria. It contains the items from the observation questionnaires, and statements
deduced from the observation text. Again, the meetings and policy products of all six
municipalities were scored on the basis of the method which is presented in section 12.2.
The information in the protocol text which did not correspond with the chosen measuring
points - e.g. the bilateral meetings which preceded the sounding board meetings - was used
to provide a context - a background and history (cf Eden and Ackermann, 1999) - for the
meetings and policy products which were analysed. In order to understand certain
developments in a policy process better it can be important to analyse the developments
which preceded them. For instance, the antagonistic behaviour of a player in a sounding
board meeting can be better understood when it can be traced to a disrespectful remark of
the other players in a previous encounter. For each quality criterion there were several
indicators. We combined the scores on each indicator into one score using a simple ordinal
scale: f}, ~-, f, -.
In order to check the consistency of the method, a cross-check was made comparing all
the scores of a municipality per quality criterion. This face-validation procedure helped us
in finding out whether the adding procedure did result in a valid ranking of the
municipalities for the criterion.
12.2 Operationalization of the six criteria
12.2. I. Aspect differentiation
Aspect differentiation refers to the number of different ideas the group of po]icy makers
expresses in organized meetings or in policy products, such as the process architecture,
policy table and strategies.
Indicators
l. stakeholders: number of different organizations, groups, institutions or
functions. groups and functions can be part of a particular
organization but are counted separately: e.g. mayor 8c alderman
of economic affairs - 2; 8t council of aldennen and mayor - 3;
8t industry - 4;
2. process aspects: different actions which can contribute to the design of actions
directed at policy making which do not directly contribute to
solving the policy issue: e.g., making rules - 1, time planning -
2, financing process - 3;
3. content aspects: different aspects referring to issue substance and not to process
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characteristics: e.g., intensify light - 1 and sleeping problems - 2
and invest in light - 3.
observation data
Measuring aspect differentiation in sounding board meeting 1(cf Chapter 7)
1. stakeholders 8z 2. process aspects 8c 3. content aspects: all three categories are added up
Measuring aspect differentiation in sounding board meeting 2~ process architecture
1. stakeholders 8c 2. process aspects are added up.
Measuring aspect differentiation in the city meeting (round 2)
1. aspects: all stakeholders, process and content aspects are calculated together, without
making a distinction between these kinds ofaspects
Measuring aspects in the policy table
1. number of different goals
2. number of different decision areas
3. number of different options
survey data
Measuring aspect differentiation in sounding board (sbml, sbm2) Icity meetings
1. stakeholders 8z 2. process aspects 8c 3. content aspects:
are you satisfied with the diversity of ideas mentioned regarding
the process architecture (sbml, sbm2)I regarding the issue, i.e.,
the light pollution policy put forward in the city meeting. (1 -
very unsatisfied, 2- unsatisfied, 3- not (un)satisfied, 4-
satisfied, 5 - very satisfied).
Measuring aspect differentiation in process architecturelstrategies
2. process aspects óc 3. content aspects
are you satisfied with the diversity in actions and aims the
process architecture~strategy lists? (1 - very unsatisfied, 2-
unsatisfied, 3- not (un)satisfied, 4- satisfied, 5- very
satisfied).
12.2.2 Aspect integration
Aspect integration refers to meaningful linking of aspects into concepts and concepts into
ideas and ideas into views of policy issues or policy processes. The connection policy
makers make between aspects creates a clearer view of the issue~policy process. Hence, not
all linking is inherently positive. The link should add information. For the scoring of the
sounding board meetings and city meetings the group maps were used.
Indicators
1. logically linking: A link between aspects or concepts. Connecting totally unrelated
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aspects such as a parking problem in a city centre and lacking
youth facilities in suburbs is not a logical relationship.
2. chains of concepts: Concepts are linked sequentially into strings, which connect one
to another which is in turn connected to another.
Observation data
Measuring aspect integration in the sounding board meetings
1 8t 2: logical linking into chains ofconcepts
- one or more heads (ultimate goals policy makers wish to
pursue, they contribute meaning)
- number of clusters ofconcepts
- size of clusters (small I medium I large)
- parallel vs sequential linking
- number of logically linked concepts of actions which
contribute to the process architecturel policy plan
- interlinking ofclusters and linking to heads
poorly integrated aspects: no heads andlor, a variety of predominantly small clusters of
concepts which are hardly linked (neither to a head nor to other
concepts), or a reasonable percentage (approximately 200~0 or
more) of unlinked concepts (orphans)
reasonably integrated aspects:- one or more heads 8c a number ofclusters
- no heads óz a few small~ medium size clusters, one small -
more parallel than sequential linked - cluster of concepts
contributing to the P.A~policy
well integrated aspects: one or a few heads 8c few mediurr~large size clusters 8t a small
or medium size - sequential linked - cluster which contributes to
the P.A~policy 8z some interlinking
very well integrated aspects: one or a few heads 8z few medium or large size clusters á a
lar-
ge size cluster which contributes to the process
architecturelpolicy 8z considerable interlinking
l~ieasuring aspect integration in the process architecture
1 8t 2: logical linking into chains of concepts
- horizontal linking: specifying actions, corresponding responsible stakeholders and
corresponding aims
- vertical linking: - each step of the process architecture contributes to the
previous step (good sequencing)
- number of steps
poorly integrated aspects: no horizontal linking, no vertical linking
reasonably integrated aspects: no horizontal linking 8z reasonable vertical linking, i.e., good
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sequencing 8z few steps good horizontal linking 8i poor vertical
linking i.e., poor sequencing óc few or reasonable number of
steps
well integrated aspects: good horizontal linking 8c good vertical linking, i.e., good
sequencing 8z reasonable number of steps
very well integrated aspects: good horizontal linking 8t good vertical linking i.e., good se-
quencing 8z high number of steps
Measuring aspect integration in the policy table
1. logical linking realization of one policy table which integrates all aspects in
terms of aims, options and decision areas produced in the city
meeting
poorly integrated aspects aspects are integrated in more than one policy table
well integrated aspects all aspects are integrated in one policy table
survey data
Measuring aspect integration in a sounding boardlcity meeting
2. logical linking are you satisfied with the way the various ideas were ordered? (1
- very unsatisfied, 2- unsatisfied, 3- not (un)satisfied, 4-
satisfied, 5 - very satisfied)
Measuring aspect integration in the process architecture
1 8c 2: logical linking in chains of aspects
The sequence of steps the process architecture presents are
coherent. (1 - totally disagree, 2- disagree, 3- not (dis)agree, 4
- agree, 5 - totally agree)
Measuring aspect integration of the strategies
1. logical linking The chosen options and aims form a coherent unity. (1 - totally
disagree, 2- disagree, 3 not (dis)agree, 4- agree, 5- totally
agree)
12.2.3 Balancing interests
Balancing interests refers to level in which policy makers weigh the different interests
which are involved in the issue.
Indicators
1. attention paid to personal interests
2. attention paid to common interests
3. contention of interests
4. willingness to consider other interests
poor balancing of interests: attention is paid to personal interests, little attention is paid to
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common interests, unwillingness to consider other (or a
particular) interests, strong contention of interests
reasonable balancing of interests: attention is paid to personal interests, reasonable attention
is paid to common interest, there is some willingness to consider
other interests, reasonable contention of interests
good balancing of interests: reasonable (or no) attention is paid to personal interests,
reasonable~good attention is paid to common interest, there is
considerable willingness to consider other interests, limited
contention of interests
very good balancing of interests: reasonable (or no) attention is paid to personal interests,
good attention is paid to common interests, there is a strong
willingness to consider other interests, limited or no contention
of interests
Measuring balancing interests in the meetings
1. attention paid to personal interests (item observation questionnaire)
- the level in which someone advocates his~her personal
interests (yes, reasonable, no)
2. attention paid to common interests (item observation questionnaire)
- the level in which someone advocates common interests
(yes, reasonable, no)
3. contention of interests
- interests dominated the meeting (item observation
questionnaire)
- statements in the observation text indicating a strong defense
of interest and a collision of interests
4. willingness to involve other interests
- statements from the observation text indicating a stakeholder
wants to or refuses to consider other interests
Measuring balancing interests in the process architecture
2. attention paid to common interest 8z 4. willingness to involve other interests
- number of different interests (stakeholders)
- time in trajectory when stakeholders become involved
Measuring balancing interests in the policy table
2. attention paid to common interest 8r. 4. willingness to involve other interests
- number of different interests (stakeholders)
survev results
Measuring balancing interests in the sounding board meetings
2. attention paid to common interest 8c 4. willingness to involve other interests
Are you satisfied with the way the various partial interests were
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being paid attention to in the meeting? (1 - very unsatisfied, 2-
unsatisfied, 3- not (un)satisfied, 4- satisfied, 5- very satisfied)
Measuring balancing interests in the city meeting
2. attention paid to common interest 8z 4. willingness to involve other interests
Are you satisfied with the way your interests were being paid
attention to in the meeting? (1 - very unsatisfied, 2- unsatisfied,
3- not (un)satisfied, 4- satisfied, 5- very satisfied)
Measuring balancing interests in the process architecturelstrategy
2. attention paid to common interest 8c 4. willingness to involve other interests
Are you satisfied about the way the process architecture~strategy
takes account of the various interests that are involved? (1 - very
unsatisfied, 2- unsatisfied, 3- not (un)satisfied, 4- satisfied, 5
- very satisfied)
12.2.4 Participation
Participation refers to `the level of active involvement' of participants involved in policy
meetings and in the future process, as specified by policy products such as the process
architecture or policy strategies.
Indicators
1. direct participation, i.e. talking, asking for clarification, contributing ideas.
2. willingness to invest means such as money, time, energy
3. pointing out the importance that 3(other) stakeholders should have the possibility to
participate
low level of participation: direct participation is limited, stakeholders are reluctant to invest
and do not ask for the active involvement of(other) stakeholders
reasonable level ofparticipation: direct participation is reasonable, stakeholders are some-
what reluctant to invest in future policy and pay somewhat
attention to the active involvement ofother stakeholders
high level of par[icipation: direct involvement is high, stakeholders want to invest in future
policy, they pay attention to the active involvement of other
stakeholders
very high level ofparticipation: direct involvement of participants is high, they indicate
they want to pay and invest otherwise considerable in future policy and
are eager to invite (other) stakeholder to become very actively involved
obsen~ation data
Measuring participation in meetings
1. direct participation (items observation questionnaire)
- amount of talking of individual participants (a lotlreasonable
little)
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- extent to which participants asked others for information
(yes~somewhaUno)
- group attitude (e.g. active, reluctant)
- dominating participant(s)
2. willingness to invest means
- statements from the observation text indicating a stakeholder
will in future invest money, time or energy in the policy-
making process
3. pointing out the importance of participation of other stakeholders
- statements from the observation text indicating that other
stakeholders should be actively involved in the process
Measuring participation in the process architecture
1. direct participation (not applicable)
2. willingness to invest means
- type of involvement: - low involvement: more passive forms of participation such as
receiving information through newsletters or in hearings
- high involvement: more active forms of involvement, i.e.,
partaking in option generation ofdecision making
- instance of involvement:- low involvement: late involvement
- very high involvement: early involvement
3. involving other stakeholders actively
- low involvement: involving only representatives of the
municipality actively
- high involvement: involving representatives of various
stakeholders besides representatives of the municipality actively
survey data
Measuring participation in the sounding boardlcity meeting
1. direct participation 8r. 2. willingness to invest means
My contribution in terms of money, energy or time to the
development of the process architecture I in the city meeting (1 -
not active, 2- little active, 3- reasonably active, 4- active, 5-
very active)
11~easuring participation in the process architecturelstrategies
2. willingness to invest means
Extent to which you will support the process architecture~ the
implementation of the strategy in terms of money, time or
energy (1 - not active, 2- little active, 3- reasonably active, 4
- active, 5 - very active)
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1 Z.2.5 Communicatloit
Communication is constructive interaction between policy makers who demonstrate
openness and attention.
Indicators communication
1. listening, i.e. paying attention to what is being said:
e.g. - let people finish speaking
- ask questions of clarification
- not reading or gazing in opposite direction
2. mutual understanding, i.e., demonstra[ing consideration for the position of the other one
3. friendly~positive atmosphere (i.e., no quarrels or fights, no personal attacks but smiling,
and positively co-working people)
poor communication: - participants do not listen or listen reasonable
- mutual understanding is poor
- the atmosphere is quarrelsome
reasonable communication:- participants listen well or reasonable
- mutual understanding is reasonable
- atmosphere is not quarrelsome nor openlenthusiastic
good communication: - participants listen well
- mutual understanding is reasonable or well
- the atmosphere is open or reasonably open~friendly
very good communication:- participants listen well
- mutual understanding is well
- the atmosphere is open and very constructive
Observation data
Measuring communication in meetings
1. listening 8c 2. mutual understanding 8z 3. friendly~unfriendly atmosphere
Measuring future communication in the process architecture
The way 1. ]istening Rc 2. mutual understanding 8i 3. friendly~unfriendly atmosphere are
an-anged for the future:
- activities directed at providing information, realizing mutual
understanding andlor support
- communication is explicitly addressed
- instances in which activities referred to here occur in sequential
steps of the PA
survey results
Measuring communication in meetings
1. listening 8z 2. mutual understanding
To what extent did participants listen to and show understanding
for each other? (1 - not at all, 2- little, 3- reasonable, 4-
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considerable, 5 - a lot)
Nleasuring future communication in the process architecture~strategies
2. mutual understanding Do you expect that as a result of the process
architecturelstrategies the understanding between the parties will
improve? (1 - not at all, 2- little, 3- reasonable, 4-
considerable, 5 - a lot)
12.2.6 Process n:anagement




2. structuring direct communication
3. structuring communication beyond meetings
poor process management: no leadership, poorly structured direct communication,
no structuring of communication beyond meetings
reasonable process management: leadership, reasonably structured direct communication,
no structuring of communication beyond meetings
good process management: leadership, good structured direct communication, limited
structuring of communication beyond meetings
very good process management: leadership, good structured direct communication, good
structuring of communication beyond meetings
Observation restslts
Measuring process management in the meetings
1. leadership (observation questionnaires: establishing who is leading and steering)
- who is the formal leader
- who is the informal leader
- extent to which a participant steers (little, somewhat, a lot)
2. structuring direct communication
- the meeting was structured (yes, somewhat, no) (observation questionnaires)
- statements indicating that the meeting was organized and that the leader:
e.g. - made sure all participant got their turn;
- summarized the discussion
- payed attention to the aim of the meeting
- introduced ideas to keep the communication going
- thanked people for their contribution
3. structuring communication beyond meetings
- statements indicating that the leader asked par[icipants to inform their rank and file and
??g
thus manage boundaries (cf Gray and Wood, 1991)
Measuring process management in the process architecture
1. leadership
- responsibility for different actions is specified
2. structuring policy making 8i 3. directly and beyond meetings
- informing relevant actors
- managing boundaries
- arranging coordination between actions
- promoting support
survey data
Measuring process management in the meetings
1. leadership 8c 2. structuring policy making directly in meeting
To what extent are you satisfied about the way in which the
meeting was led? (1 - very unsatisfied, 2- unsatisfied, 3- not
(un)satisfied, 4- satisfied, 5- very satisfied)
Measuring process management in the process architecture
2. structuring policy making directly in the meeting
Is the way in which the process architecture arranges the
interaction between the parties effective? (1 - very unsatisfied, 2
- unsatisfied, 3- not (un)satisfied, 4- satisfied, 5- very
satisfied)
2.3 Comments
The observation protocols provided a rich insight into the policy-making processes which
evolved around the issues we studied. The training of the observers and the fact that the
observation team conferred during and after the runs contributed to the reliability and
validity of the data. Although the observation text was not an exact representation of every
word spoken in the gamelsimulation, it did provide a good overview of the different ideas
which emerged and social-political and nonnative chazacteristics of the interactions.
On the whole more credit was given to the observation data in comparison with the
survey data. The participants had little time to reflect upon the questionnaires which they
answered during the game~simulation mostly on impulse. The data show that a considerable
number of participants differentiated little between the criteria while scoring for instance
the process architecture. Most importantly, the counting of aspects in the observation text
demonstrated that the way participants perceived aspect differentiation was not in
accordance with the figures which emerged from the researcher's calculation of aspect
di fferentiation.
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There are a number of lessons we learned from our research method. The observations
were very demanding. The observers had to pay attention to a lot of variables and were
really worn out at the end of the day. In future a less ambitious observation scheme would
be beneficial for the observers' working conditions.
Two observers per meeting would benefit the reliability and the validity of the data. But
the project was already very costly as it was. A lot of working hours were needed for
training the observerslfacilitators, for the sessions with the game~simulation and for
working out the observation protocol. Furthermore, there were substantial additional costs
because the runs were on locations across the country and lasted two days. However, a
choice for more observers would have interfered with the gamelsimulation' intention to
bring to life real policy-making processes.
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Samenvatting
Participatieve beleidsvorming mag zich verheugen in een groeiende belangstelling van
beleidsmakers en wetenschappers. Sommigen zien in deze benadering een mogelijkheid
om het democratisch bestel nieuw leven in te blazen en de burger nieuw vertrouwen te
laten krijgen in overheid en politiek. Een andere reden om voor een participatief
beleidsvormingstraject te kiezen is het feit dat de verschillende partijen die belang
hebben bij een beleidskwestie, belangrijke kennisdragers kunnen zijn. Beleidskwesties
kunnen erg complex zijn, zeker als veel belangen en partijen erbij betrokken zijn. Er
zijn verschillende methoden ontwíkkeld die beogen beleidsmakers te ondersteunen bij
het in kaart brengen van complexe beleidskwesties. Deze exploratieve studie probeert
een bijdrage te leveren aan het debat over participatieve beleidsvorming rondom
complexe kwesties en de betekenis die probleemstructureringsmethoden hierin kunnen
spelen. Hiertoe is een drietal onderzoeksvragen geformuleerd in hoofdstuk 1. (l.) Op
welke wijze kan de kwaliteit van probleemstructurering in inter-organisationele
beleidsnetwerken empirisch worden vastgesteld? (2.) Welke bijdrage leveren
probleemstructureringsmethoden aan de kwaliteit van probleemstructurering in
beleidsnetwerken? (3.) Hoe kan een spelsimulatie worden gebruikt voor het bestuderen
van probleemstructurering in beleidsnetwerken?
Uitgangspunt van de studie is een sociaal-constructivistische benadering van
beleidskwesties. Daarbij is een onderscheid gemaakt tussen drie dimensies van
complexiteit (zie hoofdstuk. 2). Cognitieve complexiteit verwijst naar de hoeveelheid
en aard van de informatie die nodig is om de kwestie te begrijpen. Cognitief complexe
kwesties kenmerken zich door een veelheid van variabelen waarover onduidelijkheid
bestaat en die op ondoorzichtige wijze met elkaar verbonden zijn. Sociaal-politieke
complexiteit verwijst naar het aantal verschillende partijen en de mate van
belangentegenstelling die een kwestie met zich mee brengt. Normatieve complexiteit
heeft betrekking op de controverse tussen de achterliggende normen en waarden van
de beleidsmakers die betrokken zijn bij de kwestie. Een beleidskwestie kan door één of
meerdere van deze dimensies worden gedomineerd. De participatieve beleidvormings-
trajecten die zich rondom dit soort kwesties ontwikkelen kunnen worden ontleed in een
drieta] stromen van activiteiten: probleemstructurering, beleidsontwikkeling en
implementatie. Was lange tijd een fasebenadering - waarin deze stromen elkaar
sequentieel in de tijd volgden - gangbaar in de bestuurskunde, hier wordt uitgegaan van
een zekere parallelliteit van activiteiten en een cyclisch proces. Probleem structurering
betreft al die activiteiten en interacties die gericht zijn op het signaleren, zoeken,
selecteren en bouwen van aspecten van een beleidskwestie en die beogen transparantie
en orde te realiseren.
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt een vijftal probleemstructureringsmethoden besproken:
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Group Model Building, Soft Systems Methodologie, Strategic Option Development and
Analysis (SODA), COMPRAM, en SAST. Deze methoden hebben een inter-
disciplinaïre achtergrond en hanteren een participatieve aanpak van beleidskwesties
waarbij diverse belanghebbenden worden betrokken. Een ander kenmerk is dat ze
gericht zijn op het bouwen van een model ofschema. Vanwege de inzichtelijkheid van
SODA, én het feit dat het goed aansluit bij de wijze waarop mensen zelf problemen
verwoorden, is een op deze methode gebaseerde interventie nader onderzocht. Het
hoofdstuk besluit met zes criteria - deze corresponderen met de drie eerdergenoemde
dimensies van complexiteit - aan de hand waarvan de kwaliteit van
probleemstructurering in een beleidsproces kan worden bepaald. Aspectdifferentiatie
verwijst naar het aantal verschillende ideeën. Aspectintegratie betreft de wijze waarop
deze ideeën op een logisch aan elkaar gekoppeld worden. Belangenafweging betreft de
wijze waarop de diverse belangen van organisaties ofgroepen die betrokken zijn bij een
kwestie worden gewogen. Participatie verwijst naar de mate waarin betrokken
beleidsmakers tijd, energie en geld investeren in het proces. Het criterium conununicatie
heeft betrekking op de mate waarin beleidsmakers naar elkaar luisteren en wederzijds
begrip tonen. Het zesde criterium, belangenafweging, heeft betrekking op de manier
waarop de communicatie tussen de actoren georganiseerd wordt.
Hoe een probleemstructureringsmethode deze zes kwaliteitscriteria beïnvloedt is
gemeten met behulp van een spelsimulatie (zie hoofdstuk 4). Deze spelsimulatie BANS
(Beleidsadviseur nieuwe stijl) werd ingezet als een quasi-experimentele omgeving.
BANS simuleert beleidsvorming in een gemeente en duurt twee dagen. Op de eerste dag
buigen de veertien spelers (wethouders, ambtenaren, een buurgemeente, een
industriepark en een welzijnskoepel) zich over vier beleidskwesties waarvoor zij een
procesarchitectuur dienen te ontwikkelen. Op de tweede dag krijgen de spelers te maken
met een beleidskwestie waarvoor een aantal strategieën ontwikkeld dienen te worden.
Het experiment was een `post-test only design'. Zes gemeenten deden eraan mee.
De teams bestonden naast ambtenaren, en soms ook wethouders, uit vier vertegen-
woordigers van profit en non-profit organisaties uit het gemeentelijk netwerk. Drie
gemeenten werden door vier facilitators ondersteund met een techniek die ontleend is
aan SODA, de `oval mapping' techniek van Eden et aL (1979, 1983, 1998)
(experimentele groep). De andere drie gemeenten in de controlegroep werden niet door
de methode ondersteund. Met behulpvan vragenlijsten en observaties werden gegevens
verzameld tijdens de zes runs.
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt een uitgebreidere beschrijving gegeven van SODA en de
stimulus die gebaseerd is op de `oval mapping' techniek, een onderdeel van de SODA-
methode. Kern van deze benadering is dat ideeën van mensen via een soort van doel-
middel ketens expliciet gemaakt worden. Wanneer een `plattegrond' van de gedachten
van een individuele beleidsmaker ofmanager wordt getekend, dan wordt dit aangeduid
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als een `cognitive map'. In sommige SODA-trajecten worden eerst door middel van
interviewronden met sleutelpersonen cognitieve kaarten gemaakt. Vervolgens maakt de
facilitator één groepskaart die in de groep wordt besproken. De kaart wordt aangepast
tijdens een uitvoerig onderhandelingsproces. Wanneer er onvoldoende tijd en~of
financiële middelen zijn worden er geen individuele kaarten gemaakt, maar wordt direct
gestart met het bouwen van een groepskaart. Dat kan op verschillende manieren onder
meer door de groep ideeën te laten opschrijven op ovalen kaartjes die direct op een
muur worden opgeplakt. Een vraag die op de muur geschreven is, daagt de groep uit na
te denken over een bepaalde kwestie. De ideeën worden vervolgens gestructureerd.
Deze `oval map-ping' techniek kent idealiter een cyclisch proces van ideeën genereren
en structuren en weer opnieuw ideeën genereren. De interventie in de spelsimulatie
bestond echter grotendeels uit één cyclus van ideeën genereren en structureren.
Hoofdstuk 6 geeft een beschouwing van de experimentele - en controlegroep die
op een aanta] kenmerken van elkaar verschilden. De controlegroep bestond uit grotere
gemeenten en veel vertegenwoordigers van strategieafdelingen van deze gemeenten.
Naast de onderzoeksgroepen geeft hoofdstuk 6 ook een overzicht van de
ontwikkelingen in het spel tijdens één van de zes runs. Hiermee biedt dit hoofdstuk een
kader voor de twee volgende hoofdstukken die voor elk kwaliteitscriterium een
overzicht geven van de observatie en survey resultaten voor respectievelijk de
coffeeshopkwestie - een van de vier beleidskwesties - van dag 1(hfd 7) en de
lichthinderkwestie, waarvoor op dag 2 beleid ontwikkeld wordt (hfd 8). In hoofdstuk
9 worden de conclusies gepresenteerd die hier kort worden weergegeven. Er wordt een
onderscheid gemaakt tussen een korte- en lange-termijneffect van de interventie. De
korte termijn verwijst naar de bijeenkomsten in het eerste dagdeel waarin de methode
werd geïntroduceerd. Bijeenkomsten midden op de dag en plannen die halverwege of
op het einde van de dag worden gepresenteerd, zijn als lange-termijn resultaten
aangeduid.
De interventie had op de korte termijn een negatief effect op aspectdifferentiatie.
De experimentele groep had in vier van de vijf kwesties een minder rijk beeld van de
kwestie dan de controlegroep. Op langere termijn had de experimentele groep echter
een rijker beeld. De groepskaart lijkt deelnemers te ondersteunen in het vasthouden van
ideeën. Er is een positief effect van de methodische aanpak via de `mapping' techniek
op de wijze waarop ideeën worden geïntegreerd (aspectintegratie). Dat geldt voor
zowel de korte termijn als de langere termijn. Dankzij het vroegtijdig zichtbaar
koppelen van ideeën treedt er als het ware een soort versnelling op. Wat
belangenafweging betreft zijn de resultaten tamelijk ambigu. Er is een lange-
termijneffect voor twee kwesties op de eerste dag en een kort-termijneffect voor het
beleidsvormingsproces van de tweede dag. Wat participatie betreft is er alleen op de
tweede dag een korte-termijn resultaat en voor beide dagen een lange-termijneffect wat
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de plannen betreft in vier van de vijf kwesties. De verschillen in de mate waarin beide
groepen een actieve bijdrage leveren aan het proces zijn redelijk bescheiden. Het effect
van de interventie op `communicatie' is gering. Slechts in één kwestie is er een effect
op de proces architectuur op het einde van dag 1. Op dag 2 is er een korte-termijneffect
maar halverwege de dag is de communicatie in de controlegroep juist beter. Ook voor
procesmanagement zijn de resultaten bescheiden. In twee kwesties is er voor de proces
architectuur (dag 1) een effect en voor dag 2 is er alleen sprake van een korte-
termijneffect.
De interventie die gebaseerd is op de `oval mapping' techniek heeft minder effect
dan in eerste instantie was verwacht. Het effect is het sterkst voor aspectintegratie
gevolgd door aspectdifferentiatie. Er is een bescheiden effect voor participatie en
procesmanagement en in mindere mate voorbelangenafweging. De techniek lijkt vooral
de cognitieve complexiteit van een kwestie te beïnvloeden en minder de sociaal-
politieke en nornlatieve complexiteit. Informatie wordt wel gedeeld doorparticipanten
en de interactie wordt door de groepskaart wel gestuurd, maar zij lijken zich niet echt
mede-eigenaar te voelen van de kaart.
Opvallend is verder dat de interventie in eerste instantie een negatief effect heeft
op de verscheidenheid aan ideeën die naar voren worden gebracht. Dit effect is
zichtbaar op zowel de eerste dag - waarop de techniek meer als een brainstorm-activiteit
is geïntroduceerd - als ook op de twee dag. De tweede dag lijkt meer op de nominale-
groepsaanpak. Het werken volgens een bepaalde structuur lijkt in eerste instantie
mensen te blokkeren in hun denken, maar het draagt er wel toe bij dat op de langere
termijn mensen ideeën beter vasthouden dan zij die niet met de `mapping' techniek of
methode ondersteund worden. De groepskaart lijkt te fungeren als een soort extern
geheugen.
Een aantal gemeenten van de controle groep slaagde er niet in op de afgesproken
tijd een plan te presenteren. Terwijl zij nog druk bezig waren met het ontwerpen van
een proces architectuur ofbeleidstabel, waren collega's van de experimentele groep al
klaar. De `mapping' techniek lijkt het beleidsvormingsproces te versnellen. Er zijn
evenwel alternatieve verklaringen mogelijk. De techniek biedt participanten een
structuur. Wellicht is het feit dat participanten een procedure kregen aangereikt - en niet
de techniek als zodanig - de reden waarom er sprake is van een versnellingseffect. Een
andere mogelijke verklaring is het feit dat de twee groepen verschilden. De controle
groep bestond uit mensen die vanuit hun functie eerder geneigd zijn holistisch te
denken. In deze groep werd analytischer en ook kritischer nagedacht terwijl in de
experimentele groep meer doeners vertegenwoordigd waren. Ook de invloed die de
facilitator heeft gehad op het proces zou een verklaring kunnen zijn. Het valt niet uit de
sluiten dat de facilitator de experimentele groep op de tweede dag sterk heeft
ondersteund. De exacte ondersteuning kon niet precies worden vastgesteld.
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Hierboven is al een indicatie gegeven van het verschil in het effect van de `mapping'
techniek voor beide speldagen. Op de eerste dag is het effect vooral zichtbaar in de te
produceren procesarchitectuur, terwijl de tweede dag een duidelijk korte-termijneffect
voor belangenafweging, participatie, communicatie en proces-management en een
lange-termijneffect voor aspectdifferentiatie, aspectintegratie en participatie laat zien.
Ook voor deze resultaten zijn verschillende verklaringen mogelijk. De kwesties op de
eerste dag verschilden in cognitieve en sociaal-politieke complexíteit van de kwestie
van dag 2. Op dag 1 waren bij iedere kwestie maar drie of vier participanten direct
betrokken, terwijl op dag 2 alle 14 spelers zich bogen over één kwestie. Het aantal
belangen en partijen evenals de hoeveelheid informatie verschilde als gevolg daarvan.
Wellicht is een zekere mate van complexiteit noodzakelijk wil de techniek effectiefzijn.
Een tweede reden is het verschil in oriëntatie tussen de twee speldagen. Op de eerste
dag bogen de beleidsmakers zich over het proces en op de tweede dag gingen ze echt
aan de slag met het maken van beleid voor de kwestie. Deze scheiding tussen proces en
inhoud en het denken over proces was voor de participanten lastig. Bovendien wordt
de oorspronkelijke ovalen techniek vooral gebruikt voor het in kaart brengen van de
inhoud van kwesties. Ook kan niet uitgesloten worden dat er sprake is geweest van een
leereffect. De deelnemers waren op de tweede dag gewend aan hun nieuwe omgeving
en hadden al ervaring met de techniek. Dit kan een verklaring zijn voor het korte-
termijneffect van dag 2. Een vierde verklaringsgrond is het feit dat probleem-
structurering in belang toeneemt in de eerste fasen van het beleidsvormingsproces en
na verloop van tijd in omvang afneemt. Een methode oftechniek die beoogt de kwaliteit
van probleemstructuring te verbeteren, zal dus eerst een toenemend effect laten zien en
daarna een dalend effect. Deze golft~eweging is inderdaad enigszins in de resultaten
terug te vinden.
Opvallend is dat de meetresultaten verkregen via de observaties nogal eens
verschilden van die van de vragenlijst. Op basis van de resultaten voor het criterium
aspectdifferentiatie is er voor gekozen de observaties als meer betrouwbaar te zien. De
mate van aspectdifferentiatie is voor de observatieprotocollen vastgesteld door
verschillende ideeën van participanten te tellen. De resultaten van deze meting waren
soms in tegenspraak met het oordeel van beleidsmakers die zelf veel positiever of
negatiever oordeelden over de eigen ideeënrijkheid. Ook het feit dat de analyses van de
observatieresultaten een veel uitgebreider afwegingsproces inhield dan het oordeel-
vormingsproces van de beleidsmakers is reden geweest meer waarde toe te kennen aan
de observatieresultaten. Het is de vraag of vragenlijsten die tevredenheid meten over
een bepaald beleidsinstrument enlof interventie, wel altijd even betrouwbaar zijn en of
ze inderdaad iets meer meten dan tevredenheid van participanten, bijvoorbeeld een
daadwerkelijke verandering in de beleidspraktijk.
Opmerkelijk is het feit dat in één van de kwesties op dag 1 de controlegroep beter
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presteerde dan de experimentele groep. In deze groep waren een paar beleidsmakers
actief die duidelijk ervaren procesmanagers waren en over goede onderhandelings- of
sociale vaardigheden beschikten.
In dit onderzoek speelde de spelsimulatie een sleutelrol. BANS stelde ons in staat
een beleidsvormingsproces via observaties op de voet te volgen. In de werkelijkheid zou
dat niet op deze wijze mogelijk zijn geweest, omdat veel interacties die van belang zijn
voor dit soort processen zich gelijktijdig of op onbereikbare plaatsen afspelen.
Bovendien gaat het bij trajecten in organisaties die ondersteund worden via methoden
als SODA niet zelden om vertrouwelijke zaken die organisaties niet graag aan de
openbaarheid prijsgeven. Een spelsimulatie maakt het mogelijk mensen te volgen en
hun gedrag en communicatie vast te leggen. Bovendien biedt het groepen spelers
vrijwel identieke omstandigheden waardoor het mogelijk werd een experiment uit te
voeren. Zo kon één groep worden ondersteund met de `mapping' techniek, en hun acties
en plannen worden vergeleken met die van een controlegroep. Een derde voordeel bood
de structuur van BANS. De spelstappen en de instrumenten zoals de procesarchitectuur
en de beleidstabel maakten het mogelijk om het proces en product van de
beleidsprocessen met elkaar te vergelijken. Tegelijkertijd was de rijkheid aan structuur
ook een nadeel. Het valt niet uit te sluiten dat het bescheiden effect van de interventie
deels verklaard kan worden door het feit dat de deelnemers door de structuurelementen
van het spel zelfook ondersteund werden in het beleidsproces. Bovendien werd BANS
aan de gemeenten aangeboden als een training in interactieve beleidsvorming.
Participanten waren daarom waarschijnlijk al meer genegen andere belangen in
ogenschouw te nemen en partijen actiever te betrekken. Probleemstructurerings-
methoden die mede dit soort gedrag proberen te bewerkstelligen kunnen dan ook
minder effect sorteren.
Een laatste nadeel is het feit dat een gesimuleerde beleidskwestie niet hetzelfde
is als een echte beleidskwestie in de praktijk. Voor de spelers waren de kwesties minder
idiosyncratisch dan de kwesties uit de eigen praktijk. Toch vonden de spelers de rollen
en kwesties realistisch. De wijze waarop het spel is ontworpen en het feit dat het spel
gespeeld werd met teams van beleidsmakers en vertegenwoordigers van profit en non-
profit organisaties droeg bij aan de externe validiteit van de spelsimulatie.
De resultaten van dit onderzoek roepen nieuwe vragen op over probleem-
structurering. Om deze vragen te beantwoorden is longitudinaal en vergelijkend
veldonderzoek naar probleem-structureringsinterventies gewenst. Dit type onderzoek
kan ons meer inzicht verschaffen in de betekenis van dit soort methoden. Door
veldonderzoek te combineren met experimenten kan sociaal-psychologisch onderzoek
naar het functioneren van groepen beter worden geïntegreerd in een multi-disciplinaire
aanpak. De door ons ontwikkelde kwaliteitscriteria kunnen ook in dergelijk onderzoek
van nut zijn. Op onderdelen is enige aanpassing wellicht wenselijk.
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Stellingen behorende bij het proefschrift: "Structuring Policy Issues " van Ellie Roelofs
1. Een probleemstructureringsmethode beïnvloedt vooral de cognitieve kenmerken van een
beleidskwestie en heeft veel minder effect op de sociaal-politieke en normatieve kenmerken
ervan.
2. Werken met een probleemstructureringsmethode hindert beleidsmakers aanvankelijk in hun
ideeënrijkheid maar na verloop van tijd is het effect op aspectdifferentiatie in het
beleidsvormingsproces positief, zij het in bescheiden mate.
3. Participatieve (beter bekend als interactieve) beleidsvormingstrajecten zijn uiteindelijk
contraproductief wanneer politieke - en ambtelijke besluitvormers de betrokken belangen
onvoldoende wegen, niet oprecht luisteren en weinig begrip tonen voor de positie van de
betrokken partijen.
4. Hoewel participatieve beleidsvorming veel belangstelling geniet is zij allerminst wijdverbreid
in de beleidspraktijk, dit in tegenstelling tot projecten rond vraaggericht organiseren. Cocoonen
is ook in overheidsland een populaire, immers een veilige, gedragskeuze.
5. Spelsimulaties bieden mensen een leer- experimenteeromgeving. Ze zijn levensecht omdat
mensen in hun handelen altijd geleid worden door hun persoonlijkheid, vaardigheden en
sociale status in de groep.
6. Win-win situaties zijn niet zelden een eufemistische aanduiding voor lose-less situaties.
7. De stelling dat de afwezigheid van een (substantieel) verband tussen variabelen in
wetenschappelijk onderzoek ook een resultaat is, wordt door wetenschappers zelfvaak alleen
maar met de mond beleden.
8. Ook in de wetenschap is de waarheid, indien al aanwezig, vergankelijk.
9. De Katholieke Universiteit Brabant heeft een opportunistische kijk op haar katholiciteit als ze
jarenlang mensen in ondersteunende functies via Melkertbanen werk maar geen arbeids-
contract aanbiedt.
10. "Es ist gleichwohl móglich, ...mit dem Herzen zu denken. " Rainer Maria Rilke (1998)
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